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Summary 
The economic analysis of conflict in Britain . has previously concentrated on 
examining aggregate strike frequency. The thesis recognises the limitations of this 
approach and argues for the investigation of a broader definition of conflict and at a 
more disaggregated level. While weakly encompassing previous theoretical work, the 
principal objective is to establish the patterns and trends pertaining to wider set of 
measures of conflict in post-war Britain. The empirical investigation of these 
disaggregated dimensions of conflict and their inter-relationships appears to have 
previously received only very limited attention. 
Following a critique of the extant theoretical and empirical literature, the first 
substantive chapter examines the traditional aggregate- econometric models of strike 
frequency. These are shown to be unsatisfactory in a number of ways. The chapter 
then turns to the central issue of the procyclicality of strikes. It is shown that while the 
total number of strikes is only very loosely related to the cycle, strikes arising over the 
level of remuneration bear a much closer correspondence with the level of economic 
activity and this finding accords with many of the theoretical models that have been 
proposed for strike. activity. The chapter concludes with an examination of a cyclical- 
political model of strikes within which the impact of the recent reforms in labour 
legislation is also investigated. 
One of the central arguments of the thesis is that the emphasis on strike frequency is 
inappropriate. This is most clearly illustrated by the fact that while strike frequency 
fell by almost one quarter between 1980 and 1984, the incidence of strikes at the 
establishment level actually increased by 45%. An examination of the determinants of 
the incidence of conflict activity forms the basis of the second substantive chapter of 
the thesis. As a subsidiary theme, the complementary nature of strike and non-strike 
action is also explored. 
The next chapter investigates the ceteris paribus differences in strike probabilities 
between the public and private sectors. While the levels of strike incidence and 
frequency appear to be much higher in the public sector, much of the divergence is 
found to be a consequence of differences in the characteristics of the two sectors. 
Additionally, when weighted by employment and/or union coverage, strike frequency 
is found to be lower in the public sector and, moreover, each of these strikes tends to 
be shorter and involve fewer workers. 
The final substantive chapter looks at the impact of strikes on industry output and 
efficiency. The structure of the model is novel in that a production frontier is 
estimated without having recourse to an explicit functional form for the inefficiency 
component. This is due to the availability of a panel of data in which the fixed effects 
can be viewed as capturing both the inefficiency term as well as the industry fixed 
effect. A second stage estimation is then used to identify each industry's level of 
efficiency. While strikes do not appear to reduce output in aggregate, there is some 
evidence to suggest that those industries which incur a large number of short strikes 
do have their output significantly disrupted. This loss of output also serves to make 
these industries less efficient in general. 
Thus a major conclusion is that a disaggregated approach is necessary in order that 
the multi-dimensional nature of conflict and the sectoral diversity in the incidence of 
industrial action can be investigated in a satisfactory manner. Any new theories of 
conflict will need to encompass the empirical findings of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction. 
The analysis of industrial conflict and its relationship to bargaining and wage setting 
is of major importance in developing an understanding of how labour markets 
operate. However, this area of study has been rather. disregarded, particularly research 
pertaining to conflict activity in Britain; there is no generally accepted. theory and 
extant empirical studies are of variable quality. That there have been significant 
changes in the patterns of industrial conflict in recent years can be in little doubt, but 
the nature of these transitions and their implications have not been studied in any 
depth. This thesis aims to redress these deficiencies in the literature. 
Before the nature, causes and consequences of these changes can be revealed, an 
acceptable methodological framework within which conflict activity can be examined 
needs to be defined. Industrial conflict. is multi-dimensional and yet the existing 
literature is dominated by studies of strike frequency. In part, this concentration on 
the number of strikes was due to limited sources of data. Such difficulties have been 
at least partially alleviated with the compilation of the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys, and the provision by the Department of Employment of the Industrial 
Stoppages Data Tapes which contain information on every strike recorded in Britain. 
These two sources allow a more extensive set of measures of conflict to be defined. A 
number of different dimensions of industrial conflict are considered in the following 
chapters of the thesis and, where appropriate, these are compared and contrasted with 
the traditional measure of strike frequency. One further weakness in the literature is 
that it is mainly descriptive, focussing on when, and under what circumstances, strikes 
;j 
i; 
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are more likely to occur. Thus the final part of the thesis examines the costs and 
consequences of strikes at a disaggregated level. A brief outline of each of the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis is provided in section 1.2. 
1.2. An Outline of the Thesis. 
Chapter 2 presents an overview of the theoretical literature on strike activity together 
with a selective review of the empirical studies. This review reveals several 
significant deficiencies in the body of research relating to industrial conflict; the 
adoption of models of strike activity which are derived under, assumptions 
inappropriate for the system of industrial relations that exists in Britain is particular 
unwelcome, as is the dominance of aggregate studies of strike frequency. The 
remaining four substantive chapters of the thesis seek to address these issues in 
particular by investigating the determination of more disaggregated measures of 
strikes and other forms of industrial action. 
Chapter 3 begins by examining the aggregate measures of stoppages published by the 
Department of Employment in the Employment Gazette since these have provided the 
basis for most of the previous studies of industrial conflict in Britain. However, there 
are several evident weaknesses in these data, in particular, in their extreme sensitivity 
to large strikes. The chapter then turns to a reassessment of the traditional 
econometric time-series models for post-war strike frequency in Britain. While, in 
general, these are unsatisfactory in their empirical performance, this does not preclude 
the claims for cyclicality in strike frequency. This issue is investigated explicitly in 
the chapter, while the importance of institutional considerations such as the recent 
changes in labour law is also highlighted. 
Chapter 4 is a study of the incidence of conflict at the establishment level' since this 
1. That is, the proportion of establishments incurring industrial action in the sample period. 
3 
seen to differ in important ways from strike frequency as a measure of the level of, 
and changes in, conflict activity. The importance of the evident transitions in " the 
structural, legislative and economic environment in the 1980s are discussed,. and the 
net changes in conflict incidence are apportioned to changes in industrial composition 
and changes in bargainers' behaviour. The relationship between strike and non-strike 
activity provides an subsidiary theme in this chapter. 
Chapter 5 considers the principal sectoral differences in strikes in its examination of 
the public and private sectors. Ceteris paribus differences in the incidence of strikes 
are computed, together with employment weighted measures of strike frequency. 
Using a combination of strike frequency and establishment-level strike incidence 
reveals the importance of examining a range of dimensions of conflict rather than 
focusing on one specific measure. 
The notion of 'incidence' being used in the thesis perhaps needs emphasising and 
clarifying at this. juncture. Some researchers would argue that the measure of strike 
activity which is of primary interest is strike incidence expressed as the number of 
strikes per bargaining group2. Since this is unobservable in practice, one interpretation 
of the numerous published studies on strike frequency is that this represents an 
imperfect approximation to the 'ideal' measure of strikes. Thus, according to this 
view, the probability of a strike at the establishment in the previous year (as reported 
in chapters 4 and 5) could be interpreted as a further, but still imperfect, proxy for the 
measure of fundamental interest. However, the thesis also argues for a wider 
interpretation to be given than this affords, for both previous studies and for those 
presented here. Different measures of strikes are of greater or lesser interest according 
to the purpose in hand. Thus, while the performance of the bargainers is probably best 
illustrated by the measure proposed above, workplace managers may be more 
2. Note that this cannot simply be interpreted as a probability as some have suggested since it is not constrained to 
lie in the (0,1) interval. 
4 
concerned with the proportion of establishments incurring strike action, while central 
government policy makers may only be concerned with the total number of strikes. 
The measures of strike Incidence' investigated in the thesis should best be interpreted 
in this manner,. that is, as complementary, but different measures of strike activity 
rather than purely as proxies for the number of strikes per bargaining group. 
Furthermore, the thesis is not only concerned with strike activity, but also with non- 
strike activity, and the relationship between these different manifestations of conflict. 
In addition, it should be noted that the thesis is concerned almost entirely with the 
frequency-incidence axis rather than the size or duration of stoppages. The latter in 
particular deserves much greater attention than has been afforded to date. Some 
preliminary work has been done on the analysis of strike durations utilising the 
Department of Employment Industrial Stoppages Data Tapes. However, due to the 
unavailability of the 1981 tape and data for . 1984 onwards, this material is excluded 
from the thesis. A summary is presented in Dickerson (1988,1989). 
While chapters 3, '4 and 5 investigate different measures of stoppage starts, chapter 6 
provides a distinct contrast in its examination of the costs and consequences of strikes 
for industrial production and efficiency. A novel approach is utilised which extends 
the traditional stochastic production function framework to explicitly investigate 
relative efficiency as the distance 'inside' the production frontier and the extent to 
which this is affected by high levels of strike activity. 
Finally, chapter 7 presents a summary of the major findings of the thesis together with 
some brief conclusions. 
I 
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CHAPTER 2 
=x , 
Industrial Conflict in Britain: an Overview and Critique öf the Theoretical and 
Empirical Literature A` e 
2.1. Introduction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide both context and motivation to the thesis. 
The primary objective, which derives from the appraisal of the empirical evidence 
and the extant literature presented below, can be usefully stated at this juncture. The 
thesis aims to redress some of the limitations and omissions in the plethora of studies 
pertaining to industrial conflict in Britain. In particular, it seeks to identify and 
establish the relevant 'facts' about conflict activity that successful theoretical models 
must be able to encompass and explain. In so doing, it demonstrates that the historic 
dominance within the literature of studies which examine aggregate strike frequency 
is myopic and arguably inappropriate. More recent studies in the US and Canada in 
particular have recognised this limitation and have investigated strike incidence and 
strike durations. Other dimensions of strikes, as well as non-strike activity, are also 
important in Britain and certainly warrant much greater attention than has been 
afforded to date. Finally, the level of aggregation typically employed in most previous 
studies unfortunately serves to obscure many of the important distinctions in patterns 
of conflict activity between industrial sectors and industries, and, moreover, mitigates 
against the development "of prescriptive and practical policy implications. Thus there 
is a need for a more disaggregated approach to the analysis of conflict activity. 
The remainder of this chapter establishes these general conclusions and suggests 
several primary areas for research, some of which form the bases for subsequent 
chapters of the thesis. Section 2.2 reviews the principal theoretical models proposed, 
6 
many of which originate in North America. Given the rather different system of 
collective bargaining and industrial relations which dominates the US and Canada 
(for example, and perhaps in particular, with regard to contract' formulation), the 
appropriateness of many of these models to strikes in Britain is questionable. Partly 
due to this and additionally because of deficiencies in the data available on strike 
activityl, many of the theoretical models do not 'have' empirical counterparts for 
British strike activity. Thus while the overview of the empirical literature in 
section 2.3 concentrates principally on Britain, reference is made to other countries 
(notably North America) for an assessment of some of the models as well as for 
comparison and contrast. Several fundamentally important areas for new research are 
identified following the examination of the existing literature in sections 2.2 and 2.3 
and these are highlighted within the discussion. Those on which the thesis 
concentrates are briefly summarised in the final section of the chapter. 
2.2. An Overview of the Theoretical Literature? 
Models of strike activity have concentrated on attempting to explain why strikes 
might occur. At first sight, a strike must be a Pareto inefficient outcome since both 
parties could be made better off by choosing the same settlement position but without 
undergoing the strike. Kennan (1986, p. 1091) calls this the 'Hicks Paradox', since 
Hicks was the first to state this basic result, albeit, only implicitly. Many models have 
attempted to explain this apparently non-rational behaviour by individuals and/or 
unions and firms. Much of the early theory was weak and fairly unsatisfactory, 
although more recent developments represent some considerable improvement. These 
later models consider a strike as a rational response to a lack of information by one of 
the parties involved in the bargaining process. 
The aggregate stoppages data for the UK is described and appraised in chapter 3. 
2. There have been several recent reviews of this literature, including Hirsch dt Addison (1986), Kennau (1986) 
and Sapsford (1990). 
7 
Given its origins, ' most discussions of strike behaviour begin with a 'reiteration of the 
well known Hicks' (1963) model in which the rates at which the employer and union 
make concessions in wage bargaining are positively related to the expected duration 
of the strike. Hicks noted that if both parties were equally well informed about these 
'concession curves' and the point at which they intersect, then a strikewill not occur 
since this settlement could be reached without incurring the costs associated with 
strike action3. The existence of the majority of strikes in this model is thus attributed 
to, 
"... the result of faulty negotiations... Any means which enables either 
side to appreciate better the position of the other will make a 
settlement easier, adequate knowledge will always make a settlement 
possible. " (Hicks (1963, pp. 146-47)) 
The only time that a strike may be advantageous according to Hicks was if the union 
was concerned with establishing or maintaining the credibility of the strike threat; 
"Weapons grow rusty if unused, and a Union ... will embark on strikes 
occasionally ... in order to keep, their weapon 
burnished for future use. " 
(Hicks (1963, p. 146)) 
The eventual settlement position and the way in which this might be attained was not 
examined by Hicks in any detail. However, a class of bargaining models has emerged 
which seeks to examine the way in which two (or more) parties might reach a 
settlement when there are net gains to be made by co-operative behaviour. Clearly, 
some consideration of the nature of the collective bargaining process is important for 
an understanding of why it sometimes fails to reach a settlement, but it is apparent 
that many of these game-theoretic models are highly abstracted and bear little relation 
to the 'real world'. Following the pioneering work of Nash (1950,1953), such models 
have been developed to a high degree of sophistication to include notions of 
3. That the occurrence of strikes is sub-optimal is made more explicit in the reinterpretation given to Hicks' model 
by Comay & Subotnik (1977). 
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commitment, time and, in particular, imperfect or incomplete informatic: 4 
Ultimately, however, these models have serious deficiencies as explanations of 
conflict activity. Although they are able to provide a determinate solution to the 
bargaining problem, this is at the cost of implausible axioms and unreasonable 
assumptions. Moreover, experimental tests conducted under strictly controlled 
conditions (a far cry from the practical realities of workplace negotiations) have 
shown that the models have some fundamental weaknesses in terms of predicting 
actual bargaining behaviour (see, for example, Roth & Malouf (1979), Malouf & Roth 
(1981) and Roth & Murnighan (1982)). Finally, and most importantly, these models 
typically examine the process by which the parties reach a settlement, and thus 
explicitly preclude strikes taking place. Even those models specific to union 
bargaining5 employ particular solution concepts which fail to encompass the 
possibility that a settlement may not be reached. The role of threats and counterthreats 
in the process of reaching an agreement is also neglected. 
In rather dismissive tones, Hamermesh (1973) suggests that 
"Bargaining theory contains few very interesting propositions that can 
be tested empirically. " (p. 1146) 
While this is debatable, of greater significance is that those models which do permit a 
breakdown in bargaining and allow a strike to occur invariably have to assume non- 
rational behaviour by at least one of the parties. Such an assumption is clearly 
unsatisfactory. In 'short, it is simply not possible to construct a bargaining model in 
which both sides behave optimally but the result is a Pareto sub-optimal 
disagreement. 
Thus it can perhaps be concluded that the primary importance of the pioneering work 
4. For selective surveys see, for example, Roth (1979,1985), Myerson (1984) and Binmore & Dasgupta (1987). 
S. For example, McDonald & Solow (1981), Oswald (1985) and, for a recent review of this class of models, Ulph 
& Ulph (1990). 
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of Hicks was to emphasise the role of information in bargaining; strikes in his model 
arise from imperfect or incomplete information which results in miscalculations by 
one or both parties. Almost all of the notable subsequent models have accentuated this 
informational aspect of Hicks' work, the best known of which is that of Ashenfelter & 
Johnson (1969). 
2.2.1. The model of Ashenfelter & Johnson. 
The publishing of the paper by Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969) marked a watershed in 
the economic analysis of strike activity for two principal reasons. Firstly, it made 
explicit the role of information in the- bargaining process and thus can be seen to 
provide the link between the seminal work of Hicks' and the more recent imperfect 
and asymmetric models discussed below. Secondly, it provided the first multivariate 
empirical ' analysis of' the determinants of strike activity, while being grounded in 
microeconomic theory. It heralded a plethora of similar studies, many of which 
modified and extended Ashenfelter & Johnson's model, and thus it deserves special 
consideration here, especially given the volume of criticism that it has attracted. 
Following Ross (1948), Ashenfelter & Johnson postulate the existence of three parties 
in collective bargaining; management, union leaders and . union members. They 
assume that, although the union's leaders are better informed about the firm's ability 
to pay a wage increase than the union's members, there will be occasions when they 
will prefer to take a strike in order to maintain their credibility, rather than settle for a 
lower wage than the rank and file expect. Strikes in this model therefore serve to 
deflate the (unrealistic) expectations of union members. The firm, having set a target 
wage and a strike length which it is willing to accept (in part this is a function of the 
concession rate of the union), simply waits until the union concedes sufficiently. 
Presumably, workers' expectations fall during the duration of the strike because they 
believe that the firm does not engage in bluffing. Whatever the rationale (and none is 
provided by Ashenfelter & Johnson), the outcome is modelled as a downward sloping 
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union concession schedule similar to that of Hicks. 
The model can be easily *summarised in the following fashion6. Let yo be the 
minimum wage increase acceptable to' the union membership without striking, and y. 
the lowest conceivable wage increase (which could be negative). Then the union's 
downward sloping concession curve can be written as 
ys =y+ (y0-y)exp(-as) (2.2) 
where a is simply the rate at which the wage increase, `ys, decreases during the length 
of the strike s. The firm simply seeks to profit maximise subject to this concession 
schedule. Its optimal strategy can be shown to be to set a target wage, yp which will 
be a weighted average of the maximum increase the firm can pay (that is, the rate at 
which the firm just breaks even) and the minimum 'acceptable increase to the 
union y., the weights depending on the concession rate of the union and the cost of 
waiting to the firm. 
If y0: 5 yT, then the firm grants the wage increase yo 'and no strike occurs. This is 
shown in the top panel of figure 2.1, which depicts the profit maximising position of 
the firm as being on the s=0 axis with profitability no. However, if yo > YT then a 
strike ' occurs of lengths+, ' with an eventual wage increase of y+. 'This combination 
yields a profit of n+ which is greater than that obtainable without a strike, no, as 
shown in the bottom panel of the figure. ' " 
While a discussion of the difficulties in formulating an appropriate empirical 
specification from Ashenfelter & Johnsons' model is reserved for section 2.3, their 
theoretical framework warrants some attention given its prominence in the literature. 
The model has been extensively criticised in this particular aspect on a number of 
grounds by several authors, but perhaps most vehemently by Shalev (1980). Firstly, 
41- 
6. This paragraph draws heavily on Hirsch & Addison (1986) and Kennan (1986). 
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strikes are initiated and maintained exclusively by unions, in contrast to the models of 
Rabinovitch & Swary (1976) and Siebert et al (1985) who employ a symmetric 
argument to attribute this role exclusively to firms. In their models, unions wait (on 
strike) for intransigent management to increase their wage offers. - Both of these 
extreme views of strikes are clearly untenable. Secondly, since the union's leadership 
is essentially passive, there are in fact only two active participants, management and 
workers. A genuine tripartite model with union leaders' interests differentiated from 
those of their members is developed by Swint & Nelson (1978,1980). AThirdly, the 
'bargaining process' is modelled as one in which the firm simply profit maximises 
subject to a given union concession schedule, and thus there is an absence of the 
strategic interaction which characterises -the bargaining process. In this important 
sense, Ashenfelter & Johnson is not a bargaining model at all. Finally, and most 
crucially, there is an explicit asymmetry in the treatment of the parties; firms have 
perfect knowledge and engage in optimal maximising behaviour, while unions act 
irrationally and are faced with worker ignorance7. The notion that both sides may 
concede in reaching a settlement is not considered by Ashenfelter & Johnson. 
Two central themes can be identified in the literature of the last two decades, both 
stemming from the informational considerations of Hicks and Ashenfelter & Johnson. 
The first has given rise to a class of models based on imperfect information, in that 
one or both sides are uninformed about the position of the other, and these models are 
discussed in the next sub-section. The second set of models is based on asymmetric or 
private information held by one party (typically the employer); these are examined in 
sub-section 2.2.3. An alternative view, which has a long history, is provided by the 
institutional models of strikes. These are briefly considered in sub-section 2.2.4. 
7. Note that the strike outcome (s+, y, ) in figure 2.1 is Pareto sub-optimal since each party could reach a better 
position without making the other worse off. Of course, the optimal settlement entails a strike of length s=0; 
Pareto optimal outcomes are all on the vertical axis. 
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2.2.2. Imperfect Information Models of Strike Activity. 
In the, most literal extension of Hicks' work, Mauro (1982) suggests that if different 
factors are considered by each party when deriving their own 'concession schedule' 
and their perception of the other party's schedule, then possibilities for miscalculation 
about the shape and location of these concession schedules, can easily arise. As an 
example, Mauro proposes that firms, may use product prices in determining labour 
demand, while unions will use consumer prices in evaluating the wage, and labour 
supply. He explicitly models these potential misperceptions by each party to 
negotiations within the Hicksian concession curves framework and shows that strikes 
will be more common when this information is more costly to obtain. However, why 
established negotiators should continually and systematically utilise the wrong 
information in this manner is not made clear. 
In a similar vein, some authors have attempted to explicitly model the occurrence of 
strikes as 'accidents' or mistakes, in that due to imperfect information, there is a non- 
zero probability that negotiations may fail. Siebert & Addison (1981) treat strikes as 
being analogous to road accidents, in the sense that, 
it... although any single accident is unforeseen, the probability of 
having an accident is foreseen and is a consequence of rational 
choice. " (p. 392) 
Time costs are fundamental; accidents occur because information is not costless and 
the parties to the bargain cannot negotiate indefinitely. Where this information is 
cheaper and/or easier to obtain, the probability of a settlement within the negotiation 
time available should be higher. Addison & Siebert also show that higher potential 
losses from a strike have to affect both parties if they are to negotiate for a longer 
period and hence reduce the probability of a strike. 
That the likelihood of a strike should be inversely related to the cost of the strike to 
both parties is made most explicit in the 'joint-cost' models formulated by Reder & 
Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980). Strikes in these models arise from gaps' in the 
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'protocol' which is designed to cover 'most potential, ' especially costly, conflict 
situations. Not all eventualities can be covered however, but essentially strikes should 
be less likely when they are most expensive. The theory has some attractive attributes; 
it avoids the assumption that workers or firms behave irrationally, and circumvents 
the difficulties associated with establishing how any settlement is reached. It also 
yields predictions as to the determinants of strike activity; any factor influencing its 
cost is likely to be important. However, as noted by McConnell (1987), this can easily 
be interpreted as a weakness of the joint-cost models: 
"While this theory can be tested empirically, the cost of the strike 
would presumably matter in almost any economic theory of strikes. " 
(p. 3) 
In these joint-cost models, the bargaining process itself is assumed away8; rather, 
assumptions simply are made as to its outcome. Strikes are still sub-optimal, however, 
since even' if a contingency arises which is not covered by the protocol, there is no 
need for there to be a strike; rational bargainers would still reach a settlement. A 
genuine attempt to develop a bargaining model under imperfect information is made 
by Kaufman (1981); however, he still requires myopic behaviour by at least one party 
and it is not clear why bargainers should systematically exaggerate the other side's 
position as he claims. 
The papers by Mauro (1982) and Reder & Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980) can 
be seen to be complementary; while Mauro suggests that strikes should be more 
common when information is costly to obtain, the joint-cost school posits that costly 
strikes should elicit better information flows. Both have found some support in the 
empirical literature; this is discussed in sub-section 2.3.3 below. 
2.2.3. Private (or Asymmetric) Information Models of Strike Activity. 
It is this relatively new class of models that has provided a consistent rationale for 
8. That is, it is treated as a black-box'. 
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strikes for the first time. These theories show that under asymmetric information?, 
strikes can be ex' ante Pareto optimal. The models are typically non-cooperative 
games, and include Hayes (1984), Morton (1983), Fudenberg & Tirole (1983) and 
Tracy (1984,1987) among others'°. 
Representative of this school, Hayes (1984) considers a situation in which a firm 
facing a downward sloping demand curve has more information about the state of the 
product market (and hence profitability) than the union. The union designs its wage- 
strike proposals to be incentive compatible; that is, strike activity is greater when the 
firm offers a low wage claiming that the value of the rent is low. There is no incentive 
for the firm to claim that the rent is high and offer a high wage if the rent is in fact 
low, and hence the union does not strike when offered a high wage. However, if the 
union does not impose costs on the firm when it is offered a low wage, the firm is 
always better off offering a low wage, ` irrespective of its true profitability. Thus 
unions use stoppages to reveal information about the state of the market and, in this 
manner, strikes can therefore be rationalised as an ex ante efficient bargaining tool. 
There are two central predictions of such theories. Firstly, strike activity should be 
negatively related to (the unobserved component of) profits or rent since this will 
proxy the private information held by firms. Secondly, strike activity should be 
negatively correlated with the wage settlement given the form of the incentive 
compatible wage-strike proposals of the unionll. Note that the first prediction is not 
incompatible with the apparently procyclical nature of strike activity, since it is the 
firm's position relative to comparable firms or the economy more widely that is the 
9. That is, unequal access to the same information, in contrast to the imperfect information models which consider 
the case in which bargainers utilise different information sets. 
10. In contrast, Kennan (1986, pp. 1105-1112) describes a cooperative model of bargaining. 
11 In his signalling model, Card (1990b) also derives some comparative statics for the effects of changes in the 
mean and variance of the profitability of the firm. 
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relevant factor12. However, the most significant contribution of these models is the 
predicted negative correlation between negotiated wages and strike activity; if strikes 
were accidents, such a relationship would not exist. It is this observable phenomenon 
that provides the testable prediction on which several recent North American 
empirical studies have focussed. These are discussed in sub-section 2.3.4 below. 
It should be noted, however, that this school of leader-follower models in which the 
union always leads has a fundamental weakness. As Kennan (1986) remarks, 
"... since the firm has an informational advantage, it would be more 
natural to let the firm lead. If the firm is allowed to lead, however, it 
will set the wage equal to the union's reservation wage (regardless of 
the state) and the union can do no better than to accept, so strikes will 
not occur. " (p. 1105) 
Thus, once again, the models are flawed by their unequal treatment of the two parties. 
In particular, if the union possesses some private införmation (such as its minimum 
acceptable wage increase), then strikes could be used in a similar manner by the firm 
in order to infer this information. The model would then predict a positive correlation 
between strikes and wages, equivalent to Hicks' upward sloping employers resistance 
curve (McConnell (1989)). Unfortunately, models combining private information on 
both sides would therefore appear to give ambiguous predictions as to the relationship 
between strikes and wages. 
2.2.4. Institutional Models of Strike Activity. 
There are, of course, also a large number of largely 'non-economic' or institutional 
models of strike activity, the most notable of which include Ross & Hartman (1960), 
Snyder (1975,1977) and Kerr & Siegel (1954). Earlier models of this school 
concentrated on examining the hypothesis that strikes, as an expression of conflict, 
reflect the subordination of workers within industry and within society more 
generally. Ross & Hartman attempt to explain the 'withering away' of the strike (as 
12. -If the union observes that the general economy is doing well then it may expect the firm to be similarly 
successful. If, in fact, the firm is doing relatively poorly, then a strike may result (Hayes (1984)). 
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they therr-saw' it)' in' rel'dtlod'to , the development and--maturing of the collective 
bargaining process, unity and centralisation in the labour movement, and political 
stabilisation. Snyder stresses the importance of organisational and political factors. In 
particular, he finds that the institutional setting, especially regarding union 
membership, is important in explaining aggregate strike activity in the UK, and this is 
consistent with the findings of Shorter & Tilly (1974) for France. Kerr & Siegel, in 
their international comparison, find some support for their well known and much 
criticised 'isolated mass and integrated group' hypothesis. More recently, Naylor 
(1987) has developed a 'social custom'13 model to explain strike support and the lack 
of free riding when a strike is called; even though it entails a loss of earnings, the 
individual worker may still strike if the loss of reputation from disobeying the custom 
is sufficiently high. 
While these institutionally based models undoubtedly have features important to the 
successful interpretation of industrial conflict, their failure to ascribe any role to 
economic factors remains a major weakness and tends to limit their applicability to 
specific industries under particular systems of industrial relations. However, they do 
serve to highlight several of the relevant institutional considerations that have 
typically been neglected by economists, and therefore rather greater consideration of 
these models seems warranted. 
Thus it has been seen that there are a large number of competing theories which 
purport to explain the occurrence of strike activity. More recent attempts which 
consider informational asymmetries between rational bargainers seem most 
satisfactory, although further modifications and developments are still required. 
While these models represent some advance in the study of strike activity, their scope 
13. See Akerlof (1980) and Romer (1984) for an exposigon. 
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is often rather limited, and they clearly still omit several important aspects of 'the 
collective bargaining process. In' addition, their emphasis (and dependence)' on the 
role of fixed term contract negotiations, together with contract expirations, limits their 
applicability. Moreover, given the large differences between the system of collective 
bargaining that operates primarily in North America and that which is' dominant in 
Britain, further ''modifications to-the theory are necessary before' its utilisation in 
studies of strikes in Britain. While American employees enter into bargaining only at 
the end of their (often three year) contracts, their British counterparts are more 
regularly involved in negotiations and are not faced with contract' expirations. 
Additionally, it is clear that patterns of workplace bargaining and unionism differ 
substantially between the two countries. Finally, the notion that strikes'might be used 
to develop a reputation for 'toughness' in subsequent bargaining rounds, or that 
management may be similarly intransigent as an investment for future negotiations, 
has yet to be formally incorporated in any of the models, and they would also benefit 
from being augmented by relevant institutional and structural considerations as 
suggested in sub-section 2.2.4. However, it is this new class of micro-level bargaining 
models that seems the most promising in that it provides, for the first time, credible 
theoretical models-'with empirically testable implications. As will be seen below, 
many of the earlier models have yet to be adequately assessed because their 
hypothesised determinants of strikes have extremely poor observable counterparts. 
2.3. An Overview of the Empirical Literature. 
In order to evaluate the large number of theories which have been proposed to explain 
strike activity, it is essential to discriminate between them empirically. Unfortunately, 
attempts to test the models in this manner have been largely unsatisfactory because 
many of the theoretical determinants of strikes have to be inferred from rather indirect 
proxies; concession rates, relative bargaining strengths, negotiators' perceptions, 
bargainers' expectations and strike costs are all unobservable phenomena to the 
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econometrician. Consequently, one of the major weaknesses in the literature in this 
area is that the different theoretical models tend to yield very similar empirical, 
specifications, and, as a result, model discrimination is poor. While not attempting a 
complete review, this section describes the general patterns that have been' 
established. Certain key contributions serve to highlight the central findings and the 
difficulties that have been encountered. It is these studies that are emphasised in the 
following discussion. 
Perhaps the main conclusion to emerge from the numerous studies is that strike 
frequency varies procyclically, although not all studies support this findingla. 
However, this pervading impression does serve to identify a major discrepancy 
between the theoretical models and their empirical implementations; many of the 
applications are little more than a descriptive relationship between strike frequency 
and a set of macroeconomic variables and thus fail to explicitly test the 
microeconomic models on which they are supposedly based. Indeed, the earliest 
studies of strike activity were simple descriptions of the relationship between strikes 
and the business cycle. These are examined in the next sub-section, while the large 
number of econometric models which followed the publication of the seminal study 
by Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969) are appraised in the following three sub-sections. 
2.3.1. Cyclicality and Seasonality in Strikes. ` 
The economic analysis of strike activity has a long history and originates in the late 
nineteenth century with Bevan (1880) who studied British strikes from 1870 to 1879. 
A useful summary of many of these early studies can be found in Kennan (1986). 
That strikes exhibit strong seasonal patterns has long been established. Knowles 
(1952) found similar patterns for both the UK and the US for the inter-war period, 
with UK strike frequency highest in May with a secondary peak in October and a 
14. There is also an important methodological weakness in many of the studies which claim this to be their 
condusion. This is discussed by Kennan (1986, p. 1120) and in further detail in sub-section 23.2 below. 
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trough in December'(a similar finding to that of Yoder (1938,1940) and Tracy (1986) 
for the US, ' and Geare (1972) for New Zealand). Knowles' analysis has been_ extended 
by Sapsford (1975,1982) who shows that the seasonal pattern in strike frequency is 
stable throughout the' period 1893 to 1971. This seasonality in strikes undoubtedly 
reflects the seasonality in the determinants of strikes, and thus has been attributed to 
the structure of the wage round, the seasonality in production in certain industries, and 
the timing of holidays (during which, it is argued, it is in the best interests of workers 
I 
to maintain their income flows). Somewhat curiously, despite the strong evidence for 
stable seasonal patterns in strikes, the Department of Employment has never 
published stoppages data on a seasonally adjusted basis. 
The other major strand in the literature prior to Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969) was the 
examination of the cyclicality of strike frequency. This literature dates from Hansen 
(1921), " and includes Griffen (1939) for the US and Gomberg (1944) and Knowles 
(1952) for the UK: These studies demonstrate a positive con: elation between strike 
frequency and some measure of the business cycle such as the rate of change of prices 
or wages or, with a negative correlation, the rate of unemployment. Stronger results 
were obtained for the US using the National Bureau for Economic Research 
methodology for the analysis of business cycles developed and expounded by Burns 
& Mitchell (1946). These studies include Jurkat & Jurkat (1949), Rees (1952) and 
Weintraub (1966), and are summarised and extended through to 1980 by Kennan 
(1986). Taking the average over all the US business cycles from 1915 to 1980, the 
latter finds a 'perfect fit' between the nine phases of the business cycle and phases in 
the cycles of strike frequency. Although the Burns-Mitchell method has little 
statistical rigour, the degree of consistency in this result is still highly surprising, as 
Kennan notes. 
A similar analysis of Canadian strike frequency from 1946 to 1983 has been 
performed by Harrison & Stewart (1990). They find that I 
20 
"[t]here is little evidence of any strong fluctuations in the number of 
strikes until about 1960, but thereafter there is a reasonably close 
correspondence between the frequency and the business cycle. " (p. 5) 
However, when the strikes series is disaggregated by issue and contract status15, 
Harrison & Stewart find that this evidence for pro-cyclicality in strike frequency 
derives principally from non-contract strikes. For contract strikes, there is no evidence 
of cyclicality in either wage strikes or non-wage strikes. The authors also consider the 
incidence of strikes, and again find no evidence for cyclicality in strike activity, 
arising over the level , of remuneration. 
These findings, together with their 
implications, are discussed more fully in chapter 3 of the thesis16. 
There would appear to have been no similar disaggregated analyses of British strike 
frequency using this kind of purely 'statistical' approach. Despite its lack of rigour, it 
would still be of interest to analyse the cyclicality of British strike frequency in this 
manner in order that broad comparisons can be made with the findings for the US and 
Canada. Thus the National Bureau for Economic Research methodology is utilised in 
chapter 3 to examine the correlation between strikes and the business cycle in the 
post-war period in Britain. Care is taken to distinguish the issue over which a strike is 
called and the industrial sector(s) affected by the conflict activity. However, while 
international comparisons are undoubtedly of interest, the principal motivation 
underlying this exercise is to establish whether British strike frequency displays any 
evidence of cyclicality. This issue arises following the poor performance of some 
standard aggregate macroeconomic models of strike frequency, an assessment of 
which is also presented in chapter 3. Previous evidence for these econometric models 
is examined in some detail below. 
15. That is, whether the strike began at the expiry of the contract ('contract strikes) or during the term of the 
contract ('non-contract strikes). 
16 Additionally, Screpanti (1987) compares cycles in strike activity in France, Germany, Italy, the USA and the 
UK to the Kondratieff cycles, and reveals some limited support in favour of these long waves. 
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23.2. Aggregate Econometric Models of Strike Frequency. 
The number of studies of strike frequency increased rapidly following the seminal 
article by Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969). As suggested above, several fairly heroic 
assumptions are needed to turn the theoretical model that Ashenfelter & Johnson 
derive into an empirically tractable specification. In particular, the authors assume 
that the union's rate of concession, the firm's discount rate and the horizontal 
asymptote y. (see figure 2.1) should all be fairly constant over time. Thus variations 
in strikes are explained purely through variations in the workers' initial demand, yo, 
and the maximum amount the firm can conceivably offer. The rate of unemployment 
and lagged real wages are 'hypothesised to determine the former, while the firm's 
profitability is the principal determinant of the latter, although this is also supposed to 
have an indirect impact on workers' demands yo. Much of Ashenfelter & Johnson's 
model has therefore been abandoned with these simplifying assumptions; other 
authors have subsequently attempted to keep closer to the spirit of the original model, 
for example by hypothesising that the union's rate of concession can also be affected 
by the state of the labour market as in Farber (1978). 
Despite its rather weak formulation, the empirical version of the Ashenfelter & 
Johnson model has received considerable attention in the literature. This derives 
principally from its ease of applicability and because of the fact that, for the first time, 
it offered testable empirical predictions from a rigourous economic model of strike 
activity. Many of the subsequent applications have been similarly concerned with 
relatively aggregated time-series studies, concentrating primarily on the impact of 
changes in the economic environment on strike frequency; these include Pencavel 
(1970), Hunter (1973), Bean & Peel (1974), Shorey (1977), Davies (1979) and Buck 
(1982) for Britain17; Vanderkamp (1970), Smith (1972), Walsh (1975) and Abbott 
17. Although many of these specifically exclude coal mining, considering it a'special case' (Turner (1963)), there 
have been some studies which have concentrated solely on this industry. These include Lynch (1978) and 
Winterton (1981). 
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(1984) for Canada; Turkington. (1975) and Hazledine et al (1977) for New Zealand; 
Phipps (1977) for, Australia; Sapsford (1979) for Eire while Paldam & Pedersen 
(1982) present a review of seventeen studies for various OECD countries18. One basic 
criticism of all of the studies which lay claim to the model of Ashenfelter & Johnson 
is that it is fundamentally a model of strike durations, or, conceivably, of strike 
incidence, and not of strike frequency. Thus it is implicitly assumed in many of these 
studies that patterns in incidence are, identical to those in frequency over the relevant 
time period. As emphasised below and, in more detail in chapter 4, incidence and 
frequency are rather different dimensions of strikes and thus this additional 
assumption may be inappropriate. The choice of which dimension of conflict to use as 
the regressand is crucial since patterns in the various measures differ widely. To 
reiterate, most studies are of strike frequency, rather ' than -of workers involved, 
duration or working days lost even though these other measures may be more 
indicative of the level of conflict activity in the economy as discussed in chapter 3. 
Most authors simply use the number of strikes with little or no justification for this 
choice. In many cases, it would seem that this is not the most appropriate statistic. For 
example, if an individual's decision to strike is supposedly based on some utility 
function consideration, then the number of workers involved would seem to be the 
most appropriate measure. 
In general, the results of the studies of strike frequency for the UK are broadly in line 
with those that Ashenfelter & Johnson obtained for the US, although it should be 
noted that there are a number of rather conflicting findings as' discussed below. 
Pencavel (1970) provides the first and perhaps most direct application of the model to 
UK strike frequency, justifying his choice of theoretical framework on the basis that 
shop-stewards or branch officials could be considered as fulfilling the union 
leadership role. He finds that quarterly non-coal strike frequency is negatively related 
18. Note that not all of these models allude to Ashenfelter & Johnson specifically. Some are based on more ad hoc theorising although can still justifiably be grouped in this class given their final empirical specifications. ' 
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to real wage changes and the rate of unemployment and positively correlated with a 
profits variable defined as gross trading profits as a percentage of wage and salary 
compensation. As expected, given the, trend in non-coal strike frequency over his 
estimation period 1950 to 1967, the, time trend is also highly significant. But as 
Pencavel himself notes, this in itself has little explanatory power unless some 
interpretation can be given as to why strikes should be so highly trended. In addition, 
there is some evidence of instability in his results, perhaps arising from aggregating 
across heterogeneous industrial sectors as he suggests in his paper. However, it may 
equally arise . from the model being misspecified, and this possibility 
is not really 
considered in depth by Pencavel19. Finally, such are the weaknesses underlying the 
empirical model that Pencavel estimates, his (reduced form) equation could be 
regarded as deriving from. several of the theoretical (structural) specifications 
discussed in section 2.2 above20. 
Knight (1972) and Mayhew (1979), among others, have criticised the applicability of 
the Ashenfelter & Johnson model to the system of bargaining and industrial relations 
that pertains in the UK; most British strikes are unofficial and thus not called by a 
union leadership relatively, separated from its members as in the Ashenfelter & 
Johnson model. Knight (1972) circumvents the problems associated with aggregating 
the utility function over individuals (as in the Ashenfelter & Johnson model) by 
specifying his utility function over group consciousness. He argues that this is more 
appropriate since it does not ascribe strike calls exclusively to trades unions but 
rather, and more realistically for Britain, to groups of workers. He concentrates on 
manufacturing strikes only, and controls for the size of the labour force by specifying 
VF 
19. He states that "To guard against the possibility that our inferences are jeopardized by serial correlation ... the 
equation was transformed according to the procedure suggested by Cochrane & Orcutt.... [A]ll the independent 
variables have very similar estimated coefficients and standard errors" (Pencavel (1970), p. 246, fn. 1). 
20. Note also that the model is only really appropriate for the occurrence of strikes at contract renegotiations. 
While wage strikes are probably the most equivalent dass of stoppages in the UK, only around half of all strikes 
are over wage issues. 
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the dependent variable as strikes per capita. Moreover, his equation, using biannual 
data for 1950 to 1968, is-formulated in terms of' expectations, and is estimated in first 
differences. Expected money wage increases are very important, but prices and the 
rate of unemployment are insignificant, and the impact of profitability is not well 
defined. Certainly, while there is still no account for the issues over which strikes 
arise, Knight's analysis is more satisfactory than Pencavel's in that it focuses directly 
on the conflict between groups of workers and their employer. 
A similar study to that of Pencavel (1970), but covering inter-war as well as post-war 
non-coal strike frequency, has been conducted by Shorey (1977). The theoretical 
model employed differs 'somewhat in that it is derived from ad hoc arguments as to 
the determinants of the probability of a strike at a single bargaining unit, rather than 
from a rigourously defined theoretical model. ' However, once aggregated across 
bargaining units and transformed into'an operational model, Shorey's final empirical 
specification is very similar to that of Pencavel despite its rather different origins. 
Shorey estimates his model over two periods; 1920 to 1939 and 1950 to 1967 and, for 
comparative purposes, it is the latter period that is of interest here. In his final 
specification, he omits' all variables which are not 'significant' (despite suspicions of 
multicollinearity) and, as one might expect given the broad similarities between their 
specifications, his results are quantitatively similar to those of Pencavel. He finds that 
non-coal strike frequency is positively correlated with real profits, (lagged) price 
changes and the price level and negatively correlated with (lagged) wage changes. 
Finally, he finds that lagged strike frequency, included to proxy the extent of external 
militancy in the (non-coal) economy, is strongly significant over the period 1950 to 
1967. 
The one substantive difference between the papers by Pencavel and Shorey is, that the 
former includes a time trend whereas the latter includes a lagged dependent variable. 
Since strike frequency is highly (positively) trended over their post-war sample 
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period, these two variables perform a similar function in terms of the empirical 
models' apparently high 'explanatory' power21. 
Davies (1979) attempts to extend the previous models to include the strike wave 
witnessed in 1969-71, and to include, in an appropriate fashion, the impact of incomes 
policies on strike activity. His operational equation, although derived from rather 
different theoretical reasoning to either Pencavel or Shorey, is again rather similar in 
terms of the variables included in the empirical specification. Davies states that his 
model assumes that all disputes occur over wages (or over issues with easily 
quantifiable parameters). However, he estimates three equations, using all strikes, 
wage strikes and non-wage strikes as the dependent variables for the period 1966 to 
1975. Thus, while his analysis is important in that it is the first to distinguish between 
the issues over which disputes have arisen, his results are not strictly comparable to 
those of Pencavel or Shorey; firstly, he includes strikes in the coal industry despite the 
very distinctive differences between coal and non-coal strikes over the period; and, 
secondly, his investigation spans a different sample period during which the pattern in 
strike activity was clearly dissimilar from that in the earlier period covered by 
Pencavel and Shorey. The distinction between wage strikes and non-wage strikes is 
seen to be important in the results obtained; non-wage strike frequency would appear 
to increase significantly during periods when incomes policies are implemented, 
cancelling out the reduction in disputes over wages. Although there are some 
fundamental weaknesses in the formulation of his incomes policy variables, the 
overall impact when considered over their complete life-cycle is to significantly 
increase aggregate strike frequency. One disturbing feature of his paper is that he 
would appear to have transformed his equation in some way; while few details are 
provided he states that, 
21" The papers by Pencavel and Shorey are evaluated in much greater detail in chapter 3. 
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"... in order to correct for the possibility of autocorrelation in the 
regressors the strike frequency equations were transformed according 
to the autoregressive scheme devised by Cochrane & Orcutt. " (p. 215) 
No econometric justification is provided for this and his results may be both biased 
and inconsistent (and inference invalid) if the disturbances in the original 
specification are not serially correlated after all. Forrest (1990) presents evidence to 
suggest that his estimation strategy is indeed inappropriate. However, his analysis 
does serve to illustrate the need to take account of the issue(s) over which strikes 
occur; although many certainly derive from disagreements over levels of 
remuneration (as most of the models explicitly or implicitly presume), other factors 
should not be dismissed since it seems likely that the nature of the strike and the 
concession rate of each party will differ according to the issue over which conflict has 
arisen. In Britain, only about 50% of strikes now occur over disputes over pay, and 
thus models needs to be specifically developed to describe the occurrence of non- 
wage grievances22. 
Smith (1980) attempts to apply the specifications that Pencavel and Shorey utilised to 
the period 1967 to 1976. His results are much less satisfactory than those obtained for 
the earlier period, perhaps reflecting the increasing importance of institutional factors 
such as incomes policies in this period. These are not considered by Smith and there 
is little discussion of the quarterly results since his preference would appear to be for 
an alternative annual model. Sapsford (1982) estimates a slightly different model 
subject to AR(1) disturbances (despite the fact that the DW-statistic could indicate the 
existence of almost any misspecification), and then drops all 'insignificant' variables. 
Cronin (1979) attempts to improve on these economic models by including 'political' 
factors such as indicators of union strength, political party in power and lagged strike 
frequency to represent strike 'waves'. However, since he measures his improvement in 
terms of the Durbin-Watson statistic being closer to 2, his whole (econometric) 
22. The value of the official statistics on the cause of stoppages is questionable however, not only are there likely 
to be multiple causes, but their relative importance may change over the course of the dispute, differ between 
strikers and there are also likely to be secondary motivations and latent or repressed grievances. 
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argument is fundamentally flawed since it will be biased in this direction by the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable. Finally, Cameron (1984) specifies an ad 
hoc model with which he claims to demonstrate structural instability in post-war 
annual strike frequency. But he provides little justification for the break at 1968, other 
than that most studies do not extend past this date. 
Unfortunately, aggregate macroeconomic relationships of the type considered by 
Pencavel, Shorey, Knight and Davies among many others are largely unrelated to any 
specific theory. This gives rise to several ambiguities in the theoretical foundations 
preceding estimation, as emphasised by Mayhew (1979), and hence empirical support 
is given to a wide variety of conflicting a priori arguments. For example, workers 
may have more reason to strike in recession in order to protect their interests, while 
when demand is high, employers may be more willing to concede without a strike. 
Hence the rate of unemployment and strike frequency should be positively correlated, 
contrary to the prediction of Ashenfelter & Johnson. A similar argument can give rise 
to an ambiguous sign for the coefficient on the variable measuring profitability. Bean 
& Peel (1974) argue that real profits are an indication of the employer's ability to pay 
and thus should be associated with a decline in strike frequency, a result confirmed by 
their study, whereas Pencavel argues that high profits serve to increase wage demands 
and thus should be positively correlated with strike frequency as both he and Shorey 
subsequently found. Davies obtains a significantly negative coefficient on real profits 
for non-wage strikes only, while for all strikes and wage strikes, its impact is negative 
but insignificant. 
This 'identification' problem is clearly important and is, at least partially, a 
consequence of 'observational equivalence' in many of the models. Any econometric 
estimation of these single equation models can only ever reveal a net effect which, if 
close to zero, may indicate a near balance between two competing hypotheses, or 
alternatively, that the variable has no influence in the determination of strike activity. 
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Two related criticisms of the literature are relevant here. Firstly, the conflicting results 
may also be a consequence of poor- econometric techniques and uncorrected model 
misspecifications as suggested by Shalev (1980) and, in particular, by Abbott (1984) 
in his detailed re-estimation of several Canadian studies. Aggregation bias has been 
recognised as, a potential source of problems by both Pencavel (1970) and Buck 
(1982), the latter estimating separate industry level equations by Zellner's (1962) 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) technique to circumvent Pencavel's assumption 
of independence between industries. However, both of these disaggregated studies are 
extremely partial in their industrial coverage, and both include the atypical example 
of coal-mining. 
Parameter instability has also been recognised as a possible explanation for the 
diversity in the results obtained. Moore & Pearce (1982) report on the inability of the 
Ashenfelter & Johnson-model to-explain US strike frequency beyond the ý original 
sample period, while Hunter (1973) finds similar instability when the Pencavel model 
is extended to the end of 1972. Cameron (1984) provides some evidence for a 
structural break at 1968 in his study of annual UK strike frequency, although this 
finding could be a consequence of several other misspecifications not considered in 
his paper, since he measures model adequacy in terms of R2 and the Durbin-Watson 
statistic. Hundley & Koreisha (1987) also note that structural instability seems likely 
in models of strike activity since, 
"... the costs of strikes provide incentives for bargainers to behave 
adaptively so that observable events which affected strike frequency in 
the past will not have similar effects in the future. " (p. 512) 
Their solution is to employ atheoretical vector autoregressive moving average 
(VARMA) techniques. The results suggest that a stable macro-model of US strike 
activity does not exist; although in the immediate post-war period, economic variables 
had a significant influence on strike activity, more recently this relationship has'not 
been maintained. This, they argue, is, consistent with a process in which negotiators 
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learn from their bargaining experience. These specification and estimation, issues are 
reconsidered in some depth in the discussion relating to the replication of two selected 
models for the UK in chapter 3. Over the longer time period now available to 
researchers, such models are shown to have poor forecasting performance even when 
suitably 'corrected' . 
for a variety of misspecifications to provide an econometrically 
satisfactory empirical macro-model of strike activity. While no similar VARMÄ 
analysis has yet been conducted, the adaptive behaviour suggested by Hundley & 
Koreisha may provide an explanation for this generally poor recent performance of 
aggregate econometric models in the UK. 
A second major criticism, also related to model specification and estimation, is that 
the econometric technique typically employed by researchers is single equation 
ordinary least squares. The endogeneity of strikes within labour market behaviour 
implies that such single equation regression techniques are inappropriate. This has 
long been recognised and yet, with the exception of Knight (1972), Geroski et al 
(1982) and Geroski & Knight (1983), the simultaneous determination of wages, 
market structure and strike activity has remained unstudied. The three papers cited all 
indicate that such inter-relationships do exist, and thus have important implications 
for most of the single equation studies. 
Several researchers have presented modifications to the Ashenfelter & Johnson model 
but, in general, these do little to circumvent the difficulties described above. An 
example of particular interest is that of Farber (1978). He hypothesises that the 
union's rate of concession a will be greater if unemployment is high, or if the union 
has only small strike funds. However, his model still suffers from the same basic 
criticism of Ashenfelter & Johnson that an outcome involving a strike is not Pareto, 
optimal. Farber tests his model against a rather limited micro data set of 10 bargaining 
pairs in US manufacturing over 1954 to 1970, covering 80 contract negotiations. His 
results, while only weak, suggest that the concession schedule is downward-sloping at 
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about 6% per annum. That he only obtains limited empirical support for his model 
may be a direct consequence of his lack of data, or due to the theoretical weaknesses 
in the framework he employs. 
Although this econometric literature has been dominated by time-series studies, there 
have been a number of studies examining inter-industry strike activity including 
Shorey (1976), Creigh & Makeham (1980), Geroski et al (1982) and Geroski & 
Knight (1983). Shorey examines strike frequency for 33 manufacturing industries 
using annual averages for the period 1963-67. While his, results are qualitatively 
similar to much of the time-series literature, there are also some additional 
revelations; in particular, strike. frequency would appear to be positively related to 
industry plant or firm size and to the rate of change of wages, and negatively related 
to the proportion of women in the workforce and the rate of change of productivity. 
The existence of payment-by-results schemes seems detrimental to the state of 
industrial relations, a finding supported by the cross-section study by Creigh & 
Makeham (1980) using data for 120 MLHs averaged over 1971-75. Again, their study 
claims to support the hypothesis of procyclicality in strike activity (both frequency 
and incidence are modelled), although neither of these studies found the rate of 
unemployment in the industry to be significant. Although there would appear to be no 
extant pooled time-series cross-section analyses for the UK, Card (1988), Kaufman 
(1983) and Vroman (1989) employ such models for the US with some success. 
There is also a large literature which emphasises the role of plant size on strike 
frequency, including Shorey (1975), George et al (1977), Holden (1978), Prais 
(1978), and Edwards (1980,1981). The explanations proffered for the observation 
that large plants are more likely to experience industrial action differ widely; George 
et al (1977) summarise many of the arguments although it is clear that there is no 
commonly accepted causal link. Three studies concentrate solely on the effect of size 
on the effects of size on the likelihood of conflict. Prais (1978) predicts that the 
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number of strikes should increase proportionately with employment and finds some 
support for his heirarchical model using data derived from. Department of 
Employment sources. In contrast, Edwards (1980) observes a less than proportionate 
relationship using survey data and suggests that this may be because the number of 
bargaining groups does not increase linearly with plant size. Finally, Marginson 
(1984) extends the previous analysis to include the distinct effects of company size, 
which he argues may have an additional effect on strike activity due to management 
specialisation, standardisation and formalisation, and through these, unionisation. He 
finds both plant and company size to be important in his study using the Warwick 
Survey of Industrial Relations (Brown (1981)). One obvious criticism of these three 
studies is that size may be acting as a proxy for other excluded differences between 
plants, such as bureaucratisation, technology or workforce characteristics. Such 
differences need to be appropriately controlled for in order that the ceteris paribus 
effects of size can be identified. 
The level of aggregation at which most of the macroeconomic studies have been 
conducted has been condemned most strongly by Wheeler (1984) in his extensive 
criticism= of Kaufman, (1982), Skeels (1982), Paldam & Pedersen (1982) and the 
macro-level strike literature in general. In part this criticism is related to the general 
structure of the empirical studies in that they fail to explicitly test the microeconomic 
theoretical models, and simply examine ad hoc macroeconomic specifications of 
strike activity. Relevant institutional considerations are also largely ignored at the 
high level of aggregation at which these studies are conducted. From all of these 
studies, few, if any, positive policy prescriptions have been obtained since it is 
improbable that policy-makers will attempt to manipulate inflation or unemployment, 
or restrict economic activity, simply to affect the number of strikes that occur. Indeed, 
policy is more likely to be directed and implemented at unions and individual firms or 
specific industries, and clearly the aggregate statistics cannot hope to identify the 
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impact of any changes at this more disaggregated level23. On similar grounds, one 
might also object to the inclusion of a time trend in many of the studies. Clearly, the 
fact that strike activity may be-increasing (or decreasing) over time is' of relatively 
little interest unless some explanation can be proffered as to why this might be so. It is 
clear that there is a need to examine strikes at higher levels of disaggregation in order 
that the 'relationships' at the bargaining level can be studied and so that relevant 
historical, institutional and political information can be incorporated. 
In their defence, however, the macro-models do serve to emphasise some of the 
empirical regularities that a satisfactory economic theory of strikes should be able to 
explain. Nevertheless, they do not necessarily establish the procyclicality of strikes as 
claimed by many researchers. Even where the relevant variables enter into the 
specifications with the 'correct' sign, there are typically a number of measures of the 
cycle, not all of which will be concurrent cyclical indicators. As Kennan (1986) notes: 
"In principle, the advantage of regression models is that they allow the 
separate influences of several explanatory variables to be disentangled. 
If the question of interest is whether strikes are procyclical however, 
then estimates of regression coefficients miss the point... Thus for 
example, a negative regression coefficient associated with the 
unemployment rate does not necessarily mean that strikes are 
procyclical, if the regression also includes variables such as prices, 
wages and profits which may vary systematically with the cycle" 
(p. 1120) 
It is the response of strikes to the combination of these multifarious cyclical indicators 
that is important, and none of the multiple regression models attempt to amalgamate 
the cyclical explanatory variables in any way. Herein lies the advantage of the Burns- 
Mitchell method over these multiple regression studies; the former has only a single 
index of the cycle and thus avoids such difficulties. 
As previously stated, one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the studies of strike 
activity is their almost exclusive focus on strike frequency. If the number of bargains 
23. Note, however, that both Hunter (1973) and Davies (1979) distinguish carefully between various 'strengths' of 
incomes policies and their effects on strike activity and so may be considered a partial exception. 
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being made is changing, then changes in frequency may say little about changes in 
incidence. 'Stern (1978) highlights the problems arising over the choice of an 
appropriate 'population' measure with which to standardise the statistics for strike 
frequency. Such deflators are necessary in order that actual 'changes in the level of 
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conflict can be distinguished from changes in the volume of bargaining. A variety of 
proxies have been utilised in the literature including the number of workers in the 
relevant labour force, the number of establishments, workers involved, union 
membership and so on. Other authors have made no correction at all claiming, for 
example, that the number of 'bargaining units' is constant over the relevant sample 
period despite the long time series often used. Given the abundance of union mergers' 
and amalgamations, this assumption seems untenable. None of the divisors used are 
entirely suitable however; for example, simply deflating frequency by the number of 
establishments may provide an exaggeration of the amount of bargaining since 
collective agreements are less common in small establishments, while it may also 
underestimate bargaining activity since negotiations often occur more frequently than' 
once each year. Stern therefore concludes that, rather than arbitrarily choosing a 
single denominator, it may be preferable to estimate equations with raw count data 
but using appropriate 'population' measures as explanatory variables. 
The study of strike incidence or probability in Britain has been hampered by having 
no control group against which to compare those firms or establishments incurring 
strike action. The Department of Employment statistics fail to record even how many 
establishments are affected by each dispute and thus are not appropriate for a study of 
strike incidence in Britain. For the US and Canada, however, detailed results of 
contract negotiations have been recorded and thus provide a suitable source of data 
for the study of strike incidence at this level. Card (1987a, 1987b), Gunderson et al 
(1986), McConnell (1987,1989), Swidinsky & Vanderkamp (1982) and Tracy (1986, 
1987) all utilise data of this kind and their results show that bargaining-pair-specific, 
firm-specific and industry-specific factors are all important. These more recent 
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empirical studies using micro-level data are typically much more closely related to the 
(microtheoretical) models from which they are derived, -and thus come closer to 
explicitly testing the theories of strike activity. In that many of these studies are based 
on imperfections or asymmetries in information, they are discussed under their 
relevant sub-headings in the next two sub-sections. However, -it should be noted that 
although these studies represent considerable advances in the investigation of strike 
activity, their scope is still often rather limited, and they clearly omit several 
important aspects of the collective bargaining process. 
For the - UK, the most appropriate source of data suitable for an analysis of the 
incidence of strike activity is the two Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys. These 
can be used to provide establishment-level strike incidence rates, and Millward & 
Stevens (1986) devote a chapter to the analysis of the industrial conflict information 
in the two surveys. Blanchflower & Cubbin (1986) and Booth & Cressy (1990) 
estimate equations for the probability of a strike using the 1980 and 1984 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys respectively. Unfortunately, their specifications are very 
different and thus comparisons between the two years covered by the surveys are not 
possible. Following a comparison of strike frequency and strike incidence in the 
1980s in Britain, chapter 4 reviews the studies by Blanchflower & Cubbin and Booth 
& Cressy in detail and shows them to be deficient in a number of respects, including 
the definition of conflict that they utilise as their dependent variables. The chapter 
then addresses the wider question of the determination of conflict incidence using the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys within a suitable empirical framework. 
Chapter 4 also presents an analysis of the joint determination of strike action and non- 
strike action. The results show that, ceteris paribus, establishments which are 
characterised by high levels of strike activity also experience higher levels of non- 
strike activity; that is, certain establishments can be characterised as being conflict- 
prone. 
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While still not optimal (in that it still cannot perfectly reflect the proportion of 
bargains that fail to reach a settlement), the establishment-level measure of strike 
incidence provided by the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys is much less open 
to criticism than aggregate strike frequency, since there is a clearly identifiable 
control group. Such disaggregated studies are still very uncommon for Britain and the 
chapter provides the first examination of the co-determination of strike and non-strike 
activity. Consistent specifications are estimated enabling comparisons to be made 
between 1980 and 1984, a period which saw many changes in the patterns of 
workplace bargaining, a huge rise in unemployment and many legislative changes 
governing union activity. The likely effects of these transitions in the bargaining 
environment are also discussed in detail in the chapter. 
Chapter 5 attempts to combine the insights gained froin chapters 3 and 4 with respect 
to strike frequency and incidence respectively to present an examination of the 
commonly voiced supposition that the public sector is strike prone. Both the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and the Department of Employment 
Stoppages Data Tapes are utilised; the results show that there are few significant 
differences between public and private sector strike propensities once adequate 
controls have been used to correct for the many differences between the public and 
private sectors. The tapes can also be used to provide alternative measures of the 
public-private differential in industrial action and reveal that public sector strikes tend 
to be smaller and shorter on average. 
2.3.3. Joint-Cost and Imperfect Information Models of Strike Activity. 
As described 
. 
in sub-section 2.2.2 above, Mauro (1982) extends the concession 
schedules framework of Hicks to develop a model in which each party incorrectly 
estimates the other's concession curve because it utilises different variables when 
deriving the position of the curve. The misperceptions that this use of the incorrect 
information implies result in a divergence in the expected wage settlement, and thus a 
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strike can occur, especially if the difference between the parties' expectations is large. 
Mauro fords some support for his model using a set of micro data derived from 14 US 
union-firm bargaining pairs over 30- years, and covering a total of 149 contract 
expirations. However, why systematic errors of this kind should continue to be made, 
or why particular contract negotiations should be characterised by this kind of sub- 
optimal behaviour (while other contract expirations are settled without strikes), is not 
really addressed fully in Mauro's paper. 
The hypothesis that strikes are accidents, as emphasised by Siebert & Addison (1981), 
has received only limited attention in the literature perhaps because the notion that 
systematic accidents can and would continually be made has little appeal. However, 
in its emphasis on the role of information in bargaining, with the advocacy of written 
agreements and cooling off periods (during which the uncertainties associated with 
negotiations can hopefully be reduced), the theory raises some important issues. 
Discrimination between the 'political' model of Ashenfelter & Johnson and the 
accident theory is fraught with difficulties; Addison & Siebert are able to interpret the 
findings from several previous studies in terms of their theory but do not offer any 
particularly convincing reasons for preferring their model. Thus, once- again, model 
discrimination is weak, in part due to - the difficulty in identifying proxies for 
information shortages which might precipitate strikes. The only other study 
examining the accident theory is by Cousineau & Lacroix (1983) (reported in Hirsch 
& Addison (1986)) utilising data for Canadian manufacturing strikes for the period 
1967-82. They emphasise the trade-off between the costs' of a strike and its benefits in 
terms of the quantity and quality of information generated during the strike. While 
Cousineau & Lacroix find no relationship between strike probabilities and joint strike 
costs, they do find that strikes increase with increasing uncertainty as proxied by the 
retail price index, job vacancies and the coefficient of variation on capital utilisation. 
Thus their results arguably provide support for the accident theory of strikes, although 
once again, their findings could also be interpreted as endorsing a number of 
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alternative models. 
The joint-cost model, which posits that strikes should be less common when strike 
costs are higher, has seen a wide variety of applications in the literature. The origins 
of the theory lie in the papers by Reder & Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980), while 
applications include Gunderson et al (1986), Sopher (1990) and some of the strike 
durations literature discussed below. According to this theory, the costs of a strike are 
weighed against the costs of attempting to specify a more detailed bargaining 
'protocol'. Reder & Neumann proxy strike costs with shipments and inventories and 
find some evidence for an inverse relationship between strike activity and strike costs 
for 14 US manufacturing industries. In addition, experienced bargainers would appear 
to engage in fewer strikes, again lending support to the theory. 
Gunderson et al (1986) provide a microeconomic study of Canadian contract strike 
incidence within a joint-cost framework. They emphasise that, 
"... strikes are more likely to occur in situations of uncertainty, 
imperfect and asymmetric information, and divergent expectations. In 
such circumstances, strikes can serve a number of functions pertaining 
to generating - information, eliciting truth telling, establishing 
reputations, providing catharsis, and solving intraorganizational 
problems. " (p. 273) 
Their results provide some evidence in favour of the joint-cost theory although much 
of the variation in strike activity is unexplained, even when industry dummies are 
included in the specification. A- contrasting study by Sopher (1990) reports the 
findings from an experimental game under (notionally) complete information in 
which bargaining takes place over a 'shrinking pie'. Somewhat surprisingly, strikes 
were quite frequent and the bargaining outcomes provide some general support for the 
joint-cost theory. 
The joint-cost model of Reder & Neumann (1980) and Kennan (1980) has received 
most attention in the study of strike durations. It is clear that such analyses are of 
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considerable importance; strike durations can provide information on the likely 
determinants of the length of stoppages and the factors which might contribute to a 
settlement being. reached while they may also be used to distinguish. the form. and. 
nature of disputes. In addition, some authors have argued that the duration of a 
stoppage gives an indication of its cost to both parties (e. g. Creigh (1978)). For 
employees, the cost of a strike in terms of foregone wages is clearly directly related to 
its length while, for firms, production losses can often be compensated for once a 
dispute is settled. Thus (at least part of) the real cost of a strike lies in the delay that it 
causes in the productive process; the longer that a dispute lasts, the more likely it is 
that other firms will erode market share and that inventories will be exhausted with a 
subsequent loss of goodwill through failure to meet delivery schedules. 
Thus the joint-cost theory would seem to offer a plausible framework within which 
the duration of strikes can be examined, and is a clear improvement to many of the 
previous studies of strike durations which typically lacked any structural hypothesis. 
4, 
In fact, early studies were simply statistical curve fitting exercises (e. g. Horvath 
(1968), Lancaster (1972)). In contrast, more recent analyses have allowed for 
observed and unobserved differences between strikes and can be seen as an attempt to 
bring a more formal modelling strategy to bear on the issue of strike durations. These 
include Harrison & Stewart (1989) for Canadian contract strikes, and Kennan (1985) 
and Tracy (1986,1987) for the US. These models concentrate on trying to establish 
the econom(etr)ic regularities that any successful theory of strike durations must 
confront; Kennan (1985) and Harrison & Stewart (1989) both find that North 
American contract strike durations are countercyclical and this is in accordance with 
the joint-cost theory24. 
24. Harrison & Stewart find that for their Canadian data, their chosen econometric specification dominates that 
chosen by Kennan for his US data, The latter fails to check the robustness of his results to alternative functional 
forms. 
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The analysis 'of strike' durations has been deficient to date, especially for Britain, in 
that there has been little modelling of the process by which a settlement is reached 
once a strike has begun. The complex issue of - identification of the structural 
parameters in these models has also yet to be adequately addressed in the literature, 
although both Kennan and Harrison & Stewart employ very flexible specifications to 
capture the duration dependence in the data to circumvent this problem, a solution 
suggested by Ridder (1986). In contrast, Tracy (1986) adopts a monotonic (Weibull) 
hazard and thus his results may be severely biased as shown by Heckman & Singer 
(1982,1984a, b). A full discussion of the pertinent issues in the study of strike 
durations, together with some preliminary results for UK data derived from the 
Department of Employment Stoppages Data Tapes can be found in Dickerson (1988). 
2.3.4. Private Information Models of Strike Activity. 
There have been some recent attempts to test the private information theories of strike 
activity discussed in sub-section 2.2.3 above. The private, or asymmetric, information 
models typically assume that some component of profitability is unobserved by the 
union. Strikes are the mechanism by which workers obtain higher wages from more 
profitable employers; unions use wage-strike combinations to elicit information from 
the firm. While the result is observationally equivalent to the Ashenfelter & Johnson 
downward-sloping concession schedule, in this case the negative correlation between 
wages and strikes is deduced as a direct implication of incentive compatible 
bargaining by the union. Thus strikes can be seen to be ex post Pareto-optimal. 
The initial attempts to test such theories concentrated on their first prediction, that 
strikes should be positively related to the degree of uncertainty facing the union, and 
negatively related to the size of the rents to be shared. In his study utilising a micro 
data set of major US contract negotiations, Tracy (1986) finds that firm-specific 
uncertainty, as proxied by the volatility of its security returns, is particularly 
important while the rate of return on the firm's stock has no effect on the likelihood of 
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a strike. Using the market model from finance theory, Tracy (1987) derives a stronger 
test of the äsymmetr c information model by decomposing the investor's uncertainty 
over the firm's future profitability into two components; the first resulting from 
economy-wide events and the second from firm-specific events. It is this latter 
measure of uncertainty that is seen to be particularly important for the incidence (and 
duration) of strikes, providing further support for the private information models. The 
predicted negative correlation between rents and strikes receives only weak support 
however. 
McConnell (1989) extends Tracy's data set to include both manufacturing and non- 
manufacturing. She finds that the firm's private information, as proxied by both the 
level and variation in errors in future price expectations, has an insignificant impact 
on strike activity25. One major criticism of these studies is that if the relevant private 
information can be inferred by the researcher, it can surely be inferred by experienced 
union bargainers too, and thus is not unobservable! This dilemma might partially 
explain the generally poor econometric support for the theory found in these papers. 
In response, some latei studies have examined the second main prediction of the 
private information theories, that of a negative correlation between wage outcomes 
and strike activity. This observable prediction of the theories is clearly much more 
amenable to empirical investigation. Utilising data for Canadian manufacturing 
contract strikes, Card (1990b) finds no evidence of a relationship between the average 
real wage during the contract and strike activity, having controlled for alternative 
wage opportunities, unemployment, industry demand and fixed eff6cts26. In contrast, 
McConnell (1989) shows that both the incidence and duration of strikes are 
25. However, uncertainty is still seen to play a role; the variation in past prices and unemployment both exert a 
positive effect on strikes. 
26. However, while there is no evidence for a link from strikes to wages, he does find that lagged wage outcomes 
affect future strike probabilities. 
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negatively correlated with the residual component of real wage settlements in her 
broad cross-section of US labour contracts, thus providing some support for the 
theory. However, the estimated concession schedule is very flat, with the real wage 
decreasing by only 3% after a strike lasting 100 days. This implies that the cost of a 
long strike to the firm is negligible compared to the cost of conceding a small increase 
in the wage rate; this seems rather improbable. 
The contradicting findings of the papers by Card and McConnell are discussed briefly 
by Card (1990a).. He suggests that part of the explanation may lie in the differing 
industrial coverage of the studies; while Card (1990b) includes manufacturing 
Industries only, McConnell's (1989) study also encompasses the non-manufacturing 
sector, ' and indeed it is this sector that displays greater sensitivity of wages to strike 
activity. , 
Some of these more recent microeconometric studies are reviewed in a recent article 
by Card (1990a), but, as yet, there are no such studies for UK strike activity. One 
primary difficulty is that even when information is available on individual bargaining 
pairs, as can be inferred from the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys for 
example, it is still not possible to identify 'whether the prevailing wage at the 
establishment is the outcome of pre- or post-strike negotiations. 
2.3.5. Costs and Consequences of Strike Activity. 
There has been an obvious unwillingness to directly address the costs and 
consequences of industrial conflict. This may be related to the criticism noted above 
that most research has tended to concentrate on the circumstances in which conflict is 
more or less probable, rather than on why it occurs or how it is settled. Yet it is 
clearly important to assess the impact of conflict since it seems probable that there is 
at least some expectation as to the final outcome when strike action is undertaken or 
incurred. That the gains and losses from strike action have an important role to play in 
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the analysis of conflict has been recognised implicitly by few authors, while only 
Reder & Neumann (1980) treat the (expected) costs of industrial action as paramount 
in the occurrence of strike action. 
Conceptually, the cost of strikes should be measured as the sum of the producer and 
consumer surpluses lost as a result of strike action, but obviously no such measures 
exist. Days lost has been used most frequently for assessing the impact of -strike 
action. However, it is not possible to tell from this statistic what combination of size 
and duration is involved. It also assumes that these days could have been usefully 
employed and cannot be compensated for at some future date. Therefore as a measure 
of the costs of strikes to either party or to the economy as a whole, days lost has some 
rather fundamental weaknesses. Furthermore, if the argument of Creigh (1978) is - 
accepted, then the real cost of a strike results from the delay that it produces in the 
production process rather than any irrecoverable loss in output, and thus it is the 
duration of a stoppage that is the best indication of its cost. 
The extent to which the costs of a dispute spread beyond the parties immediately 
concerned depends on the availability of stocks, supplies, the level of demand and the 
position of the firm in any production chain. Knight (1989) finds that only in those 
industries which hold relatively low levels of inventories do strikes adversely affect 
labour productivity in his cross-section of production industries in 1968. In the 
majority of industries, the effect of strike activity on productivity is actually positive 
(although small), lending some support to the Harvard School view27 that unions can 
have beneficial effects. 
The available evidence on the cost of strikes in Britain in terms of lost output is 
limited; Whittingham & Towers (1971) calculate the total loss to be only 0.2% of 
n. The most forceful proponents of this school are Freeman & Medoff (1984). 
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GNP for 1970 (and this was an exceptional year in terms of days lost), while Turner 
(1969a) puts the figure at less than 0.1% in general, a negligible amount. However, 
these figures are based on the proportion of working days lost attributable to strike 
activity, and this is likely to be rather different from the loss to the economy; in part, 
this will depend upon how far any reduction in production is passed on to the workers 
in terms of lost wages, or made up for at overtime rates. In addition, other firms may 
gain at the expense of those firms incurring industrial action. Clearly the net (welfare) 
loss is immeasurable, but seems likely to be small in aggregate. An innovative 
attempt to analyse the relationship between strikes and output losses has been made 
by Neumann & Reder (1984). They use vector autoregressions (as described by Sims 
(1972)) to reveal that for US manufacturing 1958-77, industry losses due to strike 
activity are negligible or zero; shifts in production between firms and over time 
virtually offset all output losses. However, such an aggregated study, as with previous 
estimates quoted for the UK, misses the fundamental point that the costs to the actual 
participants will be high.. It is these individual costs which are important when 
attempting to explain the level and nature of conflict activity. 
The consequences of strike action are also uncertain. At the macroeconomic level, the 
available evidence on strikes and inflation is limited and not conclusive and strikes 
in this context are often being used as a proxy for union power which implies that 
their separate effect is not identifiable. Moreover, as shown by Stewart (1983,1987) 
among others, the relative wage advantage of those covered by collective agreements, 
and thus those more able to take collective action, would appear to be small in 
practice. Note, however, the ability to take action does not necessarily imply that this 
threat effect has to be invoked; indeed, stronger unions may need to actually utilise 
their 'strike weapon' less frequently than weaker unions. 
28. The relevant literature includes Godfrey (1971), Taylor (1972), Purdy & Zis (1973), Johnson & Timbrell 
(1974) and Knight (1972), while Ward &Z is (1974) provide an international comparison. 
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Examining the consequences for inflation or wages fails to recognise that it is the 
individuals' costs which are important when attempting to explain the level and nature 
of conflict activity in terms of its costs. While sickness and industrial accidents may 
be responsible for many more days lost as previously noted, the significance of strikes 
is that their impact is concentrated, that they are more intensive and thus cause much 
greater disruption. Hence, although there are serious methodological problems, it 
would seem important to try to gauge the consequences of strikes and other industrial 
action. 
Chapter 6 of the thesis makes a preliminary investigation of the consequences of 
strike action for industrial output and efficiency. Production frontiers are estimated 
for a panel of 3-digit production industries for the 1970s. Even at this relatively high 
level of disaggregation, there are still no discernible output losses arising from either 
strike frequency or strike incidence; either lost output is made up within the plant or 
firm affected, or is compensated by increased production by other industry group 
members. However, decomposing the strikes variable reveals that there is a 
marginally significant negative impact on output of a high number of very short 
strikes. Thus industries which are dominated by frequent short stoppages would seem 
to incur some overall output losses. 
The second half of chapter 6 analyses the consequences of strike activity for relative 
efficiency at the 3-digit level. Controlling for other relevant plant, workforce and 
workplace characteristics reveals that industries which are highly unionised are less 
efficient. However, this effect would seem to derive from union presence (or 
collective bargaining coverage) per se, rather than from the actions of unions in terms 
of high levels of strike activity. Indeed, strikes may even have 
.a 
slightly mitigating 
effect. 
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2.4. Summary and Conclusions. 
The appraisal and analysis of the extant studies presented above has revealed a 
number of important shortcomings in the literature pertaining to strikes and other 
forms of conflict activity. There are several criticisms of the models themselves and 
their empirical implementations have been rather weak. Research into industrial 
conflict in Britain has been particularly' deficient to date. The utility of the 
macroeconomic aggregate studies in general has been called into question; there are a 
variety of extant models describing different time periods and, although theoretically 
quite different in origin, they tend to be empirically very similar and consequently fail 
to discriminate between the competing hypotheses that they purport to represent. No 
conclusions have been reached as to the cyclicality of strike frequency and thus the 
single 'stylised fact' of procyclicality has yet to be established for British strike 
activity. There are also very few studies of dimensions of strikes other than frequency, 
and those that examine British strike durations do not appropriately control for 
observed and unobserved differences between strikes. -In addition, there are still very 
few studies at the disaggregated level for British strike activity and thus 
microeconomic evidence is also extremely scarce. Although there have been some 
recent micro-theoretical advances yielding directly testable predictions, as yet there 
have been no applications to strike activity in Britain. Furthermore, these models are 
arguably even less appropriate outside North American systems of industrial relations 
than the earlier, essentially macroeconomic model of Ashenfelter & Johnson. Finally, 
the causes and consequences of industrial action in Britain are still largely unknown. 
The following chapters aim to address some of these issues as highlighted at the 
relevant junctures in the discussion above. The thesis does not pretend to be 
exhaustive however and concentrates in particular on the determination of the 
outbreak of conflict. Perhaps the most important omissions are an analysis of strike 
durations and the other fundamental dimensions of conflict, and of the specification 
of an appropriate formulation of an asymmetric bargaining model for the system of 
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industrial relations that exists in Britain. Thus, while arguably eclectic in approach, 
the subsequent chapters concentrate on establishing the patterns in industrial conflict, 
in particular with regard to strike frequency, conflict incidence and the impact of 
strikes, that any successful theoretical model must be able to encompass. Chapter 3 
evaluates the aggregate macroeconomic models of strike frequency and finds them to 
be seriously deficient. However, the cyclicality of strikes over wages is established. 
Chapter 4 examines the important distinction between strike frequency and strike 
incidence in the 1980s; thereafter, an empirical model is developed for the incidence 
of industrial conflict together with the co-determination of strike and non-strike 
activity. Chapter 5 concentrates exclusively on the public-private sector distinction, 
and finds few significant ceteris paribus differences in the incidence of strike action 
between the sectors while chapter 6 examines some of the consequences of strike 
activity for productivity and efficiency. Certainly each of these chapters reveal several 
interesting empirical conclusions that merit further investigation. Their central 
findings are appraised and analysed in the final and concluding chapter of the thesis. 
47 
.... cI... .:.. 
7s 
y 
Wage, 
increase 
., 
ýý 
0t Strike length 
y 
ýý 
Wage 
increase 
S 
S 
0 S+ 
Strike length 
48 
CHAPTER 3 
A Reassessment of British Post=War`'Aggregaie'Strike Frequency 
3.1. Introduction. 
The central purpose of this chapter is to reassess the aggregate. strike statistics for the 
UK, with particular emphasis on strike frequency since this has been the dimension of 
industrial conflict that has received most attention in the literature., Section 3.2 
presents a brief synopsis of the centrally collated statistics on industrial conflict since 
these have been the source for almost all of the investigation and commentary made 
with reference to strike activity in Britain to, date. In general, researchers have 
claimed that their studies show strike frequency to be procyclical. However, for UK 
strike activity at least, the adequacy, of these econometric models has yet to be 
establishedl, and most do not cover strike -activity 
in the 1970s or. 1980s. Thus in 
section 3.3 the results obtained from re-estimating two popular, macro-economic time- 
series studies of strike frequency are presented. Subjecting these models to rigourous 
econometric investigation reveals that they are fundamentally misspecified in a 
number of ways. Even satisfactory econometric specifications obtained from suitably 
transformed models still fail dramatically in post-sample predictions. 
It has long been argued that strikes are a cyclical phenomenon and much of the 
earliest literature concentrated exclusively on this observation (see, for example, 
Hansen (1921), Knowles (1952), Rees (1952)). Many econometric studies also 
incorporate indicators of the business cycle such as unemployment and the rate of 
change of prices. Indeed, given their aggregated nature, it is possible to interpret 
1. In contrast, Abbott (1984) presents a detailed examination of several models using Canadian data. 
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many of the time-series studies of strike frequency as purely descriptive models? 
Although söme'are based ön formal economic analysis, many simply resort toad 
höc 
theorising for their choice of explanatory variables and strike frequency is typically 
simply related linearly to a set of aggregate economic indicators of the state of the 
cycle. 
Given the rather pessimistic findings from aggregate econometric models, section 3.4 
provides' a purely' statistical analysis of the cyclicality of strike frequency, 
disaggregated by cause and broad industrial sector. In light of the results obtained, in 
particular that it is wage strikes in the non-coal sector that are most strongly cyclical, 
section 3.5 presents some preliminary estimates of a , new empirical model for 
quarterly strike frequency in Britain. This takes into account the inappropriateness of 
the cyclical measures that' have been employed in previous models. In addition, 
estimation spans the whole of the post-war period, including more recent times during 
which major developments have taken place in the environment in which collective 
bargaining is conducted. Some conclusions and prospects for further research into 
strike frequency are discussed in the final section of the chapter. 
3.2. Industrial Conflict in Britain: A Summary of the Available Evidence. 
Information about stoppages in the UK is collated by the Department of Employment 
(DE) on a voluntary basis, through local Unemployment Benefit Offices, returns from 
nationalised industries, public bodies and large firms, reports in the national and local 
press and, for some larger stoppages, directly from the organisations involved3. There 
obviously exist problems in ensuring complete coverage and partly for this reason, 
stoppages involving fewer than ten workers and those lasting less than one day are 
2. That is, rather than investigating the causes or consequences of strike action, they simply tend to describe when 
strikes are more or less likely to occur. 
3. The origins of British strike statistics are discussed by Creigh (1982). 
50 
excluded from the statistics unless the total number of working days lost exceeds one 
hundred. It is not possible to quantify the under-recording that this implies; clearly it 
llt " ".. I VrJ 
will be greatest for the number of strikes whereas the statistics for the total number of 
workers involved and total working days lost should be less adversely affected. The 
reporting method also leads to some other unfortunate biases; in that typically each 
party to any dispute may have a vested interest to misrepresent the size and scope of 
any strike action, then the fact that typically the DE is more reliant on the information 
yielded by employers may be of some concern when assessing the coverage of the 
official statistics. Perceptions of conflict can and do differ widely4 and the portrayal 
of conflict by the media also has an important role (Philo (1990)). Even the responses 
of those actually involved can differ in the identification and definition of the 
characteristics of any strike. For example, in the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (Millward & Stevens (1986)), while in 89.1% of establishments worker and 
management respondents agreed as to whether or not a strike had arisen among 
manual workers in the previous 12 month period, in the remaining 10.9% of 
establishments, they disagreed. For non-manual workers, the extent of disagreement 
was even greater, with either but not both of the respondents reporting that a strike 
had occurred in the previous year in 12.1% of all establishments. The divergences in 
responses between managers and workers are investigated more fully in chapter 4 and 
various suggestions are made for treating the discrepancies in measurement that these 
differing perceptions of conflict imply. 
The three basic indices of stoppage activity recorded for each strike in Britain can be 
related in the identity: 
Days Lost - Strike Size x Duration 
where Strike Size is the average number of workers involved in the dispute and 
4. Compare, for example, MacGregor (1986), Reed & Adamson (1985), Samuel et al (1986) and Winterton & 
Winterton (1989) as conflicting accounts and interpretations of the miners' strike in 1984-5. 
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Duration is measured in dayss. The total number of. days lost is. then obtained by- 
summing, over, all disputes. This relationship can be applied at any level, of 
aggregation, to any unit of. observation and, for any time period of interest. Each 
component of the identity expressed above reflects a different dimension of conflict, 
yet as will be seen below, there is a pronounced emphasis in the literature on the study_ 
of the number of strikes. Thus, before any inference or deductions can be drawn from 
the current studies, further justification needs to be made for this concentration on 
strike frequency since there is no guarantee that the characteristics of this series will 
be similar to those of the other dimensions of strikes. Indeed, as is shown below, there 
are some rather pronounced differences. 
One suggestion made in response to such criticism is that efforts should be directed 
towards creating an index of strike activity which appropriately encapsulates all its 
various possible dimensions. The notion of a 'volume' of strike activity has already, 
been used by Kerr & Siegal (1954), Britt & Galle (1972) and Shorter & Tilly (1974) 
among others6. Galambos & Evans (1966a, 1973), recognising that working days lost 
is a very crude measure of any reduction in output, compute a multi-dimensional 
'index' of stoppage. activity. However, they simply take the unweighted arithmetic 
mean of the frequency, days lost and number of workers involved (the latter two 
dimensions scaled by employment in the sector) and this seems inadequate, as noted 
by Knowles (1966). The problem is that the three indices need to be weighted in order 
to measure the (economic) loss accountable to the strike, but that there is no method 
of determining the appropriate weights to use. The relative importance of each of the 
components depends upon the structure of the industry, will differ according to'the 
5. Note that this differs from the identity presented by Hirsch & Addison (1986, p. 76) in their equation (4.1). They 
claim that total days lost is the product of the number of stoppages, the average number of workers involved and 
average duration. This is dearly incorrect since Xs; d; ' n(js; /nX d; /n). 
6. For example, Shorter & Tilly (1974) found that although days lost due to strikes in France was little changed 
over the period under consideration, the nature of strikes was very different. They viewed strike activity as a 
rectangular solid (frequency x size x duration) whose sides changed independently, but whose volume was 
unchanged. 
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context of the action and will change over time., Knowles (1966) contends that simply 
taking the average is a -spurious 
convenience. and probably, says, less. , 
than each 
component would in isolation7., Thus, rather, than a single index, the alternative of 
investigating how each of the measures of conflict vary in response, to external forces 
along the lines of the existing studies of strike frequency would, seem to be a 
preferable methodology. Each component's contribution to the overall 'volume' of 
strike activity could then be separately ascertained. The merits and demerits of 
attempting to combine the measures in some manner can then be discussed in light of 
the findings from the separate studies of each dimensions. Details of the coverage of 
each of the official statistical series are provided separately for each dimension of 
strikes in sub-sections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4 below., Firstly however, _ 
some problems of 
definition and interpretation in the measurement of strikes warrant attention. 
That UK strike statistics are not a particularly accurate representation or reflection of 
the extent and pattern of industrial conflict has long been recognised (see, for 
example, Shalev (1978b)). Much of the criticism has been reserved for the coverage 
and criteria that have been traditionally used to record conflict behaviour in particular, 
and that the official statistics ignore forms of conflict. other than strikes9. There is 
some industry-specific evidence to suggest that the, extent of under-recording of 
strikes is very serious, although it is impossible to make generalisations from this to 
the economy as a whole. Some estimates are presented in Turner et al (1967) and 
Kelly & Nicholson (1980) for the motor industry and in Brown (1981) for, the 
7. In fairness, in their reply to Knowles, Galambos & Evans (1966b) argue that their index is only intended for 
comparison, not measurement, and thus only an algebraic system of combining the indices is required. In the 
update of their earlier analysis, Galambos & Evans (1973) go further and argue that since their index does not 
measure hardship, loss of profits, wages or output, but only shows changes in the level of strike activity (and draws 
no implications as a result of such variations), then no weighting system is required in logical terms. 
8. However it should be recognised that although all the components in equation (3.1) are obviously interrelated, 
several important distinctions and relative changes are likely to be obscured by simple (or more complex) 
aggregation. 
9. A comprehensive note describing the compilation of the strikes statistics is published most years along with the 
annual summaries in the Employment Gazette. The most recent of these is Employment Gazette. July 1990, p346. 
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manufacturing sector as a whole. The latter suggests that, although direct contact was 
established in only a small minority of cases, it would appear that, together with other 
sources availaýle, to bocllAepartment of Employment officers, 62% of eligible strikes 
and 96% of working days lost in manufacturing in 1976-77 were recorded in the 
official statistics. - ... 1 ,. 
Perhaps of greater importance than the completeness of the coverage of the official 
statistics is their consistency in recording strikes over time. There seems no obvious 
way in which this can be assessed, and hence it has to be assumed that the efficiency 
with which strikes are recorded has been fairly constant over the period of interest. 
However, this is a potentially important caveat when utilising the data compiled by 
the Department of Employment, and thus the confirmation of any patterns and trends 
identified in the official Department of Employment statistics by comparison with 
other sources of data is clearly desirable. 
In addition to the non-recording of short disputes described above (and the probable 
under-recording of stoppages near the margins of the definitions), strikes over issues 
not directly linked to terms and conditions of employment are not included in the 
official statistics. Thus disputes of a 'political' nature are excluded although, until 
comparatively recently, these probably accounted for very few working days being 
lost in the UK10. Strikes and lock-outs are not distinguished, nor are 'lawful' and 
'unlawful' strikes most probably because of the difficulty in assigning such categories 
to any particular dispute. In light of the increasingjuridification' of British industrial 
relations (see, for example, Clark (1985)) it would be interesting to have this 
classificationll. 
10 Thus protest strikes over the 1971 Industrial Relations Act and over the abolition of the Greater London 
Council are not included in the official statistics. 
11, In particular, the implementation of the Trade Union Act in September 1984 made strikes unlawful if a ballot 
of workers has not been conducted, or if the ballot paper does not make it explicit that, by striking, the workers 
would be in breach of contract. 
54 
Whether a strike is 'official' or 'unofficial' was recorded up until -1981; this- distinction 
has now been dropped from the annually published summaries in the Employment 
Gazette most probably because of the difficulty in categorising each dispute. -It should 
be noted that the vast majority of strikes were (and still are)'unofficial: In the period 
1966 to 1984, less than 5% of all strikes were classified as 'official'12, and this is 
probably symptomatic of the spontaneity with which industrial action is usually taken. 
As Hyman (1984) notes, 
"The common stereotype of the strike as a carefully - planned' 
confrontation between union and employer organisations is not 
characteristic of stoppages in general. Disputes have traditionally 
stemmed principally from the initiative of the union rank and file. " 
(p. 41) 
Unfortunately, international comparisons of strike activity are severely hampered by 
the differing coverage of each country's statistics. For example, since 1981, - the US 
Bureau of Labour Statistics has only recorded disputes involving more than 1,000 
workers. Edwards (1983) calculates from data collected prior to 1981 that this will 
remove around 94% of stoppages from the figures and will therefore make it very 
difficult to perform many kinds of comparative analysis. It will also result in over 
35% of workers involved and working days lost no longer being recorded in the 
official statistics, with the new size criterion for measurement exhibiting a wide 
coverage variation over previous years13. For other countries, the greatest differences 
12. Source: Department of Employment Industrial Stoppages Data Tapes, 1966-1984. For the period after 1981, 
these still record whether each strike was made official at any stage despite this distinction being dropped from the 
published statistics. 
13, It should be noted that Garen & Krislov (1988) dissent from this view. They examine a semi-logari thmic strike 
equation separately for small and large US strikes prior to 1981. While they find that coefficient equality is 
rejected for the two series, they argue that this is "due to a minority of coefficients" (p. 80) and hence conclude that 
research can continue to be done on long-term strike patterns with the new series comprising large strikes only. 
'Their failure to recognise that their estimating equations may be unstable over time is fundamentally important 
(there are no tests for stability or any other misspecification), and suggests that their conclusion is overly 
optimistic. Hundley & Koreisha (1987) present evidence to suggest that a stable post-war strike equation for the 
US does not exist. This has the implication that large and small strikes series may behave somewhat differently, 
and thus the new BLS recording criterion will seriously jeopardise any new research into US strike activity 
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are between the criteria. used to determine whether , any_ particular 
dispute will be 
included in the official statistics. Most, including the UK, exclude small stoppages, 
and detailed descriptions of these 'minimum' criteria are provided in the, Employment 
Gazette, April 198514. The treatment of political disputes also differs widely between 
countries as does the inclusion or exclusion of workers indirectly involved in. the 
dispute. Clearly these differences prevent definitive comparisons between countries. 
At best, as Shalev (1978a) notes, comparison. should be limited to evaluating 
similarity and diversity in. trends, rather, than directly comparing. 
, 
the statistical 
characteristics of strikes under different recording methods. He describes in. some 
detail the problems that arise in international comparisons; further discussion can be 
found in Turner (1969a), McCarthy (1970) and Fisher (1973). 
There are, no attempts to provide an international comparative exercise in this thesis. 
This is not due to narrow parochialism but rather because it is first necessary to widen 
the scope of investigation relating to industrial conflict in Britain. Summaries of the 
levels of post-war strike activity in terms of each of the dimensions, of strikes follow 
in the next four sub-sections together with a further critique of each series as a 
measure of conflict. For completeness and comparison, the available evidence on 
non-strike activity is described and discussed in the appendix, to this chapter, section 
A3.1. 
3.2.1. Number of Strikes. 
As noted above, although the number of stoppages is the statistic most, frequently 
used by economists in their- studies of industrial 
, 
conflict, there are a number of 
reasons why the official record may be severely under-recording, especially in small 
firms. In the literature this issue has typically been ignored despite the spurious results 
it may be generating and there seems to be no simple method of successfully 
14. See also Crouch & Pizzarno (1978, pp. 328-332). 
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measuring or discounting the bias that exists. The extent of under-recording of 
eligible strikes has gone, largely unexamined except. for a few specific , 
industries. 
However, this masks the more considerable bias resulting from the fact that many 
short strikes are not recorded by the official statistics. because they do not meet the 
'minimum size' requirement of the Department of Employment. Brown (1981, pp. 99- 
100) estimates that, for, manufacturing, the two effects together may imply that the 
official statistics, record, only about, one fifth of, the total number -of stoppages 
occurring15. Indeed, the size eligibility requirement may account for some , of 
the 
positive correlation exhibited between the number of strikes and size of the firm (see, 
for example, Smith et al (1978)), since it implies a bias in favour of reporting strikes 
which occur in large firms. 
The Department of Employment records every, stoppage, regardless of its extent, as a 
single dispute. Thus, although the series for strike frequency may reflect the number 
of separate outbreaks of overt action, it is clear that the considerable heterogeneity 
that exists between strikes is not revealed by such measures. Thus the miners' strike of 
1984-85 is given . 
the same weight in the frequency statistics as a walk-out, for a few 
hours by, sufficient workers to meet the minimum size, requirement of the recording 
criteria. The attraction of the series for researchers is that it displays considerably less 
volatility than the other measures available although this is, of course, insufficient 
reason for discounting the other dimensions of industrial conflict. 
The total number of strikes beginning each year from 1945 to 1989 is shown in 
figure 3.1 along with the number, of strikes outside the coal industry16. This clearly 
illustrates the generally increasing growth in stoppage frequency from 1950 through 
to the peak in 1970, and the decline witnessed thereafter. For non-coal stoppages, the 
15. The figures for days lost are, of course, little affected by such problems since they are typically dominated by a 
few large, lengthy disputes. 
16. For convenience, tables and figures are gathered together at the end of each of the chapters of the thesis. 
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increasing trend through the 1950s and 1960s and the decline after 1970 are both very 
prominent, although there are still quite considerable year-on-year fluctuations. It is 
also evident that while the number of coal strikes dominated the aggregate statistics in 
the 1940s and 1950s, they have subsequently become a smaller and smaller fraction 
of the total. Indeed, the raw data reveal that coal strikes comprised some three- 
quarters of all disputes which met the Department of Employment recording criteria 
in the 1950s but, while 1970 marked the peak in strike frequency, the number of coal 
strikes was actually at its lowest post-war level and comprised only 4% of the total 
number of stoppages in that year. Subsequently, the number of disputes in the coal 
industry has remained comparatively stable while the number of stoppages elsewhere 
has fallen dramatically. Consequently the proportion of coal strikes has actually risen 
in the 1980s17. 
It is also of some interest to examine the recorded causes of strikes and how these 
have changed over the period under consideration. Figure 3.2 makes a preliminary 
comparison of stoppages arising from disputes over wages with all other disputes. It 
can be, seen that the pattern in total strike frequency is quite similar to that of the 
number of wage strikes, while the number of non-wage strikes displays much less 
variation around its mean. This raises several important and interesting questions. In 
particular, it would appear that the overall volume of strikes is primarily driven by the 
occurrence or otherwise of disputes over wages. The number of strikes over all other 
issues, while not time-invariant, is much less sensitive to the changing economic, 
political and social environment. This general conclusion is most starkly illustrated in 
the post-1970 period. It is the dramatic fall in the number of disputes over wages that 
has been primarily responsible for the overall decrease in strike frequency. Therefore, 
in order to understand the changing overall level of strike activity it would appear that 
the first concern should be to explain the fluctuations in the number of strikes over 
17. The exception, of course, is 1984, reflecting the miners' strike of that year, very few coal strikes were recorded 
because there was, simply, one very large dispute. 
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wage issues. 
3.2.2. Number of Workers Involved. . ir 
Strikes vary considerably in size and it, is clear that their economic, political and 
social impact will differ according to the number of workers involved. Clearly, it is 
often difficult to distinguish those simply laid-off (indirectly involved) from those 
actually participating in the dispute (especially given the reporting methods used) and 
thus the statistics published by the Department of Employment record those both 
directly and indirectly involved at the establishment(s) where the dispute occurred. 
The Department of Employment attempts to record the total number of workers 
involved at any time in the dispute, but this presents difficulties since the number 
taking. industrial action for the first time will not usually be available; in such cases 
the statistics simply record the maximum number involved at any one time. There 
may therefore be an under-recording of the total number of workers involved in any 
dispute. 
There are at least two additional problems with the official statistics for the number of 
workers involved. Firstly, because individual strikes are aggregated. in the published 
statistics, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the willingness of individuals to 
take strike action in support of any dispute. This can also manifest itself in double 
counting; as noted by Smith et al (1978), if one hundred workers strike three times a 
year, the aggregate number of workers involved increases by three hundred, and thus 
the statistics can be a rather misleading indicator of workforce 'militancy'. Moreover, 
as recognised by Batstone et al (1978) among others, the figures for the number of 
workers involved only yield a limited amount of information about the nature of the 
strike. In particular, the organisational level at which the strike occurred (plant, trade 
union or particular skill category for example) is not revealed by the aggregated 
statistics and, this feature of the strike. seems likely to have ramifications as to the 
cause and likely consequences of strike action. 
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A second major problem is the inclusion of those workers only indirectly involved. 
This results in a further bias since bigger plants are likely 'tö have more' workers 
indirectly involved, especially if there is `some form 'of'cöntinuoüs production process 
as in much of manufacturing for 'example. Thus''strikes at larger workplaces tend to 
show up disproportionately in the statistics for workers involved, irrespective of the 
number of' workers actually taking' strike action18. "Once again therefore, the 
conclusion that large plants incur greater levels of strike activity is at least partially an 
artefact of the recording methodology. Finally, ) however, the statistics do not-include 
those laid-off in consequence of the dispute at other points in the production chain. 
Clearly the full repercussions of any single dispute cännot be traced throughout the 
whole economy' but it should be noted that this does'present an inconsistency in the 
construction of the statistics for the number of workers involved as a measure of the 
scope or intensity of the strike. At a minimum, the coverage of the statistics for the 
number of workers 'involved' in any particular dispute seems rather arbitrary and 
appears likely to differ between individual strikes. 
Figure 3.3 plots the annual totals for workers involved in stoppages in progress in the 
post-war period. This clearly illustrates the considerable volatility of this particular 
dimension of strike activity. The graph is dominated by the two peaks in 1962 and in 
1979; more than twice as many employees participated in industrial conflict in these 
particular years than in any other year in the post-war era. The peak in 1962 
represents the two national one-day engineering and shipbuilding stoppages of that 
year, while that in 1979 is principally a reflection of the national dispute in 
engineering in the late summer of 1979, although the so called 'winter of discontent' 
also contributes to the overall total number of workers involved. However, as 
Whitehead (1985) notes with regard to the latter, 
ig. It is also possible that some of those recorded as indirectly involved may only be so as the consequence of 
sanctions imposed by management in order to indirectly pressurise those taking strike action to return to work. 
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"... it was neither the extent of the strikes nor the economic damage, 
caused by them which made an impact. The strikes were effective 
, because they were visible and they hurt the public 
directly. " (p. 281)_,, 
It is apparent from the raw data that a small number of disputes typically dominates 
the composition of, the statistics in each year, and it is this size concentration that 
leads to the considerable volatility exhibited by. the series for the number of workers 
involved (and, consequently, the number, of days lost as shown in sub-section 3.2.4). 
Extending the summary for 1960 to 1979 presented in the Employment Gazette 
September 1980 for the period up to 1989 demonstrates this phenomenon. The 91 
stoppages that involved over 200,000 days lost in these three decades accounted for 
31% of all workers involved and 55% of all working days lost, but only comprised 
0.15% of the total number of strikes19. These large strikes tend to be official and have 
distinctive and rather specific causal factors. Thus there is a need to somehow remove 
these from the statistics in order that the underlying patterns and trends in the 
extensiveness of strike activity (as measured by the number of workers participating 
in strike action in any year) can be discerned. 
3.2.3. Strike Durations. 
There are several reasons why the duration of a strike is of particular interest. Firstly, 
it may yield information about the nature and significance of any particular stoppage; 
trials of strength may be compared with 'token demonstrations' (Hyman (1984)). 
While the former dominate the aggregate statistics, especially for days lost, most- 
strikes are of the latter variety in which the decision to stop working is spontaneous. 
Secondly, Creigh (1978) among others has argued that the real cost of a strike results, 
from the delay it produces in the production process, rather than an irrecoverable loss 
in output, and thus the duration of a strike is one , potential 
indicator of its cost. 
Thirdly, the speed at which disputes are settled is indicative of the efficacy of the 
negotiation and bargaining mechanisms in operation. 
19. In fact, the concentration in large strikes is even more acute than this. Further analysis shows that the 35 
stoppages involving more than 500,000 days lost still comprise ý7% of all workers involved and almost half of all 
days lost in the period. 
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The Department of Employment aggregates strike durations into several banded 
measures for, strikes longer than,. fiye days, currently completing the categorisation 
with an open-ended interval comprising all strikes of over fifty days in length20. This 
form of measurement implies that it is not possible to directly calculate the average 
duration of strikes unless strong distributional, assumptions are made21. Thus 
figure 3.4 depicts the post-war patterns in the distribution of strike. durations; the. chart 
depicts the proportions of strikes lasting up to 2 days and up to 5 days. It is 
immediately apparent that most stoppages, are of limited, duration;, on average, over 
half last no more than 2 days and more than three-quarters last 5 days or less. It is also 
important to note that these proportions are for recorded strikes only; given the 
minimum size criteria used in the compilation of , 
the statistics, they would be 
somewhat higher if all stoppages were included. .. 
It is also evident that the duration distribution of stoppages has not been invariant 
over the whole period. Following the relatively stable post-war decade, strike 
durations increased almost monotonically until the mid-1970s, since when they have 
decreased sharply (although are still longer, than during the 1950s). This may at first 
suggest that UK strike durations are largely unrelated. to the, economic cycle, contrary 
to the findings of Kennaa (1985) and Harrison & Stewart (1989), for the US and 
Canada respectively, who both find countercyclicality in (manufacturing) strike 
durations. However, the trends exhibited in figure 3.4 may also be due to the changing 
composition of the number of strikes throughout the period and/or any of the other 
numerous differences between them. Some evidence is provided by disaggregating 
strike durations by cause of stoppage and industrial sector using the Department of 
20. The duration band-widths used have not been consistent over the whole of the post-war period. 
21. Meaningful estimates of average durations cannot be reliably calculated from the ratio of days lost to workers 
involved as in Edwards (1983), since both these series are frequently dominated by one or two very large strikes in 
each year. Tice annual summary tables in the Employment Gazette show that median durations are typically 2 to 4 
days. 
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Employment Stoppages Tapes. This exercise reveals that strikes in the non-coal sector 
are longer, on average, than those in the coal industry. Since the former increasingly 
replaced the latter as the dominant determinant of the overall level of strike activity 
from 1950 onwards, then average durations would be expected to increase, ceteris 
paribus, and this tendency is indeed apparent in figure 3.4. Similarly, strikes arising 
over the level of remuneration would appear to be longer than non-wage stoppages. 
Given the falling proportion of wage strikes in total strikes since the peak in 1970 as 
shown in figure 3.2, then average durations would be expected to fall again. These 
two 'composition' effects clearly explain at least some of the trends displayed by the 
duration distribution, but clearly much more detailed investigation is necessary before 
any firm conclusions can be drawn22. 
3.2.4. Number of Days Lost. 
In the technical note attached to the annual summary of stoppages in the Employment 
Gazette, the Department of Employment argue that the figures for working days lost 
are the best indicator of the impact of industrial conflict. This assertion is based on the 
fact that the number of strikes is under-recorded due to the omission of strikes that are 
small; since the number of days lost in short strikes represents a tiny fraction of the 
total number of working days lost, then the latter is a better measure of the level of 
conflict than strike frequency. While there are undoubtedly problems arising from the 
unreserved use of the statistics as discussed below, days lost is clearly an important 
dimension of industrial conflict. Despite this, it has received scant attention in the 
literature to date. 
The unit of reference for days lost is the basic working day, excluding overtime 
working. Where a strike lasts less than a complete number of days (or shifts), hours 
22 
. It should perhaps be noted that the duration distributions for these disaggregated series 
display quite similar 
patterns to those for the total number of strikes (although they are only available for the period 1966-1984), and 
thus increasing durations followed by decreasing durations may have typified stoppages more generally over the 
period. 
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lost are converted to full-days equivalents as are any days lost by part-time workers. 
However, it is clear that comparisons between different sectors of the economy will 
be hampered by the extent to which the standard working day differs and thus the 
proportional impact on output, for example; will not be the same for any given 
percentage of days lost. 
There are at least two major objections to the unreserved and unqualified use of these 
data. Firstly, as seen in sub-section 3.2.2, the-figures. for days lost are typically 
dominated by a few very large strikes, particularly when these occur at the national 
level. Hence the statistic can be a very misleading indicator on a year to year basis of 
the state of industrial relations in the economy. In 1984 for example, the miners' strike 
resulted in an almost unprecedented total for days lost, and yet this was. but one strike 
in a year which saw the number of disputes at its lowest level for any year in the post- 
war period. Secondly, given the coverage problems noted above in relation to the 
number of workers involved, then the number of days lost may under- or over- 
emphasise the impact of strike action. 
Figure 3.5 presents the annual aggregates for the number of days lost. The volatility 
of this series is evident, and reflects the different composition of some of the major 
disputes in the last four decades. The statistics are dominated by three peaks; the first 
corresponds to the Post Office and car workers disputes in 1971 and the two miners' 
strikes of January-February 1972 and February-March 1974; the second reflects the 
strike by public service and hospital ancillary workers and the national engineering 
workers' stoppage in the late summer of 1979 together with the national steel strike in 
1980; finally, the third is exclusively due to the miners' strike of 1984-85. Of these, 
only 1979 is exceptional in terms of the number of workers involved as seen in 
figure 3.3 above, while the peaks around "1971-74 and 1984 are the result of strikes 
that were extraordinary because of their length. 
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An indication of the relative scope of strike action is more clearly illustrated by the 
series for the number of days lost per employee in employment. This series is 
presented in figure 3.6 and reveals that only in the three years 1972,1979 and 1984 
did UK employees lose, on average, more than a single day each in stoppage activity. 
For the whole period, workers spent less than half a day per annum involved in overt 
strike action. This helps to place strikes in context; the number of days lost is an order 
of magnitude smaller than the number lost through sickness or industrial accidents. 
Knowles (1952) goes further and claims that 
"... it is clear that the loss in working time from other causes has 
hitherto been very much greater- than the loss from -strikes. - Again the 
loss of time and output from managerial inefficiency, for example, 
may sometimes be considerable; but while- the time lost by workers is 
measureable, that lost by managers is not. " (p. 251) 
However, this does not imply that the study of conflict is unimportant; the impact of 
industrial disputes is concentrated both over time and in dispersion and strikes are 
therefore of much greater significance, particularly to the active participants. 
Typically, there can be no allowance for a strike while an average level of sickness 
can be indemnified against by proportional over-employment to the extent to which 
workers are expected to be ill. Finally, strikes are likely to affect workplace morale 
and disrupt output and may also have an inflated impact in the wider economy 
through shock and spillover effects. 
In summary, the above description of the centrally collated statistics relating to strikes 
in Britain demonstrates firstly, that strikes are uncommon, and secondly, mostly of 
limited duration and size. Moreover, non-strike action is seen to be at least as 
prevalent as overt strike action. 
3.3. Replication and Re-estimation of Two Selected Models. 
As seen in chapter 2 above, there are a large number and wide variety of models for 
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strike frequency. Although often theoretically quite different in origin, they tend to be 
empirically-very similar and consequently fail to discriminate between the competing 
hypotheses that they purport to represent. Moreover, they have yet to be rigourously 
tested or extended to the whole of the post-war period and it can therefore be argued 
that a satisfactory empirical macro-model of UK post-war strike activity has yet to be 
established. This section of the thesis addresses these issues in particular., .. -- 
The exercise to be performed is one of replication and re-estimation. Utilising a wider 
range of econometric techniques than was available to previous authors, the primary 
purpose is to discover to what extent competing extant models adequately describe 
strike frequency for the period for which they were originally specified, and to 
investigate their ability to explain subsequent strike activity. The two models chosen 
for comparison are those of Pencavel, (1970) and Shorey (1977), this choice being 
governed by a number of considerations. Pencavel's study was effectively the first 
application of the model of Ashenfelter & Johnson to UK data and is one of the few 
that have an underlying theoretical model23 and many of the other models cited in 
section 2.3 are similar in specification. An obvious exception is the paper by Shorey 
(1977) which is also unusual in including a lagged dependent variable, and can be 
considered to be representative of the class of models that is based on more informal 
reasoning. Both of these models were originally estimated for all disputes excluding 
coal mining over the same period, 1950(1) to 1967(2), and this will facilitate non- 
nested comparisons. Finally, these papers by Pencavel and Shorey remain two of the 
most widely cited of all studies of post-war strike frequency in the UK. It would 
therefore seem prudent to test and evaluate their alternative specifications given the 
recent advances in econometric methodology and the longer time-series now 
23. It should be noted that several heroic assumptions are necessary to translate their theoretical model into an 
operational specification. Full details are given in Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969) and discussed in sub-section 2.2.1 
above. 
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available'. 
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3.3.1. Replication of Peneavel (1970)25 
Pencavel postulates that the number of stoppages beginning ideach quarter is linearly 
related to a set of seasonal dummies (Q1t, Q2t, Q3), the rate of unemployment (U), 
the ratio of profits to total compensation (D), a moving average of real wage changes 
(jß1ARt-j), and a time trend (T). His preferred basic specification and results are 
presented in column 1 of table 3.1. The six lag coefficients (ß1) on real wage changes 
(Ak, i=1,..., 6) are restricted by imposing a second degree polynomial with the far 
endpoint constraint (1 ý= 0) imposed, by the method of Almon 
(1965). This implies 
that only two parameters are freely estimated, from which the ßi can be recovered. 
Somewhat curiously perhaps, real wage changes are defined as, 
ARt =100[(Wt+2'Wc-2)/2Wt - (Pt+2-Pt-2)I2Pt) (3.1) 
where Wt is an index of weekly wage rates and Pt is the retail price index. This 
specification may be intended to 'centre' the rate of change at the current period, 
although this does not explain the divisor of 2. 
Despite Pencavel detailing his sources, it has not been possible to replicate his results 
exactly as can be seen in column 226. However, they are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar and again provide broad support for the model of 
Ashenfelter & Johnson27. The number of strikes tends to be lower when 
unemployment is high, reflecting the lack of alternative job opportunities available to 
striking workers. Higher relative profitability raises workers' aspirations and 'hence 
24. Forrest (1990) attempts a similar exercise to that described below for the model of Davies (1979). However, 
she meets with little success in either replication or respeciflcation.. 
25 
. The software used for this section of the chapter was Datafit (Pesaran & Pesaran (1987)) and Microfit, version 
3.0 (Pesaran & Pesaran (1991)). 
26. In particular, the coefficient on Dt is larger in both magnitude and significance. 
27. The appendix, table A3.2, details the data sources utilised here. 
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tends to increase strike activity. Employees are less militant the larger recent real 
wage increases have been, and hence the coefficient on lagged real wage changes is 
negative. One immediate criticism is that although Pencavel excludes the current real 
wage change in his specification in order to avoid any simultaneous equation bias, he 
still includes contemporaneous Dt. Since the latter represents the employers' 
bargaining gain, it is also simultaneously determined with the level of wages. and thus 
should again be included as a lagged variable on similar grounds. There tend to be 
more strikes in the first half of the year and the trend term is highly significant. This 
reflects the fact that over the sample period, non-coal strike frequency increased by 
nearly 60% as seen in figure 3.1. Pencavel offers a variety of explanations of this 
latter result, including poor industrial morale and increases in labour's bargaining 
power within a fairly inflexible institutional setting. The corresponding estimated lag 
coefficients are also presented in table 3.1. Those in the first column are taken from 
Pencavel (1970) and can be seen to follow an exponential pattern, while those for the 
replication in column 2 describe a seemingly less plausible U-shape. One possible 
explanation for the latter finding is that wage increases in the previous quarter are not 
as relevant to wage claims as those received the previous year (given that most UK 
employees only negotiate annually). That the largest lag coefficients are at lags 3 and 
4 lends support to such an argument. 
The first task is to evaluate the chosen specification. The polynomial restriction on the 
ßi, including the endpoint constraint, is easily supported by the data in a comparison 
with the unrestricted alternative28. Of rather greater importance perhaps, table 3.1 also 
presents some common tests of misspecification for the replication in column 2. 
These are described in greater detail in Godfrey (1988), Maddala (1988) and the 
references cited therein. While the Durbin-Watson test (DW) for first order 
28 
. An F-test yields a value of 0.347, which is less than any reasonable critical value from an F(4,49) distribution. 
Estimated regression coefficients of the unrestricted equation are very similar to those in table 3.1, column 2, and 
are therefore not reported here. 
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autocorrelation is (marginally) significant at the 5% level but is indeterminate at the 
1% level, it seems more appropriate to test for higher orders of autocorrelation 
with 
quarterly data as used here. Correspondingly, än LM-test for (up to) fourth order 
autocorrelation is computed, and this is insignificant at the 5% level29. 
While there is no evidence of non-normality (NN) or heteroskedasticity (HETERO), a 
RESET test for functional form misspecifcation clearly rejects the formulation that 
Pencavel has chosen. However, this test cannot indicate precisely where the error 
might lay and there are several likely candidates. There may exist a problem over the 
definition of real wage changes, the price and nominal wage change components may 
not act symmetrically with respect to the frequency of strikes, there may be an 
omitted variable problem or the functional form chosen may be inappropriate. Each of 
these four possibilities is examined in turn below30. 
Table 3.1, column 3 reports estimates of Pencavel's *specification with real wage 
changes redefined to be, 
ARt = 100[(Wi Wt-a)/Wt-a - (pi Pt-4)lpt-4J (3.2) 
which is more appropriate if employees do base their expectations and hence demands 
on past changes in real wages31. The estimated regression coefficients appear to be 
comparable to those in column 2, with the exception of the overall magnitude of the 
impact of real wage changes which is much smaller due to the omission of the divisor 
of 2 included in the definition in equation (3.1). However, the major difference that 
results from this respecification is in the pattern of the lag coefficients. These do now 
29 
. It should be noted that misspecification tests of this kind can be sensitive to a number of misspecifications 
other than that for which they were originally formulated. This non-robustness to other specification errors is 
generally ignored in what follows, and hence any conclusions reached on the basis of such tests should always be 
treated with caution. 
30. A fifth possibility that is ignored at this juncture is that Wt may be endogenous (see, for example, Knight 
(1972) inter alia and the discussion in section 23.2). 
31. This is not the only possible alternative definition. For example, Shalev (1980) uses Apt= 100[ln(RWRt. l)] 
where Rt = Weir 
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trace out an exponential- decay as found by Pencavel, although take positive (but 
insignificant) values at the longer lags32. More importantly however, there would still 
appear to be evidence of some form of misspecification.. 
To determine whether this has resulted from incorrectly assuming that price and wage 
changes have a symmetric impact on strike frequency,. real wage. changes were 
decomposed into . their separate price and nominal wage change 
components. 
Table 3.2, column 1 reports, the estimates that -Pencavel obtained, while column 
2 
presents those obtained from the replication. Once again, these are qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar to those that Pencavel derived. The Almon restrictions for this 
model are again supported by the data, and an F-test of the restrictions implied by the 
estimates in table 3.1, column 2 against table 3.2, column 2 yields a statistic of 1.71, 
which is less than the 5% critical value from an F(2,51) distribution. Hence the 
hypothesis that price and wage changes act symmetrically on strike frequency is not 
rejected by the data, a result also found by Pencavel. 
The corresponding values of the lag coefficients are also reported in table 3.2. For the 
replication in column 2, these are both U-shaped and this is in contrast to the 
estimates that Pencavel reports (column 1) where only those on wage changes (y) are 
U-shaped while the coefficients on price changes (S) follow an exponentially 
declining trend. Additionally, while the alternative definition of rates of change given 
in equation (3.2) above makes little difference to the coefficient estimates (as can be 
seen by comparing columns 2 and 3 in table 3.2), the effects of past changes in prices 
and wages are very different when defined in this manner as revealed by the estimated 
lag coefficients in column 3. Once again the restrictions implied by table 3.1 (that it is 
only changes in real wages that are important) are supported by the data. Therefore, 
rather as expected, dichotomising real wage changes into their separate price and 
32. An F-test reveals that the Almon restrictions (a second order polynomial with the far endpoint constraint 
imposed) are again not rejected by the data. 
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nominal wage components does nothing to alleviate the misspecification as revealed 
by the diagnostics at the bottom of table 3.2. 
The third possibility noted above for the significance of the RESET test is that there 
are important variables omitted from, the specification. In his study, Pencavel 
estimates an additional equation which attempts to account for the effects of incomes 
policies and the party of government and these can be regarded as potential omitted 
variables. Institutional factors like these have been found to be important by Davies 
(1979) among others. Pencavel's results and those from the replication are reported in 
table 3.3. The variable Lt takes value one when the Labour Party was in power, while 
JJ is unity when an incomes policy was in effect. Pencavel argues that although 
individually insignificant, his two dummy variables are jointly significant and are 
therefore important. However, a comparison of table 3.1, column 1 with table 3.3, 
column 1, reveals that this conclusion is incorrect, and that his calculated F-statistic of 
5.08 (Pencavel (1970, p. 248)) is in error. That these crude indicators of institutional 
arrangements are not statistically significant is confirmed by the results reported for 
the replication in table 3.3, column 2. A similar comparison to that attempted by 
Pencavel yields an F-statistic of 0.387 which is less than any relevant critical value33. 
Hence it would appear that these additional variables have not been erroneously 
omitted from the selected specification, and indeed the equation is still misspecified 
as indicated by the diagnostics reported at the'bottom of table 3.3. For completeness, 
the final column in the table reports estimates based on the alternative definition of 
real wage changes as specified in equation (3.2). Once again, the two additional 
variables are not significant either separately or jointly, and the specification is 
rejected by the misspecification tests at the bottom of the table. 
The last possible source suggested above for the econometric inadequacy of the 
33. It should also be noted that the estimated coefficients on L and Jt are very different from those that Pencavel 
reports. 
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equation is that the functional form is inappropriate. Econometricians often use 
logarithmic or semi-logarithmic formulations, especially in time-series work of this 
kind. While a full logarithmic model would allow interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients as elasticities, given the approximately exponential trend in the dependent 
variable over the sample period, it was decided to examine a semi-logarithmic 
specification in which the logarithm of non-coal strike frequency is regressed on the 
same set of explanatory variables used previously. The resulting estimates for the 
original sample period and the initial specification are reported in table 3.4A. Both the 
Bera & McAleer (1983) test and the PE test suggested by Mackinnon et al (1983) 
support the selection of this semi-logarithmic model over the levels formulation in 
table 3.1, column 2 and the diagnostic tests at the bottom of table 3.4A indicate that it 
is econometrically acceptable on all criteria. It is therefore this specification that is 
preferred for the period 1950(1) to 1967(2). 
Table 3.4B, column 1 incorporates the institutional factors considered previously. A 
simple F-test indicates that these are now important in explaining strike frequency. In 
particular, it can be seen that in periods when a Labour Government is in power, 
strike frequency is significantly lower. This seemingly provides some support for the 
hypothesis advocated by Turner (1963) that the links between the unions and the 
Labour Party will mean that workers are more reluctant to see a Labour Government 
'embarrassed' by industrial conflict. However, there are obvious exceptions to this 
rather naive argument, with the so-called 'Winter of Discontent' of 1978/79 perhaps 
being the most damaging politically (see, for example, Whitehead (1985)). 
Forecasting with the Semi-logarithmic Pencavel Model. 
Given the econometrically satisfactory semi-logarithmic empirical specification, this 
sub-section reports on its ability to describe strike activity after 1967(2). In the 
following years, strike frequency more than doubled to reach a new peak in 1970, 
although has subsequently declined in the 1980s to less than half of the 1967 level. 
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The period selected for forecasting is restricted to 1967(3) to 1979(1) however. In that 
the election of the Conservative Government in May 1979 heralded a radical reform 
of labour law affecting both collective and individual rights, it seems likely that there 
will have been major implications for the conduct of industrial relations. In addition, 
the beginning of the 1980s marked the start of an economy wide recession which 
substantially altered the balance of power between employers and employees. During 
the 1970s however (perhaps with the exception of a greater emphasis on both 
statutory and voluntary incomes policies), the patterns of industrial relations 
continued to change only gradually, reinforcing the trend away from national 
agreements towards workplace bargaining that had begun many years previously. 
Given this relatively stable background, if the chosen model does indeed represent an 
appropriate and adequate description of the true data generating process, then ' it 
should be able to explain strike frequency over the whole period to 1979. 
At the bottom of column 1 in tables 3.4A and 3.4B, tests for the forecasting ability of 
the model are reported34. These are Chow tests as reported in Chow (1960); the test 
for structural stability (SSTAB) tests the hypothesis of coefficient equality across the 
two periods, while Chow's second test, the predictive failure test (PRED), effectively 
examines whether the mean prediction error is significantly different from zero. For 
both tables, these decisively reject the hypothesis that the estimated model is able to 
predict strike frequency for the period 1967(3) to 1979(1). A caveat is necessary 
however, since both tests are conditional on homogeneity in the disturbances across 
the estimation and forecast periods. Fortunately, this hypothesis can be tested 
explicitly; the ratio of estimated variances from the two sub-periods was calculated, 
and this has an F(n2-k, nl-k) distribution under the null, where n1 is the number of 
observations in period i, i=1,2. Homogeneity is marginally rejected at the 5% level 
for table 3.4A, (but not at 1%), although it is accepted for table 3.4B when the 
34. The incomes policies variable Ji is extended using information derived from Davies (1979) and Clegg (1979). 
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institutional factors are included. Hence there would seem little doubt that the results 
of the Chow tests are acceptable, and thus the conclusion that the chosen specification 
fails as an appropriate model for the 1970s is inescapable35. ,.. 
The generally poor predictive performance of the model is starkly illustrated in 
figure 3.7, which is based on the estimates presented in table 3.4B, column 1. Clearly 
the model fails to predict the peak in (log) strike frequency around 1970, and greatly 
over-predicts in the late 1970s when strike frequency no longer continued to increase. 
Undoubtedly, this failure is principally the consequence of the highly significant 
positive trend term which dominates the estimates for 1950(1) to 1967(2)36. 
The second column in tables 3.4A and 3.4B report separate estimates for the forecast 
period 1967(3) to 1979(1). Comparing these with the coefficients in the first column 
demonstrates more precisely the reason why the model fails to predict beyond the 
sample period; in particular, the previously highly significant, trend term (Ti) has a 
much smaller coefficient and is no longer significant. Additionally, the coefficient on 
the ratio of profits to total compensation (D) is now small and insignificant, while the 
rate of unemployment Ut is an important 'explanatory' variable in this period, 
reflecting the increase in the rate of unemployment at a time when strike frequency 
was falling. Of course, this does not necessarily imply a causal relationship. Incomes 
policies would also appear to have had a suppressing effect on the number of strikes, 
perhaps by lowering the minimum acceptable wage increase as suggested by 
Ashenfelter & Johnson (1969). However, as indicated by the diagnostics at the bottom 
of both tables, that there is evidence of residual autocorrelation means that these 
estimates, though unbiased, are not efficient and the inference procedures are 
35. While it has already been noted that Pencavel's specification is misspecified for his original sample period, his 
model was also subjected to the same analysis as performed for the semi-logarithmic respecification. As expected, 
its forecasting performance was even more disappointing. 
36. A further analysis reveals that the model is not even able to forecast satisfactorily from 1967(3) through to the 
peak in 1970. Hence the problem does not appear to be a structural break at or around the peak in strike frequency. 
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invalid37. Hence these results must be viewed with some caution. 
The third and final column in tables 3.4A and 3.4B reports the estimates. from pooling 
the data and estimating the models over the whole period 1950(1) to. 1979(1). The 
results serve to confirm the analysis above in that the model would not appear to be 
an adequate description of strike frequency for the whole of this period. While the 
coefficient estimates reflect the increase in strike frequency up until 1970 (in the 
positive trend term), and the subsequent decrease (in the negative unemployment 
coefficient), both specifications are decisively rejected by several of the 
misspecification tests employed. In particular perhaps, the dynamic behaviour of non- 
coal strike frequency has not been adequately captured by the specifications 
employed here. 
It must therefore be concluded that neither Pencavel's chosen formulation nor the 
replication examined here can provide a satisfactory empirical model of non-coal 
strike frequency in Britain. Whether the rather different model suggested by Shorey 
(1977) is more successful is examined in the next sub-section. 
3.3.2. Replication of Shorey (1977). 
As reviewed in sub-section 2.3.2 above, Shorey (1977) discusses the " relevant 
influences on the probability of strike action in a single bargaining unit. However, in 
aggregation, the operational specification requires the assumption that the number of 
bargaining units is constant through time. This then implies that strike probability is 
37. Note that this conclusion is only valid if the autocorrelation is 'genuine' serial correlation rather than the result 
of some form of model misspecification. 
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proportional to the number of strikes38. Shorey's final specification for the period 
1950(1) to 1967(2) omits all 'insignificant' variables and for comparative purposes, his 
estimates are reported in table 3.5, column 1; the number of non-coal strikes is 
linearly related to a dummy variable for the first quarter (Qlr), real profits ((WP)), 
lagged changes in wages (AWt_1) and prices (OPi_1), the current price level (P) and 
non-coal strike frequency in the previous quarter (Si. 1). 
Attempts to replicate these estimates have been fairly unsatisfactory. In part, this is 
because Shorey fails to give details of his data sources, base years used or the precise 
specification of the rate of change variables. Table 3.5, column 2 presents estimates 
when annual rates of change are used, that is 
AWc = (WtWc, )/Wt-4 and - APt = (Pt-Pt. a)/Pc-4 (3.3) 
while column 3 utilises quarterly rates of change defined as 
AWt = (Wt-Wt. i)/W, -1 and 
APt = (Pi Pt., )/ t-1 (3.4) 
As can be seen, neither of these duplicates column 1 very precisely. While all of the 
coefficients are of the correct sign, many are of very different magnitudes and this 
may reflect differing normalisations. Several other rates of change specifications were 
also examined but none produced estimates that matched those that Shorey obtained. 
The diagnostics at the bottom of table 3.5 indicate that the replications are apparently 
misspecified. Although there is no evidence of serial correlation in the disturbances39, 
both the RESET test and the test for heteroskedasticity are rejected by the 
38. This assumption is obviously unrealistic; over the period in question, the number of unions fell through 
amalgamations, and there was a growth in average firm and establishment size. Thus the number of bargaining 
groups cannot really be considered constant over time although the crucial issue is whether the assumption has 
important consequences for the interpretation that can be given to the results he obtains. This is difficult to assess. 
Moreover, the model is not really of strike probability since it is quite possible for there to be more than one strike 
at a bargaining unit in any time period. It would seem more appropriate to view the model as either an 
approximation to the incidence of strikes (at the level of the bargaining unit if these are assumed constant in 
number), or as a descriptive model of strike frequency, though the latter interpretation detracts rather from the 
original rationale that Shorey uses to specify his model. 
39. Only the absolute value of Durbin's h-statistic (Durbin (1970)) is reported in the tables. 
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specification (although these may of course be interrelated). The results presented in 
sub-section 3.3.1 above for the replication of Pencavel's model most readily suggest 
that the semi-logarithmic transformation may be more appropriate. Therefore, 
table 3.6A, column 1 presents the estimates obtained when this alternative dependent 
variable is utilised together with annual rates of change for AWt. I and OPi_i as in 
equation (3.3)40. This specification can be seen to be accepted by all the criteria 
employed. Furthermore, when compared with the estimates presented in table 3.6B, 
column 1, an F-test for the omission of dummy variables for the second and third 
quarters and the institutional factors Li (Labour party in Government) and Jt (incomes 
policies in operation) considered previously reveals that these additional regressors do 
not contribute significantly to the chosen model. All the coefficients have their 
expected signs and are almost identical when these supplementary variables are 
included. Thus this is the basic formulation employed for forecasting in the next sub- 
section. 
Forecasting with the Semi-logarithmic Shores model. 
The results from forecasting over the period 1967(3) to 1979(1) are given at the 
bottom of table 3.6A, column 1. These Chow tests are identical to those discussed in 
relation to tables 3.4A and 3.4B above and they show that once again the model fails 
to predict over the latter period. One weakness of the tests is that the requirement of 
homoskedasticity would seem to be violated as revealed by the variance ratio test and 
hence they may have unacceptably low power. However, when the additional 
quarterly dummies and the institutional factors are included as in table 3.6B, 
column 1, this problem disappears while the model still fails to forecast satisfactorily. 
Moreover, that the model fails to describe the more recent trends in strike frequency 
is confirmed by examining figure 3.8, derived from the estimates in table 3.6B, 
column 1. Once again, the model is unable to predict the peak in (log) strike 
40 
. The estimated coefficients are very similar when quarterly rates of change are used and hence these results are 
not reported here. 
F, 
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frequency around 1970 and its subsequent levelling-off and finally substantially over- 
predicts in the late 1970s when the levels of strike activity fellal. 
Estimates of the semi-logarithmic model for the period 1967(3) to 1979(1) are 
presented in the second column in table 3.6A. This indicates that the economic 
influences on strike frequency as captured by the respecification of Shorey's model 
are very slight for this period42. Most of the 'explanation' of the dependent variable is 
derived from its lagged value, and hence the model describes a simple first order 
autoregressive process with no cyclical variations43. However, as revealed in 
table 3.6B, column 2, the four additional variables are highly significant in this 
period, and the other parameter estimates are clearly not robust to their inclusion. 
Real profits and prices are now strongly significant, a Labour Government is 
associated with more strikes per quarter while incomes policies are seen to suppress 
strike activity. Finally, strike frequency is significantly higher in the first nine months 
of the year. These results clearly warrant further investigation although it is important 
to note that the rather strong evidence of autocorrelation in the disturbances together 
with the presence of the lagged dependent variable means that the OLS estimates are 
both biased and inconsistent, and their t-ratios are invalid. Hence the conclusions 
drawn above should be treated with some caution. 
For completeness, estimates of the model for the whole period under consideration are 
presented in column 3 of tables 3.6A and 3.6B. As might be expected from the 
discussion above, most of the explanatory power rests with the lagged dependent 
variable, although the cyclical nature of real profits is also important. Over the whole 
41. once again, the model is not even able to forecast through to the peak in strikes in 1970. 
42. A test for zero-restrictions on all variables except the intercept and ln(St. l) is easily rejected by the data, and 
thus the problem does not appear to be one of multicollinearity. 
43. Estimating the model in levels yields similar results and hence this finding is not a result of the respecification 
of the dependent variable. 
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period 1950(1) to 1979(1), the four additional variables in table 3.6B are not jointly 
significant at conventional levels and the dynamics of the model would again appear 
to be misspecified. The overall conclusion from the replication is that even though'the 
semi-logarithmic respecification of Shorey's model is satisfactory for the, original 
sample period 1950(1) to 1967(2), it fails to describe subsequent strike frequency and 
certainly cannot provide an acceptable model for the whole of the post-war period. 
3.3.3. Commentary, Comparisons and Prospects. 
The attempts at replicating the results of two popular quarterly models of strike 
frequency over the period 1950(1) to 1967(2) indicate that, at least for the data and 
formulations employed here, the original specifications are inappropriate. A semi- 
logarithmic transformation is found to be econometrically acceptable for both models 
although in several non-nested comparisons44, all favoured the modification to 
Shorey's formulation over that of Pencavel. However, this finding is of little value in 
itself since both models fail to predict strike activity beyond the original sample 
period. Neither can predict the level of strikes in the period immediately following up 
to the peak in strikes in 1970, let alone beyond and through to 1979 as illustrated in 
the tables. Re-estimating both specifications over the whole of the post-war period is 
also found to be unsatisfactory even with sympathetic treatment of institutional 
factors such as incomes policies45. Much of the explanatory power of the models over 
this longer period lies with the trend term (Pencavel) or with the lagged dependent 
variable (Shorey) and therefore any description of strike frequency in terms of 
cyclical economic variables is rather ambiguous. 
The prospects for estimating models of the type presented by Pencavel and Shorey are 
still uncertain however. Although the formulations examined here are rejected by the 
44. See, for example, the surveys by MacKinnon (1983) and McAleer & Pesaran (1986). 
45. Forrest (1990) observes a similarly unsatisfactory performance for her replication of Davies' (1979) model. 
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data, this does not necessarily imply, that a satisfactory aggregate empirical macro- 
model of strike frequency does not exist since a more carefully chosen dynamic 
specification (based on a suitable model) could yield more satisfactory results than 
those discussed above. However, it seems prudent first to consider the central 
question as to whether strike frequency is a cyclical phenomenon since this has yet to 
be established by the investigation presented previously. Such information will 
clearly be relevant to any new theoretical model and empirical specification and thus 
section 3.4 presents a detailed analysis of this conjecture. 
3.4. The Cyclicality of British Strike Frequency. 46 
Persuasive theoretical explanations for the cyclical behaviour of strike frequency have 
been provided by the more recent asymmetric- or private-information theories as 
described by Hayes (1984) and Tracy (1984,1987) among others and reviewed in 
sections 2.2.3 and 2.3.4. Representative of this class of models, Hayes considers a 
situation in which the firm has more information about the state of the product market 
than the union. The union designs its wage-strike proposals such that in the 'bad state', 
the firm will prefer to take a strike and pay a lower wage, while in the 'good state', the 
firm will find it profitable to grant the union's higher demands immediately. Hence 
only 'bad state' firms incur strike action. However, if the union perceives that the firm 
is doing well, perhaps on the basis of information derived from some general 
economic indicator, it is more likely to propose a higher wage-strike schedule. Thus 
there will tend to be more strikes at the top of the cycle through the union incorrectly 
evaluating the firm's profitability. Counterfactually, in a slump when all firms appear 
to being doing poorly, the union will tend to offer a lower wage-strike schedule and 
thus there is a smaller probability of overestimating the firm's performance. Hence 
46. The software used in this section of the chapter was written by the author in VS-Fortran running on an IBM- 
4381. 
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these models predict that strike activity should be procyclical47. 
However the identification of any cyclicality in strikes is fundamentally flawed in the 
standard multiple regression models that have typically been estimated. As noted by 
Kennan (1986), 
"... a negative regression coefficient associated with the 
unemployment rate does not necessarily mean that strikes are 
procyclical, if the regression also includes variables such as prices, 
wages and profits which may vary systematically with the cycle. " 
(pp. 1119-1120) 
As discussed in section 2.3.2 above, studies of strike frequency in Britain have 
utilised a variety of dependent variables and econometric specifications and cover 
many different time periods making any direct comparisons difficult. However, the 
realisation of the 'identification' dilemma when attempting to discern possible cyclical 
patterns in British strike frequency has been noted by Davies (1979) who observes 
that, 
"... the expected inverse relationship between unemployment, used as 
a proxy for the state of the labour market, and strike frequency has not 
been confirmed by all studies, while coefficients with both positive and 
negative signs have been found to be significant for real corporate 
profits. " (p. 205) 
The attempted replications and extensions of the studies by Pencavel and Shorey in 
section 3.3 also reveal such problems (as well as yielding estimates which are clearly 
not robust to the estimation period under consideration). As can be seen from 
figure 3.7 and figure 3.8, even within the estimation period, there is only very weak 
evidence for any cyclicality in the predicted values, and these 'cycles' would not 
appear to correspond with the business cycle which has a periodicity of around five 
years48. Thus Kennan's critique would certainly appear to be pertinent and may be the 
underlying reason for the generally unsatisfactory performance of the aggregate 
47. Note that the role of employers in these models is minimal since they are presumed to hold the informational 
advantage in every case. 
'. Of course, this finding could be interpreted to imply that aggregate strike frequency is NOT cyclical. This issue 
is discussed in much greater detail below. 
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econometric models. 
One plausible solution to this difficulty would be to compare levels of strike activity 
with a single measure of the business cycle and such an exercise is conducted in this 
section of the chapter. As described in more detail in sub-section 3.4.1 below, the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) methodology for the analysis of 
business cycles can be used to examine the concordance of the changing level of 
strike activity with the timing of the cycle. For the US, this kind of analysis of strike 
frequency has a long history from Jurkat & Jurkat (1949) through Rees (1952), 
O'Brien (1965) and Weintraub (1966) to Kennan (1986) who also summarises the 
previous studies. Kennan demonstrates that while the timing within any single cycle is 
variable, an average taken over all fourteen business cycles from 1915 to 1980 reveals 
that strike frequency rises during the up-swing and falls during the down-swing of the 
cycle49; that is, strike frequency is procyclical. 
A similar and rather more comprehensive exercise has been performed recently by 
Harrison & Stewart (1990) for Canadian strike activity over the period 1946 to 1983. 
Their results reveal that both the issue and whether the strike occurred at the end of a 
contract (termed contract strikes) are important factors in determining' the 
correspondence between strike activity and, business cycles50. There is some 
indication of cyclicality at the aggregate level, although little evidence of a stable 
cyclical effect. Moreover, the disaggregated series reveal that, 
"... among all ', strikes, the procyclical frequency ... derives 
predominantly from noncontract strikes, and that contract strikes over 
wage issues alone show no evidence of procyclical frequency. " (p. 12) 
In addition, for their contracts data, Harrison & Stewart find that only strikes over 
non-wage issues demonstrate procyclical incidence. Thus, while strikes over wages 
49. However, this relationship seems rather stronger earlier in the period, in particular, prior to World War II. 
50. The US studies cited above fail to disaggregate the total number of strikes either by issue or the point at which 
the strikes occurred during the contract period. 
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are the central concern of the theoretical bargaining models, these strikes do not 
appear to exhibit any systematic cyclicality for Canadian post-war data. 
There are two related studies for British strike frequency. Firstly, Knowles (1952) 
presents a graphical analysis for the pre-war period and reveals a positive relationship 
between strikes and the level of wages and prices, and a (weakly) negative 
relationship between strikes and the unemployment rate. Secondly, Mayhew (1979) 
constructs the detrended seasonally adjusted logarithm of quarterly non-coal strike 
frequency for the period 1958 to 1974. This is regressed on a similarly detrended 
index of GDP and a positive coefficient is obtained. He concludes, 
"There is thus a significant, but not very strong, relationship between 
strike activity and cyclical movements in the economy. " (p. 12) 
He attributes this finding to the fact that the cycle affects both the variables which 
determine the size of the initial offers and demands, and the determination with which 
these demands are pursued. This section concentrates on examining this result in more 
detail and investigates its robustness over a rather longer time horizon and for various 
disaggregated strike measures. Sub-section 3.4.1 briefly* explains . the NBER 
methodology used for the identification of British post-war business cycles and 
describes the disaggregated strikes series. Thereafter, a, similar analysis of British 
strike frequency to the US and Canadian studies cited. above is presented in sub- 
section 3.4.2. 
3.4.1. National Bureau of Economic Research Methodology and Data 
Description. 
Bums & Mitchell (1946) describe the construction of a variety of tables which can be 
used to compare the duration, timing and magnitude of cycles in economic time- 
series51. Here the intention is only to match the timing of the specific cycle of interest 
51, Although their analysis is primarily designed to be used with monthly data, it can be appropriately modified for 
series at lower frequencies. 
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(strike frequency) with that of some reference business cycle. Having identified the 
dates of the turning points of the business. cycle, the Burns-Mitchell method proceeds 
as follows52. Each business cycle is divided into nine phases; phase 1 is the three 
months centred around the initial trough, phase 5 includes the three months around 
the peak and phase 9 is the three months around, the terminal trough , 
(and which 
therefore corresponds with phase 1 of the next cycle). The up-swing,, identified by 
phases 2,3 and 4, splits the months between initial trough and peak into three equal 
length periods, and the down-swing is similarly defined over phases 6,7 and 8. Over 
each complete cycle, an index of the average monthly level of strike activity is 
constructed as a base and then the relative levels for each phase are computed53. If 
strikes are unrelated to the cycle, these nine indices should be randomly distributed, 
whereas if strikes are procyclical, the indices should increase over phases 1 to 4, reach 
a peak in phase 5 and decrease thereafter. 
Thus the first task in the analysis is to identify the timing of the reference business 
cycles. Monthly data are required to define precisely the turning points and typically 
an index of industrial production is utilised since this is often the only monthly series 
available covering a sufficiently long time series. Figure 3.9 shows the strongly 
trended and highly seasonal Index of Production (IOP) series for, the period January 
1946 to December 198754. Identifying any cycles and their turning points is extremely 
difficult and hence the 12-month centred moving average of the logarithm of IOP was 
constructed to remove the seasonality in the series. This was then detrended by taking 
the residuals from a regression on time and time-squared and the resultant series is 
52. The following is a description of a table of type R1 according to Burns & Mitchell (1946). 
53. The first and last months are weighted by 0.5 to avoid the downward bias from including two trough values in 
the index (Burns & Mitchell (1946, p. 131)). Of course, this adjustment will only affect the amplitude of the strikes 
cycles and not their timing. 
54. Source: Monthly Digest of Statistics and unpublished data provided by the Central Statistical Office. 
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plotted in the top panel of figure 3.1055. Clearly identifiable cycles are apparent with 
a fairly regular frequency although no downturn is discernible after the trough in 
1981. 
ý. 
Since the timing of the turning points is crucial to the Burns-Mitchell methodology, it 
is important to compare the correspondence of the Index of Production cycles with 
other available cyclical measures of economic activity. One strong candidate is the 
Concurrent Cyclical Indicator (CCI) series published by the Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) and available from 1957 onwards56. The CCI is a composite series based upon 
the three quarterly measures of GDP (output, expenditure and income) together with 
the monthly Index of Volume of Retail Sales and the Index of Production, plus 
information derived from the Confederation of British Industry's Capacity Utilisation 
Index which forms part of their quarterly Industrial Trends Survey. These are then 
amalgamated to yield the composite CCI index. The detrended moving average of this 
series is plotted in the lower panel of ; figure 3.10 and displays a very close 
correspondence with the IOP cycles shown in the top panel. A closer examination of 
the numerical values of the two residual series reveals that no turning points are more 
than one month apart and thus the seven post-war cycles identified from the-longer 
IOP series were chosen as the reference cycles to be used in the Burns-Mitchell 
analysis below57. 
Reiterating the description given in section 2.2, strikes in Britain are recorded by the 
55. Higher order detrending terms were not significant at conventional levels and did not alter the timing or 
magnitude of the cycles identified in figure 3.10. 
56. A fall description of the compilation of this monthly series is given in Economic Trends, March 1975 and May 
1976. 
57. The turning points identified from the CCI are slightly different from those presented by the CSO for their 
reference cycle. This is a result of the degree of subjectivity introduced by the CSO who attempt to discount 
"(k)nown special economic or climatic factors ... in judging the location of reference turning points" (Economic 
Trends. May 1976, p. 70). However, there is still never more than three months disparity between their turning 
points and those utilised in the analysis below. 
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Department of Employment from information gathered through local Unemployment 
Benefit Offices, returns from Nationalised Industries, public bodies and large firms, 
statements in the press and, for some larger disputes, directly from the organisations 
involved. There are problems in ensuring complete coverage and, partly for this 
reason, stoppages involving fewer than ten workers and those lasting less than one 
day are excluded from the statistics unless the total number of working days lost 
exceeds one hundred. The annual aggregates for monthly strike frequencies 
disaggregated by cause and sector are summarised in table 3.758. 
Several points need to be noted with respect to these data. Firstly, while the monthly 
data for all strikes (column 1) and coal strikes (column 4) are re-published with a 
13 month lag following revisions, monthly data for strikes disaggregated by cause of 
stoppage (columns 2 and 3) are only available contemporaneously. Hence the 
numbers of pay and non-pay strikes tend to underestimate the actual totals, although 
this under-recording is likely to be fairly consistent and therefore should not affect the 
timing of any cycles in strike activity59. Secondly, given the dominance of strikes in 
the coal industry particularly in the immediate post war period, it would seem useful 
to investigate separate series for pay and non-pay strikes in the non-coal economy. 
Unfortunately such series are not available on a monthly basis but can be 
approximated if, for each month, the ratio of pay to non-pay strikes in the non-coal 
sector can be assumed to be the same as in the whole economy. The annual 
aggregates for the monthly series constructed under this assumption are summarised 
58. Source: Employment Gazette (and its predecessors). 
59. Annual totals for pay and non-pay strikes consistent with column 1 are available, of course, and form the basis 
of the discussion in chapter Z The apparent falling efficacy in the recording of strikes (in that the sutra of 
columns 2 and 3 is a falling proportion of the (revised) total in column 1) is closely correlated with the falling 
proportion of coal strikes in the economy. A possible explanation may lie in the more extensive data collation 
service in the coal industry as compared with the wider economy. 
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in columns 6 and 7 of table 3.760. The coefficients of variation' at the bottom of the 
table reveal that the number of pay strikes has been much more volatile than the 
number of non-pay strikes, particularly in the non-coal sector. This mirrors the 
findings for the annual series discussed in section 3.2 and illustrated in figure 3.2. 
That there are strong seasonal patterns in strike frequency is evident from table 3.8 
which illustrates the distinct troughs in December and July and peaks in October and 
March. It is also apparent that'each of the seven strikes series exhibits approximately 
the same degree of seasonal variation. As noted by Sapsford (1975), this pattern 
reflects the seasonality of wage negotiations combined with that of production. He 
confirms this seasonal bimodality with peaks in spring and autumn for a series taken 
over the rather longer period 1893 to 1971. 
3.4.2. An Assessment of the Cyclicality of British Strike Frequency. 
To identify any cycles and their turning points, the strikes series need to be detrended 
and seasonally adjusted. The residuals from 12 month centred moving averages 
regressed on a cubic polynomial in time were computed for all of the disaggregated 
measures of strike frequency summarised in table 3.761. These indicators of the 
cyclicality in strikes were then examined for any correspondence with the business 
cycle. 
As an initial, although rather crude, comparison, the standardised residuals from the 
60. Some assessment of the reliability of this exercise has been conducted. Since 1959, the Employment Gazette 
has published annual totals for pay and non-pay strikes disaggregated by industrial sector and thus the constructed 
series for non-coal strikes can be directly compared to the official statistics on an annual basis. For both pay and 
non-pay strikes, the series are virtually indistinguishable from these published statistics, and hence the exercise 
conducted would appear to be legitimate. Any inappropriately induced monthly variations will be nullified since 
seasonally adjusted series are used throughout the Burns-Mitchell analysis presented below. However, as a further 
check on the validity of the method of constructing these non-coal strikes series, the ratio of the annual number of 
pay and non-pay strikes in the non-coal sector from 1959 was used to decompose the monthly non-coal strikes 
series from that date. None of the conclusions presented below are affected by this second decomposition and the 
detailed results are little changed. 
61. Higher order detrending polynomials made little difference to the results obtained. 
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detrended moving average series for industrial production and total strike frequency 
are plotted together in figure 3.1162. Discounting the first business cycle from 
September 1946 to October, 1952, this graph reveals a surprisingly close 
correspondence in the timing of the troughs and peaks of the two series63. Even for 
the period after the trough in 1981 when no complete cycle can yet be identified, it is 
apparent that the cyclical components of the two series move quite closely together. 
Figure 3.11 would therefore indicate that post-war strike frequency in Britain is 
procyclical. This is in contrast to the results that Harrison & Stewart (1990) present 
for their Canadian data; prior to the 1960s, there is no evidence of any cyclicality in 
their strike frequency series. 
This finding is confirmed by the Bums-Mitchell analysis presented in the first panel 
of table 3.9. The trough-peak-trough dates of the business cycles identified in the IOP 
series in sub-section 3.4.1 are given in the left hand column, while the relative levels 
of strike activity in the nine divisions of each cycle are recorded in the body of the 
table64. Interpretation of the statistics is as follows; in line 2 for the business cycle 
running trough-to-trough from October 1952 to October 1958, strike frequency was 
67.5% of the average for this cycle in the initial trough, reached a peak of 120.2% of 
the average halfway through the downswing and fell to 72.9% of the average by the 
end of the cycle. Except for the first cycle which would appear to be inverted65, it can 
be seen that in general, peaks in strike activity do roughly correspond with peaks in 
industrial production, and thus strike frequency is procyclical. The mean taken over 
all seven cycles given at the bottom of the panel confirms this general conclusion, 
62. Standardised (or 'normalised) residuals are obtained by dividing the residuals by their standard deviations. This 
produces series with (a mean of zero and) a variance of one and thereby facilitates comparisons between series. 
63 
. Note that the residuals have been normalised and thus no inference can be drawn from the relative magnitude 
of the cycles. 
64. The relative peaks in strike frequency for each business cycle are given in italics. 
65. That is, the peak in strike frequency corresponds to the trough in industrial production and vice versa. 
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with the peak'in strike frequency falling on average in phase 6 of the cycle66. Of 
course, this result is strengthened when the first cycle is excluded from the 
calculations; the inverted U-shape becomes more pronounced and the averages for 
phases 4,5 and 6 are then more than 50% greater than at the start and end of the mean 
cycle. Thus there would appear to be fairly strong support for the proposition that 
aggregate strike frequency is procyclical. - 
Whether this procyclicality is a general feature of strike activity can be determined by 
performing similar analyses for the component disaggregated series of strike 
frequency. These are presented in the subsequent panels of table 3.9. Panel (2) and 
panel (3) show that both pay and non-pay strikes exhibit a degree of procyclicality 
although this tendency is much stronger for pay strikes both in terms of the 
concordance with business cycles and the distinction between troughs and peaks of 
each cycle. For non-pay strikes, the relative peaks tend to occur before the peaks in 
the cycle in business activity and the cycles are less pronounced. Panel (4) illustrates 
that for coal strikes, there is no systematic pattern whatsoever, with peaks in strikes 
appearing randomly throughout the phases of the business cycles. Correspondingly, 
panel (5) reveals that it is indeed strikes outside the coal industry that are strongly 
procyclical. In particular, the inverted first cycle apparent in panel (1) for all strikes 
can now be seen to be entirely the consequence of the dominance of the pattern in 
coal strikes in this period. When these are excluded as in panel (5), the number of 
strikes is once again seen to be closely correlated with the corresponding business 
cycle. 
This finding would appear to confirm the suspicion that coal strikes may dominate in 
the immediate post-war period and provides further justification for the construction 
of pay and non-pay strike series for the non-coal sector as detailed in sub- 
66. Harrison & Stewart (1990) find a similar slight lag in many of their disaggregated Canadian strikes series. 
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section 3.4.1. The Bums-Mitchell analyses for these series are presented in panels (6) 
and (7) and the results are very much as expected. It is cycles in pay strikes that are 
highly 'correlated with cycles in production and are particularly pronounced; non-pay 
strikes exhibit less cyclicality in general both in magnitude and in correspondence 
with business cycles. This is encouraging in that theories of strike activity tend to be 
more applicable to grievances arising over rates of remuneration than to those arising 
over more general disagreements. It is also starkly in contrast to the Harrison & 
Stewart (1990) results which find no relationship between strikes over wage disputes 
and Canadian business cycles. 
The Burns-Mitchell analysis therefore reveals a remarkably close correspondence in 
the timing of cycles in production and strike frequency and thus provides 
circumstantial support for those theories that predict that (pay) strikes are 
procyclical67. Given the inconclusive evidence from the econometric models of strike 
frequency presented in section 3.3, this finding is perhaps surprising. However, as 
suggested above, undoubtedly part of the difficulty with the econometric models is 
their inclusion of so many cyclical indicators (some which lag and some which lead 
the cycle) and which, in combination, would therefore appear to obscure the evident 
cyclicality in strikes in Britain. 
As guidance for future research, the evidence presented above suggests that strikes in 
the coal industry should continue to be treated separately from strikes elsewhere in 
the economy. Additionally, given the differences in the timing and magnitudes of 
their cycles, pay and non-pay strikes should also be distinguished. Finally, given that 
67. One possible criticism is that this may partially reflect the cyclicality in the number of negotiations taking 
place, and thus says little about any procyclicality in the incidence of strikes. However, worker-firm relationships 
in Britain are such that the number of bargaining groups changes fairly slowly over time and each bargaining pair 
tends to conduct negotiations at a similar time every year. In addition, each cycle is treated separately in the Burns- 
Mitchell analysis and on average is only five years long in the post-war period considered here. Hence any 
potential effects this problem could have should be minimised. However, the general issue of strike frequency vs 
strike incidence is returned to in section 3.6 and, in more detail, in chapter 4. 
90 
the general conclusion from this section is that there is strong evidence of 
procyclicality in strike frequency, then the inclusion of an appropriate concurrent 
indicator of the cycle in any future econometric study should serve to reveal this 
cyclicality in strikes. This would then leave the non-cyclical component of strikes to 
be explained by the other (non-cyclical) variables included in the model. The next 
section presents a preliminary investigation of the application of these proposals to a 
quarterly 'cyclical-political' model of post-war strike frequency. 
3.5. A Cyclical-Political Model of Strike Frequency in Britain. 
The results presented in the previous two sections indicate that while post-war 
aggregate (non-coal) strike frequency would appear to be poorly described by 
conventional econometric specifications, there is undoubtedly a strong cyclical 
element to the patterns in certain classes of strikes, in particular those that result from 
disputes over levels of remuneration. This section attempts to integrate these findings 
into a new empirical description of strikes which any satisfactory theory of strike 
frequency must embrace. While the results revealed in section 3.4 above are derived 
from monthly data, in order to facilitate comparisons with the previously published 
studies and the respecifications detailed in section 3.3, the estimates presented in this 
section utilise quarterly data. Sub-section 3.5.1 outlines the specification of the 
empirical model while sub-section 3.5.2 details the method of estimation and the 
results obtained. Finally, sub-section 3.5.3 presents some brief observations on recent 
related attempts to estimate models of strike frequency together with the 
consequences in the context of the cyclical-political specification considered in this 
section. 
3.5.1. Description and Specification. 
Broadly speaking, the chosen specification might be described as a 'cyclical political' 
r It, 
model. As noted in section 2.3.2 above, almost all empirical models of strike 
91 
frequency include variables which can be construed as cyclical indicators, even 
though they are often acting as proxies for other information which is not available. 
These variables include price changes, variations in nominal or real wages, the level 
or rate of unemployment, measures of profitability and so on. For the current study 
however, only (the logarithm of) the quarterly seasonally unadjusted index of 
production series (CYCLE) has been included68. This is the quarterly counterpart of 
the monthly series utilised in section 3.4 above, although it is used here without prior 
filtering since interest is now focussed on the magnitude of the seasonal and trend 
responses as well as the timing of the cyclical variations in strike activity to general 
movements in the economy. Quarterly dummies and a quadratic in time are included 
to capture the systematic seasonal and trend variations in strikes over time. 
The basic estimating equation can therefore be written as 
1nSt = ßo + ßlQlt + ß2°2c + ß3°3t + ß4Tc + ß5T2 + ß6CYCLEi + ut (3.5) 
in obvious notation69. This should not be regarded as an explanatory model of strike 
frequency but as a decomposition of the number of strikes into seasonal, trend and 
cyclical components. The residuals ut are thus the constituent part of strike frequency 
which is unrelated to the cycle. As noted by Harrison & Stewart (1990, p. 6, fn. 17), the 
coefficient estimates ßj from equation (3.5) will be unbiased despite these missing 
non-cyclical variables since, by definition, the latter are uncorrelated with the 
business cycle. Estimates for the simple decomposition represented by equation (3.5) 
are presented in the next sub-section and comparisons are made with the rather more 
'sophisticated' respecifications of previous econometric studies considered in 
section 3.3 above. 
68. This variable should capture the concurrent changes in strike activity with the business cycle, including any 
impact arising from bargaining over a larger 'pie' or any increase in uncertainty over price and/or real wage levels 
at the peak of the cycle. 
69. The dose similarities with the work of Harrison & Stewart (1990) for Canada should be acknowledged at this 
juncture. 
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In addition, and as an extension to the basic formulation in equation (3.5), 'political' 
variables are subsequently included in order that their separate impact on strike 
frequency can be ascertained. While the issue of the possible endogeneity of the 
implementation of these policies is not treated in the analysis below, the estimates 
reported do serve to give some indication as to the influence of political factors that a 
satisfactory model of strike frequency would need to incorporate. Specifically. the 
'political' side of the model represents an attempt to capture the broad effects of major 
policy decisions and enactments by parliament which seem likely to affect the level of 
industrial conflict. In particular, it is their likely effect on the drive and ability of 
workers to engage in direct and overt industrial action in support of any claim that the 
model attempts to identify. 
Recent work by Freeman & Pelletier (1990) on the impact of industrial relations 
legislation on trade union density provides a readily accessible index of labour law. 
They construct four measures to represent the 'favourableness' of UK industrial 
relations laws towards unionisation, each coded from 1 (least favourable) to 5 (most 
favourable), and which are then aggregated to yield two indices of labour legislation. 
The first relates to union organisation per se and embodies those laws pertaining to 
recognition and bargaining rights and enactments relating to individual rights to 
associate/disassociate from trades unions. The second reflects the relative power of 
unions and management in collective bargaining and encompasses parliamentary acts 
giving immunities to unions engaging in industrial disputes together with a subjective 
index measuring the relative power of trades unions vis a vis employers. 
There are undoubtedly problems with the necessarily ad hoc assignment of cardinal 
values to the two indices. Freeman & Pelletier (1990) state that they, 
"... tried to scale the indices across time ... in a consistent way so that one-unit differences in the indices reflect roughly comparable 
differences in the laws. " (p. 150) 
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In fact, the two indices are highly correlated70 and thus both reflect rather generally 
the changing legal climate in which unions have been operating in the post-war 
period. However, despite the similarities, Freeman & Pelletier find that it is only the 
index of organisation (ORG) that has a significant (positive) impact on the level of 
trade union density in the UK in the period 1945-1986, while the index of collective 
bargaining (BARS has a negligible and insignificant effect. 
The changing legal climate in the post-war period and its likely impact on the level of 
industrial conflict is discussed in detail in chapter 4, section 2. At this juncture, it is 
sufficient to note that the a priori expected signs on the Freeman & Pelletier legal 
indices in the context of strike activity are indeterminate in general; an improvement 
in the ability of a union to collectively organise its members and/or a strengthening of 
its relative bargaining power may not necessarily lead to an increase in industrial 
action if this is counteracted by a more conciliatory attitude of employers in the face 
of such circumstances. In a similar fashion, the undoubtedly weakened position of 
unions in the 1980s may not necessarily imply a reduction in conflict activity if the 
employers' response is to become more confrontational in the light of its enhanced 
relative position. The two variables ORG1 and BART are included linearly in 
equation (3.5) and, once again, it should be noted that the coefficient estimates will be 
unbiased as long as these policy variables are orthogonal to any variables excluded 
from the model. 
In summary therefore, the empirical model estimated in the next sub-section relates 
the logarithm of strike frequency to seasonal and trend variables, a measure of the 
70. They are both roughly constant until 1974 and then rise steeply with the successive enactments of the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations Act (1974), the Employment Protection Act (1975) and the Trade Union and Labour 
Relations (Amendment) Act (1976). From 1980 onwards, they both fall rapidly following the passage of the 
Employment Acts of 1980.1982 and 1988 and the Trade Union Act of 1984. For the period 1946-1988, the 
correlation between the two indices ORGt and BAR, is 0.748, while for the period of interest here (1950-1987), the 
correlation coefficient is 0.909. Simple interpolation of the Freeman and Pelletier series is used to derive quarterly 
series as used in sub-section 3.52 
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business cycle together with the two political variables. While this is acknowledged to 
be a rather naive model (or perhaps 'eclectic'), it should be recalled that the intention 
here is only to. establish the degree to which cyclical and political and/or institutional 
forces influence various disaggregated series of strike frequency. It also serves as a 
reference point against which to assess previous econometric models such as those 
considered in section 3.3. A fairly simple specification should therefore suffice. 
3.5.2. Estimation and Results. 71 
The seven disaggregated measures of strikes described in section 3.4 are modelled 
separately since it is apparent from the results above that only certain classes of 
strikes are cyclical and therefore likely to be adequately described by the framework 
outlined in sub-section 3.5.1. Table 3.10 presents estimates for the period 1950(1) to 
1979(1) in order that comparisons with the previous work in this chapter can be made. 
The basic cyclical specification (equation (3.5)) is considered in the first half of the 
table. The four misspecification tests presented for the OLS estimates are identical to 
those utilised in section 3.3 above. The diagnostics indicate the presence of (up to) 
fourth order autocorrelation in the disturbances for all seven measures of strike 
frequency, while the other tests for misspecification are generally accepted at 
conventional levels. As is well known, such a finding of serially correlated residuals 
could simply be indicating that the dynamic structure of the equation is misspecified 
(Sargan (1964) and Hendry & Mizon (1978)). The argument is familiar, in the 
simplest terms, suppose that 
yt = ßxt + u, with ut = pluc_1 + e,, I pl I<1 and ei - ID(O, o2). (3.6) 
This can be rewritten as 
Yt = PiYt-i + pxt - P1ßXt-1 + £t (3.7) 
which is sometimes termed the restricted transformed equation (RTE). An alternative 
stable dynamic model given by 
71. The software utilised in this section of the chapter was a combination of Microfit, and Limdep, version 5.1 
(Greene (1990)) and version 6.0 (Greene (1991)). 
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Yt = ß1Yt-1 + ß2Xt + ß3Xt-i + Et ( ß11 < 1, (3.8) 
is termed the unrestricted transformed equation (UTE). Clearly equation (3.7) is 
equivalent to equation (3.8) with the restriction 
ßlß2 + ß3 = o. (3.9) 
The strategy Sargan suggests is to first test this non-linear restriction, and to only test 
for pl =0 if (3.9) is not rejected. If it is rejected, then the problem is not one of serial 
correlation at all, but the omission of the variables yi_1 and x, _1 
from the equation, i. e. 
'misspecified dynamics', and the coefficient estimates will be biased. 
The results from this testing strategy are reported in table 3.10 under the heading 'LR 
Tests for Misspecified Dynamics'. AR4 is a simple likelihood ratio test Of the RTE 
against the UTE for the more general fourth order autoregressive scheme 
ut = Plut_1 + P2ut_2 + P3Ut 3+ pout-a +t and Et -- ID(O, a2) (3.10) 
which seems a reasonable hypothesis given that the data are quarterly. The test 
statistic has a x2(4) distribution under the null; while there is only one variable in the 
model to which the equivalent restriction to equation (3.9) is being applied (CYCLE), 
there are four' such restrictions following the imposition of the fourth order 
autoregressive scheme (3.10). Clearly the restrictions are accepted for all seven 
measures of strikes with the implication that the error process is indeed autoregressive 
rather than the equation having an omitted variables problem resulting in misspecified 
dynamics. 
The consequences of autocorrelated disturbances for OLS estimation are that although 
coefficient estimates are still unbiased given that all the right-hand side variables are 
exogeneous, the standard errors are incorrectly estimated and thus conventional 
inference procedures are invalid. While it is possible to estimate the model under an 
autoregressive error specification using maximum likelihood or Cochrane-Orcutt or 
some other iterative technique, the strategy invoked in the current study is to simply 
present coefficient standard errors that are robust to generally unspecified 
96 
autocorrelation. Newey & West (1987) detail the construction of an autocorrelation 
consistent variance-covariance matrix which is a generalisation of the more familiar 
heteroskedastic-consistent version devised by White (1980). The estimates presented 
in table 3.10 allow for autocorrelation of up to order four, this lag length being 
determined by the insignificance of additional terms in higher order autoregressive 
error schemes (using simple likelihood ratio tests) and inspection of the residual 
correlograms. As expected, the autocorrelation consistent standard errors are larger 
than their OLS equivalents since both the errors and the explanatory variables tend to 
be positively correlated over time leading to the OLS standard errors underestimating 
the true standard errors (see, for example, Koutsoyiannis (1977, pp. 208-210)). Only 
estimated coefficients for the cyclical variable are reported in the table; these 
represent the elasticity of the measure of strikes to the business cycle (since CYCLES 
is the logarithm of the index of industrial production). The coefficient estimates 
confirm the results from the monthly data examined in section 3.472; it is pay strikes 
that are most strongly procyclical and most responsive to the business cycle, 
especially when attention is restricted to the non-coal sector as can be seen from an 
examination of the final two columns of the table in particular. Coal strikes 
(column 4) are exceptional in their strong counter-cyclicality, and their presence 
would appear to adversely affect the results for columns 2 and 3 and also when strikes 
are taken in aggregate as in column 1. 
The next section of table 3.10 considers the comparative performance of the empirical 
model over the period 1950(1) to 1979(1)73. Firstly the forecasting performance of the 
specification is examined by considering structural stability (SSTAB) and predictive 
failure (PRED) tests for the sample period divided at 1967(2). These are Chow (1960) 
n The seasonal dummies again reveal that strikes are more prevalent in the first six months of the year while the 
coefficients on the quadratic in time yield an inverse U-shaped function for all seven measures of strikes. 
73. Note that these tests are conducted under the assumption that the model is correctly specified. That there is 
evidence of autocorrelation may possibly invalidate the tests. 
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tests as described in subsection 3.3.1 above, and are, of course, only appropriate to 
OI. S estimated coefficients. While these will be unbiased for the specification 
considered here, they are not efficient, and hence perhaps do not accurately reflect the 
ability of the model to forecast beyond the estimating sample. The results show that 
for the basic specification represented by equation (3.5) the model does not perform 
particularly well, although, encouragingly, the results for non-coal strikes are rather 
better as revealed by the statistics in the final three columns of the table. It should be 
noted, however, that the variance ratio test (VRATIO) rejects homogeneity in a 
number of cases and thus the tests may have unacceptably low power74. 
The next two lines of the table report the results of non-nested comparisons against 
the most favourable semi-logarithmic respecifications of Pencavel (1970) and Shorey 
(1977) described in section 3.3. As with the forecasting tests reported in the previous 
paragraph, only OLS estimation is appropriate and hence the autoregressive nature of 
the error process cannot be incorporated into the cyclical specification. A wide variety 
of tests is available for non-nested models and these have been extensively reviewed 
by MacKinnon (1983) and McAleer & Pesaran (1986). The six tests used here are: the 
N-test (Cox (1961,1962)); the NT-test (Godfrey & Pesaran (1983)); the W-test 
(Godfrey & Pesaran' (1983)); the J-test (Davidson & MacKinnon (1981)); the JA-test 
(Fisher & McAleer (1981)); and the encompassing test (which is simply the standard 
F-test for the excluded regressors, see Mizon & Richard (1986)). Full details of each 
of these tests can be found in MacKinnon (1983) and McAleer & Pesaran (1986) 
while their relative small-sample performances are investigated by Godfrey & 
Pesaran (1983)75. 
74. The structural stability test cannot be calculated for coal strikes due to the inclusion of a dummy variable for 
the national coal strike of 1974. Since this dummy takes value zero for all observations before this date, no 
estimated coefficient is available for the period prior to 1967(2). The test for predictive failure is however 
available (and is resoundingly rejected). 
75. These are the test procedures programmed into Microfit (Pesaran & Pesaran (1991)). 
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The line labelled PENCAVEL reports the results of testing the cyclical model against 
the semi-logarithmic Pencavel specification as reported in tables 3.4A and 3.4B for 
each of the seven disaggregated strikes series. In every case, the cyclical model is 
preferred (Accept) and, moreover, is acceptable in its own right as a descriptive 
model for all measures of strikes (except coal strikes) in an encompassing test (results 
not reported). Testing the cyclical specification against the semi-logarithmic Shorey 
model (SHOREY) yields rather different results, and it is the econometric model 
reported in tables 3.6A and 3.6B that is chosen by the non-nested tests (Reject)76. 
(The sole exception is non-coal, non-pay strikes in column 7. ) However, given that 
the semi-logarithmic Shorey model is rejected for the period as a whole for all seven 
measures of strikes in an encompassing test, then this finding is not particularly 
instructive, and indeed may be rather misleading. 
These conclusions for the basic cyclical specification are little changed when the 
political variables are included in the model as shown in the second half of table 3.10. 
Once again, the evidence points to there being genuinely autocorrelated disturbances 
(with the exception of the aggregated strikes series in the first column), and hence 
autocorrelation-consistent standard errors are presented for the cyclical and political 
variables. The coefficients on the cyclical variables again confirm the general patterns 
established in section 3.4, although coal strikes are no longer significantly correlated 
with the cycle. The model still displays structural instability however, and is unable to 
forecast satisfactorily when the sample period is divided at 1967(2). The inclusion of 
the political variables does not affect the conclusions with respect to the comparisons 
with the Pencavel and Shorey respecifications. Indeed, the legal indices rarely achieve 
76. It is the dynamic structure allowed for by the lagged dependent variable in Shorey's specification which would 
seem to put it at a considerable advantage over the essentially static cyclical model. It is conceivable that the latter 
would be preferred if only the tests could allow for the dynamic residual component. 
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statistical significance at conventional levels77. 
Table 3.11 presents the results from-estimating the cyclical-political model over the 
whole of the post-war period from 1950(1) to 1987(4). Once again, it is apparent that 
the disturbances are autocorrelated, although there is also evidence of other forms of 
misspecification in several categories of strikes and which may therefore be 
producing a misleading LM4 statistic. These diagnostics tests may be indicating that 
there has been a departure from the simple cyclical-political description of strikes in 
the 1980s. Despite this finding, testing for misspecified dynamics in a similar manner 
to that described above yields strong support for the hypothesis of autocorrelated 
errors with the single exception of the coal industry. Thus the lower half of table 3.11 
presents OLS estimates with autocorrelation-consistent standard errors computed to 
4th order given in parentheses. Strikes are found to be more frequent in the first three 
quarters of the year, most probably reflecting the pattern in the seasonality of 
negotiations. Moreover, over the longer time period, the cyclicality of pay strikes is 
still strongly evident and the coefficients on the political variables are again rather 
poorly determined in general78. The forecasting tests reported at the bottom of the 
table are for the sample period split at 1979(1) and the model then used to predict 
through to 1987(4). As can be seen, the cyclical-political model receives partial 
support on this criterion. 
3.5.3. Consequences for some Recent Studies of Strike Frequency. 
Further work clearly needs to be done before a satisfactory empirical description of 
post-war strike frequency can be said to have been established. However, some 
77. Since the two political variables are highly correlated, this finding may be a consequence of multicollinearity. 
This possibility was investigated in two ways. Firstly, the indices were combined to give a single legal index, and 
secondly, each of the legislative variables was dropped in turn from the model. Qualitatively, the results in 
table 3.10 were unchanged by either of these respecifications. 
78" The inclusion of an additional dummy variable for the implementation of incomes policies had little impact on 
the results reported in table 3.11. 
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observations seem pertinent at this juncture in the light of the results obtained above 
and the evidence recently reported by. others and which has been succinctly 
summarised by Metcalf (1990). The first issue to be addressed centres on the impact 
of recent legislative reforms on the incidence of industrial. conflict. Takla (1988, 
reported in Metcalf (1990)) estimates an aggregate time-series econometric model 
similar to that of Pencavel (1970) and shows strike frequency to have been 
significantly reduced due to the labour legislation introduced since 1980 as recorded 
by a simple dummy variable. McConnell & Takla (1990) use an industry level panel 
to show a similar finding, although the negative effect of the legislation is stronger for 
days lost than for strike frequency. Thirdly, utilising the Confederation of British 
Industry's Pay Data Bank from 1979 to 1989, Ingram et al (1991) show that the labour 
legislation has reduced strike activity for manufacturing bargaining groups which 
comprise their unit of analysis. They use both the Freeman & Pelletier (1990) index 
and dummy variables for 1982 and 1984. 
One basic criticism of all three studies is their failure to explain why strike activity 
also fell substantially. in the 1970s when the legal climate was becoming increasingly 
favourable towards, unions. There is an important asymmetry here; strike activity has 
decreased under both supportive and adversarial legislative regimes. The three papers 
only record and examine the impact of the law during the 'unfavourable' period and 
this is clearly unsatisfactory and insufficient. Certainly, the observed correlation 
between the 'anti-union' legislation and strike frequency in the 1980s cannot be used 
to infer that there is some causation from one to the other. In fact, the results reported 
in table 3.11 above for a longer time series which incorporates the reforms of the 
1970s as well as those of the 1980s show that, overall, there would appear to be no 
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significant legislation effect79. 
The second issue concerns the. applicability of the dependent variable used in the 
analysis in this chapter. As noted in chapter 2 and by Stem (1978), it would seem 
appropriate to deflate the statistics for strike frequency by some measure of 
population size in order to distinguish changes in the level of conflict from changes in 
the volume of bargaining. Two possibilities are considered in the context of the 
empirical model estimated in this sub-section; firstly, strike frequency is calculated on 
a per employee basis, and secondly, on a per union member basis. 
Deflating the seven measures of strike frequency by the number of employees in the 
sector of interest and re-estimating the cyclical specification of sub-section 3.5.2 
yields results little different from those presented in table 3.11. In particular, the 
elasticities of strike frequency with respect to the business cycle are virtually 
unchanged compared to those estimated for the raw frequency measures. The second 
strategy of deflating strike frequency by the number of union members in the sector of 
interest is one that has recently been (re-)advocated by Milner & Metcalf (1991). On 
the basis of strikes per union member they conclude that it was the 1970s that were 
exceptional, 
"... whereas the 1980s simply saw a return to the underlying trend of 
strike activity apparent since 1930. " (Milner & Metcalf (1991, p. 5)) 
This conclusion would seem to contradict with the assessment presented in Metcalf 
79. Further evidence is provided by replacing the ORG1 and BART variables in the cyclical-political specification 
in table 3.11 by three dummy variables recording the passage of the 1980 and 1982 Employment Acts and the 
1984 Trade, Union Act. The Employment Acts would appear to have reduced the frequency of all categories of 
strikes, although only by a small and insignificant amount in general. In contrast, and most conspicuously, the 
1984 Trade Union Act is associated with a large and significant reduction in the number of strikes, particularly pay 
strikes. This Act enforces trades unions to hold secret ballots of their members before a strike can be called. Three 
plausible and competing interpretations of this result are admissible; firstly, it may be that the legislation has 
established a delaying, or 'cooling-off period in negotiations so that settlements are reached more often. 
Alternatively, this finding may reflect the strengthened position of unions following a ballot of their members; 
employers may then be forced to make a quick settlement before incurring costly strike action. Finally, the 
downward trend in strike frequency witnessed since 1970 may have accelerated post-1980 for some other reason 
such as compositional changes in the economy. Without further information, it is not possible to discriminate 
between these three competing hypotheses. 
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(1990), and discussed above, in which he concludes that the impact of labour 
legislation has been significant in seeing the decline in industrial conflict in the 1980s. 
Estimating the cyclical-political model using union membership weighted measures 
of strike frequency once again does not change the estimated cyclical responsiveness 
of strikes80. However, the model now forecasts rather more successfully in the 1980s 
than when estimated using raw frequency measures of strikes. This would seem to 
give some support for the proposition that the acceleration apparent in the falling 
levels in strike frequency seen in the 1980s stems largely from the falling levels of 
union membership rather than a direct result of the changing legislative environment. 
Thus, failing to deflate strike frequency statistics for changes in union membership 
erroneously attributes this acceleration to the direct effect of the Conservatives' anti- 
union legislation. A more cautious analysis would seem to indicate that the legislation 
has had only an indirect effect, if any, and mainly through its impact on the level of 
union membership. It should be emphasised that this conclusion is necessarily 
tentative, and clearly much work remains to be done in this area. In particular, an 
investigation of the simultaneous determination of union density and strike activity, 
together with their relationship to the business cycle, would seem to be warranted. 
Finally, it is important to reiterate that the cyclical-political model presented above is 
not an attempt to specify a new model of strike frequency in Britain. Rather it is an 
'eclectic' description of strikes which serves to reveal the differing patterns of conflict 
across sectors and by cause and establishes a bench-mark against which a satisfactory 
'economic' model of strike activity will need to compare. 
80 
. The single exception is the series for coal strikes which are now (marginally) insignificantly negatively 
correlated with the business cycle. 
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3.6. Summary and Conclusions. 
It is apparent from the analysis presented above. that strikes in Britain are procyclical. 
The extant models singularly fail to establish this result because they are 
econometrically misspecified and incorporate several indicators of the business cycle, 
some leading, some concurrent with and some lagging the cycle and which together 
serve to obscure the cyclicality in strikes. These weaknesses are revealed in 
section 3.3 when two popular models are subjected to a more rigourous econometric 
examination than was previously possible. Moreover, even suitably transformed, 
these models cannot account for the downturn in strike activity after 1970. 
The chapter then addresses the proposition that strikes are a cyclical phenomenon in a 
more direct manner. While the Burns-Mitchell analysis is purely statistical in nature, 
it does serve to highlight the differences in the cyclical behaviour of various 
disaggregated measures of strike frequency. It also provides pointers for future 
research of this kind. Not only should coal and non-coal strikes continue to be 
distinguished, but so also should pay-strikes and non-pay strikes within the non-coal 
sector. 
In an attempt to put these findings into context, section 3.5 presents some preliminary 
results for a 'cyclical-political' empirical specification using a similar framework to 
that employed for the previous econometric models of strike frequency. The inclusion 
of a single index of the cycle does serve to reveal the cyclicality noted in section 3.4 
in certain disaggregated categories of strikes. Moreover, this simple cyclical model is 
seen to perform relatively favourably against the more sophisticated econometric 
specifications examined in section 3.3. Finally, some tentative estimates are made of 
the impact of the changing legislative environment. While others have suggested that 
the reforms of the 1980s have led to a decrease in strike activity, they universally fail 
explain why there was no corresponding upturn in strikes in the 1970s. Further 
analysis shows that there would appear to be no overall effect of changes in labour 
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law in the post-war period. 
There are several implications of the results presented in this chapter for any further 
analysis of aggregate strike frequency. Firstly, it is evident that important distinctions 
exist in the behaviour of different component series of aggregate strike frequency. Not 
only does the coal sector remain rather an enigma, but there are strong differences in 
strikes over pay and non-pay issues and thus these should be treated separately in 
order to avoid the aggregation bias that has plagued many previous studies. Moreover, 
the results from the cycle-trend-seasonal decomposition in section 3.4 indicate that 
further work along the lines of a structural time-series approach may be fruitful. 
Some final remarks with respect to the changing patterns of unionisation and its likely 
impact on the level of industrial conflict seem merited. A crude examination shows 
that at least part of the apparent further downturn in strikes in the 1980s is a 
consequence of the decline in union density in the period. But there has also been an 
increasing concentration among unions through amalgamations, so that while there 
were some 513 unions in 1970, this had fallen to only 438 in 1980, and by 1988 (the 
latest date for which statistics are available), unions numbered only 31481. During the 
same period, union density rose substantially (in particular between 1970 and 1980) 
and reached an historically high level of over 55% in 1979. Since then, as is well 
documented, union density has been in sharp decline and a variety of hypotheses have 
been offered in explanation (see, for example, Carruth & Disney (1988) and Disney 
(1990)). Undoubtedly, these changes in unionisation will have had an impact on the 
recorded levels of strike activity and must account for at least part of the substantial 
fall in strike frequency since 1970. The decreasing number of unions means that 
fewer strikes are recorded for any given level of grievance activity (and that each 
strike will tend to involve more workers) purely as an artefact of the way in which 
81. Source: Employment Gazette. May 1990. 
ýv ? 
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strikes are measured. Moreover, the decline in density since 1980 will compound this 
effect since unions will find it increasingly-difficult to organise strike action if they 
comprise a smaller and smaller proportion of the workforce. Indeed there may be a 
minimum feasible density below which it is simply not possible to call a strike. 
Together therefore, it seems likely that these changes in the patterns of unionisation 
will serve to reduce recorded strike frequency and may obscure any real changes in 
the level of conflict activity. A more suitable- approach may be to examine strike 
incidence, (that is, strikes per worker or strikes per plant etc. ) to complement the 
study of strike frequency. However, the central difficulty lies in selecting an 
appropriate deflator for the number of strikes, and it is clear that simply deflating 
strike frequency by employment or union membership as in sub-section 3.5.3 does not 
adequately capture the influence of union amalgamation, or of the trend towards 
decentralised bargaining, or of the compositional changes in the economy witnessed 
in the early 1980s in particular. 
While there are a number of possibilities, given the changes in workplace unionism, a 
natural unit of analysis to choose for further investigation is the plant or 
establishment, with the measure of conflict suitably adjusted for the degree of 
unionism. Thus the next chapter presents an investigation of the incidence of strikes 
(and non-strike activity) at the establishment level utilising the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys of 1980 and 1984. 
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Table-3.1 
Replication of Pencavel (1970): Basic Sp ecification 
Dependent Variable: Non-Coal Strike Frequency 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 
Mean 237.7 240.9 
S. D. - 109.9 110.3 
n - 62 60 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST -147.88 (1.68) -264.01 (2.47) -331.10 (2.87) 
Olt 74.93 (4.99) 82.90 (5.15) 91.34 (5.42) 
Q2t 38.00 (2.67) 29.00 (1.86) 24.47 (1.60) 
03, 7.01 (0.48) 1.75 (0.11) 0.51 (0.03) 
Ut -41.29 (2.89) -42.07 (2.42) -42.92 (2.43) 
D1 1.87 (2.60) 3.74 (3.54) 4.53 (3.73) 
1piARt_I -42.46 (4.89) -41.16 (3.62) -20.15 (2.92) 
Tt 5.50 (15.28) 5.98 (15.90) 5.97 (16.49) 
Lag Coefficients 
ß1 -10.27 (1.97) -6.04 (1.02) -10.91 (3.78) 
P2 -9.49 (4.06) -7.89 (2.75) -6.52 (3.85) 
P3 -8.34 (4.28) -8.60 (3.43) -3.15 (2.22) 
P4 -6.81 (2.52) -8.17 (2.52) -0.82 (0.53) 
Ps -4.92 (1.77) -6.59 (2.03) 0.48 (0.33) 
P6 -2.64 (1.39) -3.87 (1.76) 0.76 (0.78) 
IN -42.46 (4.89) -41.16 (3.62) -20.15 (2.92) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.869 0.873 0.880 
SEE 41.9 42.1 41.1 
lnL - -314.93 -303.25 
DW 1.36 (1.89) 1.31 (1.89) 1.37 (1.89) 
LM --9.09 (9.49) 11.12 (9.49) 
RESET --9.45 (3.84) 10.54 (3.84) 
NN --0.94 (5.99) 0.35 (5.99) 
HETERO --2.14 (3.84) 0.64 (3.84) 
Notes: 
1. Absolute t-ratios for the estimated coefficients are given in parentheses. 
2. The figures in parentheses beside the diagnostic test statistics are the relevant 5% 
critical values. For DW, the upper bound is given. 
107 
Table 3.2 
Re plication of Pencavel (1970): Wag e-Price Specification 
Dependent Variable: Non-Coal Strike Frequency 
Column 1, Column 2 Column 3. 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 
Mean - 237.7 240.9 S. D. - 109.9 ". 110.3 
n - 62 60 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST -74.46 (0.72) -172.60 (1.43) -263.14 (1.75) Olt 70.55 (4.60) 84.42 (5,18) 88.30 (5.04) 
02t. 38.45 (2.70) 29.81 (1.94) 24.72 
.. 
(1.59) 
03, 5.44 (0.37) 2.02 (0.13) 0.65 (0.04) 
U1 -38.73 (2.43) -64.47 (2.74) -52.09 (2.48) D1 1.27 (1.49) 3.81 (3.32) 4.14 (3.08) 
2YiAWc-t -44.20 (3.89) -68.66 (3.68) -22.99 (2.66) 261API-i 39.34 (4.34) 49.52 (4.09) 19.98 (2.83) 
Tt 5.24 (13.10) 5.65 (12.09) 5.87 (12.32) 
Lag Coefficients 
Y1 -6.52 (1.02) -10.24 (1.34) -12.81 (3.36) 
Y2 -8.49 (2.73) -13.22 (3.03) -7.55 (3.57) 
Y3 -9.23 (3.80) -14.33 (3.62) -3.55 (1.95) 
Y4 -8.78 (2.81) -13.56 (3.00) -0.79 (038) 
Ys -7.06 (2.21) -10.92 (2.54) 0.72 (0.36) 
Y6 -4.14 (1.91) -6.40 (2.25) 0.99 (0.74) 
ly, -44.20 (3.89) -68.66 (3.68) -22.99 (2.66) 
öl 11.12 (2.05) 4.23 (0.63) 10.29 (3.39) 
02 9.33 (3.94) 8.48 (2.79) 6.28 (3.58) 
03 7.51 (3.58) 10.76 ( 9 0 (2.21) 
64 5.67 (1.92) 11.04 3. 9 0) 
i 20 
(0.64) 
05 3.80 (1.25) 9.35 (2.46) -0.24 (0.16) 06 1.91 (0.92) 5.67 (2.20) -0.57 (0.57) 
39.34 (4.34) 49.52 (4.09) 19.98 (2.83) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.873 0.881 0.882 
SEE 41.9 41.5 41.7 
lnL - -312.88 -302.83 
DW 1.35 . (1.98) 1.39 (1.98), 1.38 (1.98) LM - - 7.66 (9.49) 11.25 (9.49) RESET - - 15.15 (3.84) 14.64 (3.84) NN - - 0.30 (5.99) 0.39 (5.99) HETERO - - 1.85 (3.84) 0.73 (3.84) 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.1. 
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Table 3.3 
Replication of Pencavel (1970): Institutional Factors. 
Dependent Variable: Non-Coal Strike Frequency, 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 
Mean - 237.7 240.9 
S. D. - 109.9 110.3 
n - 62 60 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST -142.25 (1.47) -256.77 (2.11) -351.74 (2.67) 
01t 75.56 (4.91) 82.78 (5.01) 93.04 (533) 
Q2t 37.99 (2.64) 2831 (1.78) 22.78 (1.45) 
Q31 6.71 (0.46) 0.48 (0.03) -0.72 (0.05) 
Ut -50.19 (2.95) -51.09 (2.29) -47.74 (2.04) 
D1 1.97 (2.35) 3.76 (3.24) 4.81 (3.59) 
Y, ßjARt_i -52.52 (3.85) -45.22 (331) -21.81 (2.80) 
T, 5.71 (13.28) 6.29 (1130) 6.16 ( 11.01) 
L1 -11.10 (0.54) -21.42 (0.88) -21.25 (0.88) 
it -10.27 (0.56) 2.53 (0.11) 12.93 (036) 
Lag Coefficients 
ßl - - 539 (0.88) -10.98 (3.60) 
P2 - - 8.26 (2.61) -6.78 (3.61) 
33 - - 9.62 (3.18) -3.52 (2.21) P4 - - 9.47 (2.53) -1.22 (0.73) 
Ps - - 7.82 (2.14) 0.14 (0.09) 
P6 - - 4.67 (1.91) 0.54 (0.54) 
ßßj -52.52 (3.85) -45.22 (331) -21.81 (2.80) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.871 0.875 0.882 
SEE 42.3 42.5 41.6 
lnL - -314.45 -302.70 
DW 1.41 (1.98) 1.33 (1.98) 1.42 (1.98) 
LM - - 8.52 (9.49) 9.96 (9.49) RESET - - 19.81 (3.84) 19.47 (3.84) NN - - 0.52 (5.99) 0.39 (5.99) HETERO - - 1.87 (3.84) 0.77 (3.84) 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.1. 
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Table 3.4A 
Replication of Pencavel (1970): Semi-Logarithmic Specification 
Dependent Variable: ln(Non-Coal Strike Frequency) " 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1967(3)-1979(1) 1950(1)-1979(1) 
Mean 5.364 6.366 5.796 
S. D. 0.472 0.253 0.634 
n 62 47 109 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST 3.013 (7.09) 6.144 (15.42) 4.992 '(18.65) 
Q1, 0.324 (5.07) 0.096 (1.02) 0.157 (234) 
Q2t 0.058 (0.94) 0.180 (1.68) 0.119 (1.78) 
Q31 -0.004 (0.06) 0.064 (0.57) 0.003 (0.04) 
U, -0.098 (1.42) -0.195 (3.18) -0.287 (7.90) D, 0.016 (3.93) 0.002 (0.41) -0.002 (0.76) 7, ßIARt_i -0.124 (2.59) -0.047 (1.38) -0.043 (1.94) Tt 0.026 (17.56) 0.007 (1.52) 0.026 (19.10) 
Lag Coefficients 
ßl -0.028 (1.19) 0.001 (0.07) -0.001 (0.08) 12 -0.027 (2.28) -0.006 (0.84) -0.006 (1.23) P3 -0.025 (2.36) -0.011 (1.54) -0.010 (2.04) N -0.021 (138) -0.012 (1.74) -0.011 (1.89) Ps -0.015 (1.17) . 0.011 (1.76) -0.010 (1.72) P6 -0.008 (0.95) -0.007 (1.73) -0.006 (1.61) 
-0.124 (2.59) -0.047 (1.38) -0.043 (1.94) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.891 0.343 0.864 
SEE 0.167 0.225 0.243 
1nL 27.84 8.35 4.15 
DW 1.38 (1.89) 0.97 (1.95) 0.75 (1.85) 
LM 7.06 - (9.49) 17.54 (9.49) 45.05 (9.49) RESET 0.22 (3.84) 1.78 (3.84) 3.78 (3.84) 
NN 1.16 (5.99) 3.02 (5.99) 6.29 (5.99) 
HETERO 0.01 (3.84) 1.64 (3.84) 4.69 (3.84) 
SSTAB 7.44 (1.98) 
PRED 3.38 (1.60) 
VRATIO 1.82 (1.62) 
Notes: 
1. S-eetable3.1. 
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Table 3: 4B 
Replication of Pencavel (1970): Semi-LogarithmlC Specification 
Dependent Variable: ln(Non-Coal Strike Frequency) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1967(3)-1979(1) 1950(1)-1979(1) 
Mean 5.364 6.366 5.796 
S. D. 0.472 0.253 0.634 
n 62 47 109 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST 3.067 (6.80) 5.980 (15.95) 5.110 (18.97) 
Q1i 0.324 (5.28) 0.109 (1.38) 0.150 (2.31) 
Q2t 0.049 (0.82) 0.230 (2.49) 0.124 (1.92) 
Q31 -0.019 (0.32) 0.098 (0.99) -0.011 (0.16) Ut -0.200 (2.42) -0.198 (3.84) -0.317 (8.62) Dt 0.017 (3.93) 0.006 (1.34) -0.003 (1.16) 7, ßjARt4 -0.170 (3.34) -0.062 (3.25) -0.078 (3.98) T1 0.030 (14.43) 0.007 (1.57) 0.029 (16.61) 
L1 -0.257 (2.86) 0.117 (1.52) -0.001 (0.01) it 0.044 (0.50) -0.274 (4.11) -0.194 (2.95) 
Lag Coefficients 
ßl -0.020 '(0.90) -0.015 (1.86) -0.014 (1.51) P2 -0.031 (2.75) -0.014 (3.33) -0.016 (3.35) P3 -0.036 (3.33) -0.012 (2.85) -0.016 (3.69) N -0.035 (2.60) -0.010 (1.90) -0.014 (2.65) P5 -0.029 (2.18) -0.007 (1.43) -0.011 (2.09) P6 -0.018 (1.95) -0.004 (1.17) -0.006 (1.78) 
lßß -0.170 (3.34) -0.062 (3.25) -0.078 (3.98) 
Diagnostics 
R2 
SEE 
lnL 
0.906 
0.158 
32.48 
0.559 
0.190 
17.7 
0.875 
0.235 
18.96 
DW 1.63 (1.98) 1.55 (2.07) 0.85 (1.89) 
LM 2.99 (9.49) 14.38 (9.49) 41.91 (9.49) 
RESET 2.54 (3.84) 1.16 (3.84) 1.91 (3.84) 
NN 0.93 (5.99) 0.57 (5.99) 0.91 (5.99) 
HETERO 0.57 (3.84) 1.61 (3.84) 4.25 (3.84) 
SSTAB 8.76 (1.89) 
PRED 3.53 (1.60) 
VRATIO 1.44 (1.66) 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.1. 
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Table 3.5 
Replication of Shorey (1977): Basic Specification 
Dependent Variable: Non-Coal Strike Frequency 
Column 1- "' Column 2 Column 3 
Period.., 
. 
1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 1950(1)-1967(2) 
Mean 231 234.3 229.4 
S. D. 107 108.6 108.8 
n - 65 68 , 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST -291.7 (5.2) -328.25 (4.89) -320.98 (5.10) 
Q1t 81.8 (7.3) 86.83 (7.53) 8337 (7.00) 
(n/P)1 158.1 (5.4) 45.63 (5.84) 37.42 (5.22) 
Awl-1 -18.2. (2.3) -13.50 (3.27) -9.41 (1.75) 
Apt-1 12.9 (1.8) 10.01 (3.27) 3.67 (0.78) 
Pt 1.2 (2.2) 1.19 (2.06) 1.31 (2.36) 
St-1 0.48 (5.3) 0.38 (4.22) 0.48 (5.17) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.89 0.897 0.887 
SEE 36.3 36.7 38.4 
lnL - -322.67 -340.85 
Dh -- 0.33 (1.96) 0.26 (1.96) 
LM -- 8.77 (9.49) 7.53 (9.49) 
RESET - 10.72 (3.84) 8.60 (3.84) NN -- 0.76 (5.99) 0.68 (5.99) HETERO -- 436 (3.84) 7.03 (3.84) 
Notes: 
1. We table 3.1. 
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Table 3.6A. 
Replication of Shorey (1977): Semi-Logarithmic Specification 
Dependent Variable: ln(Non-Coal Strike Frequency) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1967(3)-1979(1) 1950(1)-1979(1) 
Mean 5.351 6.366 5.777 
S. D. 0.465 0.253 0.636 
n 65 47 112 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST 1.370 (5.05) 2.585 (3.19) 0.378 (1.89) 
01, 0.349 (7.87) 0.071 (1.04) 0.213 (4.74) 
(n/P), 0.197 (6.26) 0.009 (0.41) 0.043 (2.14) 
OWt_1 -0.060 (3.73) -0.003 (0.50) -0.002 (0.39) 
Apt-, 0.039 (3.25) -0.004 (0.44) -0.003 (0.44) 
Pt 0.005 (2.27) -0.000 (0.44) -0.000 (0.12) ln(S1.1) 0.369 (4.35) 0.596 (4.91) 0.869 (19.06) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.916 0.450 0.902 
SEE 0.141 0.201 . 0.205 InL 38.64 12.53 22.30 
Dh 0.75 (1.96) 2.61 (1.96) 3.02 (1.96) 
LM 6.43 (9.49) 8.81 (9.49) 16.34 (9.49) 
RESET 0.32 (3.84) 2.90 (3.84) 0.80 (3.84) 
NN "1.01 (5.99) 2.33 (5.99) 0.17 (5.99) 
HETERO 1.42 (3.84) 0.74 (3.84) 0.48 (3.84) 
SSTAB 8.23 (2.10) 
PRED 3.45 (1.58) 
VRATIO 2.02 (1.60) 
Notes: 
1. stable 3.1. 
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Table 3.6B 
Replication of Shorey (1977): Semi-Logarithmic Specification 
Dependent Variable: ln(Non-Coal Strike Frequency) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 
Period 1950(1)-1967(2) 1967(3)-1979(1) 1950(1)-1979(1) 
Mean 5.351 6.366 5.777 
S. D. 0.465 0.253 0.636 
n 65 47 112 
Regression Coefficients 
CNST 1.420 (4.55) 2.797 (3.47) 0.549 (2.58) 
Q1t 0.356 (6.46) 0.183 (2.45) 0.224 (3.99) 
On/P), 0.221 (5.60) 0.093 (2.91) 0.052 (2.33) 
Awl-1 -0.057 (3.45) -0.005 (0.81) 0.001 (0.21) 
Opt-1 0.038 (2.87) 0.004 (0.48) -0.008 (0.98) 
Pt 0.004 (1.34) -0.002 (2.85) -0.000 (0.75) ln(S1.1) 0.353 (3.81) 0.436 (3.50) 0.823 (16.05) 
Q2t -0.014 (0.27) 0.291 (3.26) 0.035 (0.62) 
Q31 -0.004 (0.08) 0.170 (1.78) -0.007 (0.12) 
L1 -0.062 (0.96) 0.233 (3.04) 0.125 (2.34) 
it 0.107 (1.47) -0.152 (2.24) -0.003 (0.06) 
Diagnostics 
R2 0.920 0.632 0.908 
SEE 0.143 0.173 0.202 
lnL 40.01 21.98 25.99 
Dh 1.53 (1.96) 4.78 (1.96) 3.01 (1.96) 
LM 11.04 (9.49) 15.45 (9.49) 16.61 (9.49) 
RESET 0.60 (3.84) 2.10 (3.84) 0.09 (3.84) 
NN 0.71 (5.99) 1.05 (5.99) 0.14 (5.99) 
HETERO 1.66 (3.84) 0.00 (3.84) 0.03 (3.84) 
SSTAB 7.21 (1.90) 
PRED 3.11 (139) 
VRATIO 1.46 " (1.64) 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.1. 
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Table 3.7 
Strikes Series Annual Aggregates 1946-1987. 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
All Pay Non-Pay - Cöal. Non-Coal Non-Coal Strikes 
Year Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Pay Non-Pay 
1946 2205 912 1147 1333 872 385 487 
1947 1721 764 854 1053 668 316 352 
1948 1759 723 1004 1116 643 271 372 
1949 1426 590 794 874 552 236 316 
1950 1339 561 749 860 479 205 274 
1951 1719 790 867 1058 661 314 347 
1952 1714 697 948 1222 492 209 283 
1953 1746 767 964 1307 439 196 243 
1954 1989 936 1095 1464 525 244 281 
1955 2418 1213 1238 1783 635 312 323 
1956 2648 1190 1450 2076 572 258 314 
1957 2858 1257 1630 2224 634 276 358 
1958 2629' 1228 1453 1963 666 305 361 
1959 2093 956 1137 1306 787 357 430 
1960 2832 1336 1402 1666 1166 569 597 
1961 2686 1228 1312 - 1458 1228 593 635 
1962 2449 1009 1201 1105 1344 614 730 
1963 2068 861- 1037 987 1081 495 586 
1964 2524 1135 1230 1058 1466 704 762 
1965 2354 1053 1073 740 1614 799 815 
1966 1937 794 958' 563 1374 624 750 
1967 2116 885 1002 394 1722 810 912 
1968 2378 1073 957 221 2157 1141 1016 
1969 3116 1419 1058 186 2930 1680 1250 
1970 3906 2130 1193 160 3746 2403 1343 
1971 2228 961 875 135 2093 1096 997 
1972 2489 1259 815 224 2265 1377 888 
1973 2873 1232 1111 301 2572 1354 1218 
1974 2922 1569 818 186 2736 1800 936 
1975 2282 1089 737 212 2070 1231 839 
1976 2016 720 849 276 1740 795 945 
1977 2703 1231 847 262 2441 1449 992 
1978 2471 1082 652 338 2133 1337 796 
1979 2080 870 574 298 1782 1077 705 
1980 1330 453 484 302 1028 500 528 
1981 1338 444 441 302 1036 520 516 
1982 1528 446 490 403 1125 548 577 
1983 1352 369 453 355 997 447 550 
1984 1206 386 387 78 1128 566 562 
1985 887 249 270 160 727 346 381 
1986 1053 320 484 351 702 281 421 
1987 1004 283 629 299 705 223 482 
Mean 2104.6 915.9 920.7 777.6 1327.0 696.7 630.2 
S. D. 648.6 387.6 318.6 611.7 797.1 519.4 294.5 
CV 0.308 0.423 0.346 0.787 0.601 0.746 0.467 
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Table 3.8 
Strikes Series Seasonality, 1946. &1987 .- ý_" 
Column l Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
All Pay Non-Pay Coal Non-Coal Non-Coal Strikes 
Mont Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Pay Non-Pay 
Jan 176.1 72.0 81.7 61.2 114.9 56.7 58.2 
Feb 185.4 78.7 86.5 67.7 117.7 59.5 58.2 
Mar 202.0 88.6 86.8 75.5 126.5 67.5 59.0 
Apr 192.7 85.5 83.0 74.4 118.3 64.9 53.4 
May 192.0 87.1 83.0 72.1 119.8 64.1 55.7 
Jun 183.9 81.6 80.5 69.8 114.1 60.8 53.4 
Jul 136.2 60.6 57.0 45.5 90.7 49.0 41.8 
Aug 162.9 73.7 69.1 57.7 105.2 57.1 48.2 
Sep 184.6 81.4 79.8 68.1 116.5 61.9 54.6 
Oct 212.3 93.7 91.4 77.0 135.2 71.1, 64.1 
Nov 182.8 76.8 78.4 68.3 114.5 59.3 55.2 
Dec 93.9 36.3 43.5 40.3 53.5 24.9 28.6 
Mean 175.4 76.3 76.7 64.8 110.6 58.1 52.5 
S. D. 32.0 15.3 13.8 11.7 20.9 11.9 9.4 
CV 0.183 0.201 0.180 
, 
0.180 0.189 0.205 0.179 
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Table 3.9 
Burns-Mitchell Results 
Panel (1): All Strikes: 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46--6/50-"10/52 131.4 124.5 100.4 82.3 85.5 97.5 98.6 92.6 86.9 
10/52--6/55-"10/58 67.5 77.1 85.2 102.7. 111.2 114.3 120.2 95.0 72.9 
10/58--6/60--1/63 83.5 87.0 111.4 124.8 123.5 116.4 101.2 67.4 69.2 
1/63-"10/64--5/67 93.2 110.5 126.1 130.9 120.9 104.0 70.2 79.9 89.9 
5/67--3/69-"11/71 58.5 65.8 83.8 109.6 138.4 162.7 99.2 65.9 79.5 
11/71--6/73 -"10/75 83.0 93.8 105.9 103.9 105.2 116.5 113.0 70.4 64.0 
10/75--8/79--3/81 72.0 107.0 126.2 109.4 81.4 67.0 62.5 71.1 81.5 
Mean 84.2 95.1 105.6 109.1 109.4 111.2 95.0 77.5 77.7 
Panel (2): Pay Strikes 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46--6/50-"10/52 129.9 133.1 95.1 78.4 87.8 106.2 96.9 85.9 85.3 
10/52--6/55-"10/58 62.3 72.5 87.9 115.0 121.1 112.6 114.0 94.4 70.5 
10/58--6/60--1/63 89.1 94.3 125.6 136.3 132.3 123.5 91.0 48.8 55.9 
1/63-"10/64--5/67 87.0 118.9 144.0 145.5 133.9 121.4 46.1 59.0 87.3 
5/67--3/69-41/71 42.6 54.0 73.1 983 141.3 191.5 101.7 58.1 86.5 
11/71--6/73 -"10/75 89.2 97.7 92.5 91.4 107.8 133.8 127.9 53.8 32.2 
10/75--8/79--3/81 42.3 99.6 141.8 115.7 72.6 56.4 50.2 62.4 75.6 
Mean 77.5 95.7 108.6 111.5 113.8 120.8 89.7 66.1 70.5 
Panel (3): Non-Pay Strikes 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46--6/50-"10/52 147.8 136.7 110.9 80.9 75.0 80.8 87.5 86.7 78.3 
10/52--6/55-"10/58 57.4 69.6 79.2 91.1 102.9 117.2 132.2 100.8 75.9 
10/58--6/60--1/63 87.1 88.3 110.5 119.7 117.3 112.6 103.0 72.5 75.9 
1/63-"10/64--5/67 86.6 102.0 117.4 115.7 108.4 95.0 85.6 96.4 96.5 
5/67--3/69-"11/71 86.2 85.0 89.6 102.0 114.7 126.8 106.0 82.9 84.8 
11/71"--6/73-40/75 78.7 93.7 118.1 114.3 1023 95.5 93.6 94.3 102.1 
10/75--8/79--3/81 109.0 122.7 102.1 93.8 94.5 88.1 84.2 82.5 86.0 
Mean 
If 
93.2 99.7 104.0 102.5 102.1 102.3 98.9 88.0 85.6 
--JI 
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Table 3.9 (continued ) 
Burns-Mitchell Results 
Panel (4): Coal Strikes 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46--6/50-"10/52 184.0 156.5 103.4 61.4 60.9 74.7 89.7 100.4 95.5 
10/52--6/55-"10/58 47.8 58.3 69.9 95.2 109.0 123.0 138.4 102.5 65.6 
10/58--6/60--1/63 853 85.9 110.3 129.5 127.2 118.2 91.7 73.0 77.1 
1/63-"10/64--5/67 112.5 121.8 134.5 125.9 107.6 94.1 80.9 71.4 62.7 
5/67--3/69-"11/71 84.0 76.9 83.2 88.8 88.9 96.8 110.6 126.8 147.7 
11/71. --6/73-"10/75 78.8 89.1 101.7 97.8 93.9 95.1 105.8 107.8 113.6 
10/75--8/79--3/81 90.9 95.6 103.5 102.4 104.7 101.7 97.8 96.8 98.1 
Mean 97.6 97.7 100.9 100.1 98.9 100.5 102.1 97.0 94.3 
Panel (5): Non-Coal Strikes 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46 --6/50 -" 10/52 71.1 84.2 94.0 101.4 108.3 116.6 113.5 104.0 100.5 
10/52 --6/55 -"10/58 105.0 109.2 109.7 110.7 109.4 100.1 91.6 84.5 83.9 
10/58--6/60--1/63 95.8 99.2 112.4 114.3 113.2 108.6 105.1 70.0 68.2 
1/63--10/64--5/67 86.7 102.2 112.8 123.8 122.3 108.5 72.3 91.3 110.6 
5/67--3/69-"11/71 57.9 67.6 85.4 111.8 142.5 166.8 97.6 59.8 69.8 
11/71. --6/73-"10/75 85.8 93.8 102.7 104.1 109.0 123.6 115.1 63.2 53.0 
10/75--8/79--3/81 64.4 1093 131.5 112.3 73.3 56.7 54.1 65.8 78.2 
Mean 80.9 95.1 106.9 111.2 111.4 111.6 92.8 77.0 80.6 
11l$ 
Table 3.9 (continued ) 
Burns-Mitchell Results 
Panel (6): Non-Coal Pay Strikes 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46--6/50-"10/52 65.8 82.2 90.7 100.8 109.9 120.6 116.3 106.6 104.5 
10/52--6/55-"10/58 106.3 110.1 111.2 114.0 112.0 99.9 89.5 82.2 79.9 
10/58--6/60--1/63 99.8 104.1 118.8 120.0 118.0 111.8 100.0 60.8 59.7 
1/63-"10/64--5/67 92.3 113.0 125.8 140.2 137.9 123.6 49.7 70.3 107.6 
5/67--3/69-"11/71 39.6 53.7 77.2 109.5 153.8 194.0 95.9 51.1 72.4 
11171--6/73-"10/75 92.4 95.4 86.7 90.5 112.4 146.3 135.0 40.6 13.6 
10/75--8/79--3/81 18.6 92.6 158.8 129.0 57.4 34.4 30.2 51.1 70.3 
Mean 73.5 93.0 109.9 114.9 114.5 118.7 88.1 66.1 72.6 
Panel (7): Non-Coal Non-Pa y Strikes 
TROUGH PEAK TROUGH 
Reference Cycle 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9/46--6/50--10/52 76.7 86.2 97.4 102.0 106.7 112.5 110.7 101.2 96.3 
10/52 --6/55 -"10/58 103.5 108.2 108.1 107.1 106.5 100.3 94.0 86.9 88.3 
10/58--6/60--1/63 92.1 94.8 106.5 109.1 108.8 105.7 109.7 78.5 76.0 
1/63-"10/64--5/67 83.1 95.2 104.4 113.1 112.2 98.6 86.9 104.9 112.6 
5/67--3/69-"11/71 81.1 85.1 95.8 114.6 128.2 132.3 99.7 70.9 66.4 
11/71--6/73 -"10/75 78.1 91.9 121.4 119.9 104.9 97.1 91.8 89.8 99.0 
10175--8/79--3/81 106.8 124.8 106.2 96.8 88.0 77.4 76.2 79.4 85.5 
Mean 88.8 98.0 105.7 109.0 107.9 103.4 95.6 87.4 89.1 
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Table 3.10 
A Cyclical-Political Model of Quarterly Strike Frequency 
Period: 1950(1)-1979(1) 
Dependent ariable: ln(trike requency) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
Strikes All Pay Non-Pay Coal Non-Coal Non-Coa l Strikes 
Series Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Pay Non-Pay 
Mean 6.365 5.556 5.541 5.004 5.743 5.045 5.029 
S. D. 0.252 0.328 0.259 1.025 0.651 0.763 0.548 
n 117 117 117 117 117 117 117 
Basic Cyclical Specification 
OLS Diagnostics 
LM4 (9.49) 48.67 48.10 38.66 85.43 31.19 33.65 27.62 
FF (3.84) 3.26 0.04 5.07 2.81 2.78 2.00 3.81 
NN (5.99) 0.43 4.65 0.10 6.26 3.90 4.52 3.10 
HET (3.84) 0.25 0.38 0.76 3.91 0.03 3.02 7.12 
LR Test for Misspecified Dynamics 
AR4 (9.49) 4.50 2.94 2.92 5.78 3.20 4.06 0.78 
Regression Coefficient on Cyclical Variable 
(Autocorrelation consistent SEs in parentheses, computed to 4th order) 
CYCLE, 0.898 1.783 -0.083 -5.585 3.788 4.717 2.861 
(0.662) (0.920) (0.594) (1.592) (0.662) (0.892) (0.516) 
Forecasting Performance for sample divided at 1967(2) 
SSTAB (2.10) 10.93 9.52 10.99 N. A. 2.09 1.87 2.57 
PRED (136) 4.45 6.11 2.63 20.80 1.25 1.93 0.75 
VRATI (1.59) 2.32 3.67 1.10 N. A. 1.09 1.84 1.94 
Non-Nested Tests 
PENCAVEL Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SHOREY 
. Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept 
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Table 3.10 (continued) 
A Cyclical-Political Model of Quarterly Strike Frequency 
Political-Cyclical Specification 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
Strikes All Pay Non-Pay Coal Non-Coal Non-Coal Strikes 
Series Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Pay Non-Pay 
OLS Diagnostics 
LM4 (9.49) 48.40 48.47 33.16 77.38 28.47 33.03 22.39 
FF (3.84) 4.81 0.72 2.15 3.10 4.05 2.68 5.86 
NN (5.99) 1.13 7.37 0.58 2.29 2.32 3.76 2.92 
HET (3.84) 1.58 0.80 1.29 12.84 0.17 2.88 10.89 
LR Test for Misspecified Dynamics 
AR4 (21.03) 26.22 20.37 17.92 16.32 15.36 18.20 10.72 
Regression Coefficients on Cyclical and Political Variables 
(Autocorrelation consistent SEs in parentheses, computed to 4th order) 
CYCLE1 1.715 2.682 0.971 -1.548 3.437 4.304 2.608 
(0.621) (0.865) (0.623) (1.632) (0.669) (0.810) (0.672) 
ORG1 -0.022 -0.039 -0.012 -0.174 0.033 0.020 0.052 
(0.054) (0.072) (0.038) (0.148) (0.067) (0.089) (0.049) 
BAR1 0.089 0.109 0.104 0.485 -0.056 -0.052 -0.061 
(0.052) (0.067) (0.040) (0.142) (0.056) (0.074) (0.045) 
Forecasting Performance for sample divided at 1967(2) 
SSTAB (1.98) 9.05 7.23 8.15 NA 2.07 1.78 2.56 
PRED (1.57) 4.54 6.24 2.36 33.44 1.22 1.91 0.68 
VRATI (1.59) 2.34 3.99 1.00 N. A. 1.01 1.81 2.60 
Non-Nested Tests 
PENCAVEL Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept Accept 
SHOREY Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Reject Accept 
Notes: 
1. See text for details of specification and estimation methodology. 
2. Each of the specifications also include quarterly dummies and a quadratic in time. 
3. The figures in parentheses beside the diagnostic tests SSTAB, PRED and VRATI 
are the relevant 5% critical values. 
4. The regression specification for coal strikes additionally includes dummies for the 
national strikes in 1974. 
5. The non-nested test procedures utilised are: the N-test; the NT-test; the W-test; the 
J-test; the JA-test; and the encompassing principal. 
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Table 3.11 
A Cyclical-Political Model of Quarterly Strike Frequency 
Period: 1950(1)-1987(4) 
Dependent Variable: ln(trike Frequency) 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 Column 7 
Strikes All Pay Non-Pay Coal Non-Coal Non-Coa l Strikes 
Series Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Strikes Pay Non-Pay 
Mean 6.218 5.321 5.349 4.772 5.678 4.958 4.984 
S. D. 0.372 0.551 0.441 1.112 0.601 0.724 0.497 
n 152 152 152 152 152 152 152 
Political-Cyclical Specification 
OLS Diagnostics 
LM4 (9.49) 54.63 49.05 64.71 88.01 46.42 56.07 29.86 
FF (3.84) 1.40 0.79 11.64 2.25 18.83 17.53 12.14 
NN (5.99) 0.60 4.55 6.99 2.62 2.55 1.01 0.99 
HET (3.84) 2.05 1.27 12.81 0.36 0.62 0.34 9.52 
LR Test for Misspecified Dynamics 
AR4 (21.03) 15.93 17.07 7.22 50.88 11.83 15.91 6.99 
Regression Coefficients on Cyclical and Political Variables 
(Autocorrelation consistent SEs in parentheses, computed to 4th order) 
CYCLE1 1.374 2.480 1.083 -3.250 3.076 3.651 2.256 
(0.329) (0.447) (0.550) (0.911) (0.458) (0.726) (0.349) 
ORG1 -0.054 -0.047 -0.060 -0.290 0.022 0.028 0.021 
(0.041) (0.054) (0.046) (0.097) (0.047) (0.065) (0.035) 
BAR1 0.083 0.098 0.041 0.261 0.005 0.033 -0.029 
(0.040) (0.052) (0.046) (0.111) (0.048) (0.065) (0.037) 
Forecasting Performance for sample divided at 1979(1) 
SSTAB (1.95) 0.88 0.81 7.89 N. A. 3.40 5.38 2.08 
PRED (1.54) 0.80 0.73 3.82 6.50 1.42 1.97 1.21 
VRATI (1.61) 1.23 1.41 1.92 N. A. 1.27 1.19 1.09 
Notes: 
1. See table 3.10. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
. .. 1... 
AM. Other Forms of Conflict Activity. 
It is apparent that other forms of conflict activity' are important factors in the 
collective bargaining process. Indeed, strike action is frequently seen to be a 
derivative of situations in which such other sanctions have previously been employed. 
Yet the study of non-strike action has been seriously neglected in the literature. This 
is undoubtedly due to the fact that official statistics only cover. stoppages (albeit 
imperfectly as noted above) and not these other indicators of industrial unrest. In 
addition, non-strike action is typically less explicit than overt strike action and thus 
attracts only secondary public and media attention. Hence, while the patterns and 
trends have been described in the measured realisations of conflict, these unrecorded 
manifestations may yet be of greater economic and political significance. 
A few commentators have previously noted the importance of non-strike sanctions; 
Clegg (1979) goes as far as to argue that, 
"... there can be little doubt that the overtime ban is now the most 
common form of industrial action. " (p. 258) 
Despite such claims, the investigation and analysis of non-strike action, together with 
its association with overt strike action, is still extremely limited. Within the industrial 
relations literature, there is some debate as to whether the 'alternative' or the 'additive' 
hypothesis is appropriate to describe the relationship between strikes and non-strike 
action. The former argues that industrial action arises as a response to work-related 
discontentment which can be expressed through a variety of channels such as strikes 
(organised) through to absenteeism and quitting (unorganised), and that these are 
substitutes for each other. In contrast, the 'additive' hypothesis asserts that where there 
is a high incidence of one form 'of conflict, other forms will also be in evidence, a 
result perhaps of generally poor industrial relations within the workplace 
1. These include working-to-rule, overtime bans and restrictions, go-slows, and blacking of work. 
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environment. According to this school, non-strike sanctions are likely to be an 
accompaniment preceding, rather than an alternative to, a-strike. Bean (1975) and 
Edwards (1979) both discuss these hypotheses in further detail. 
There is a minimum' of published evidence on non-strike sanctions and it has only 
been ' with the advent of detailed surveys of industrial relations that information 
pertaining to collective non-strike action has become available. The evidence 
gathered by these surveys for some selected forms, of non-strike action is 
chronologically summarised in table A3.12 It is apparent that non-strike action is at 
least as prevalent as strike action. Unfortunately comparisons over time are not 
feasible because of the differing industrial coverage of the surveys and the time span 
to which the questions regarding the incidence of conflict activity refer, (the 'referral 
period'). However, for each survey, the ratio of the. incidence of non-strike action to 
strike action can be used to gain an impression of the relative importance of non- 
strike sanctions, and how this may have changed over time. This methodology is also 
suggested by Brown (1981), who concludes that, 
"... the relative importance of action short of a strike has fallen. "(p. 83) 
Further support for this observation would appear to be provided by the two 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys; approximately equal numbers of 
establishments experience non-strike and strike action, in sharp contrast to the earlier 
surveys in which the ratio was much higher. Brown suggests that a possible 
explanation lies in the increase in unemployment in his reference period; since non- 
strike action is less costly at such times (to both employer and employee), employers 
may be more prepared to hold out against such sanctions, thus reducing their 
effectiveness. Strike action may then be the only potent collective sanction available. 
However, given the substantial increases in unemployment in the early 1980s, 
2. The only known omission is the survey collated for the Donovan Commission (Government Social Survey 
(1968)). In this case, the respondents were simply asked whether industrial conflict had taken place "since they 
took up their present position". Thus the referral period is unknown and not constant for the different respondents 
(union stewards and works managers) who each had rather different average tenures. 
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augmenting the evidence he presents with that provided by the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys would seem to contradict this hypothesis. Non-strike sanctions are 
clearly still very important and show no signs of further relative or absolute decline. 
They certainly merit further substantive investigation and chapter 4 of the thesis 
provides such an analysis. Finally, while there now exists survey data on collective 
non-strike sanctions, it would appear that an analysis of individual expressions of 
discontent, especially absenteeism, is still some way off3. 
3. Some additional observations are noted by Kelly & Nicholson (1980) who also discuss the problem of providing 
a suitable definition of 'conflict' and in particular, whether absenteeism and labour turnover can be classified as 
such. Their attempted survey of South Yorkshire firms met with little success; a response rate of only 21% drew 
51 replies, and therefore generalisations beyond this tiny sample seem unwise. 
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Table A3.2 
Data Sources and Description 
Strike Frequency St Employment Gazette, various issues 
Stoppages involving fewer than ten workers and those 
lasting less than one day are excluded from the statistics 
unless the nuumber of days lost exceeds one hundred. 
Unemployment Rate Ut Employment Gazette, various issues. 
Profits Rate Dt Defined as gross trading profits as a percentage of wage 
and salary compensation. Klein et al (1961) plus 
Monthly Digest of Statistics. Base: 1948=100. 
Weekly Wage Rate Wt Klein et al (1961) and Employment Gazette. Base: 
1956=100. 
Retail Price Index Pt Klein et al (1961) and Employment Gazette. Base: 
1956=100. 
Real Profits xt National Accounts 
4. 
"'Y 
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CHAPTER 4'' " _r ,... 
The Incidence of Industrial Action in Britain 
4.1. Introduction. 
That there have been substantial changes in the collective bargaining arena in the 
1980s can be in little doubt. Transitions in the structural, legislative and 
macroeconomic environment have led to unions and firms facing very different 
circumstances from those that prevailed in the 1970s. While the implications have yet 
to be fully realised, it seems prudent to begin to try to assess the effects that these 
changes may have had. Stewart (1991) examines the variation in the union wage 
differential between 1980 and 1984 utilising the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveysl and finds that the mean differential altered very little. What change there has 
been is attributed to the decline in manufacturing industry and a downward shift in the 
size distribution of establishments. In particular, industry union density and local 
unemployment rates are seen to have negligible net impacts on the average union 
wage differential. This chapter can be considered as complementary to Stewart's 
paper in that it is concerned with the impact of these changes on another major area of 
union activity, that of industrial action. 
The last ten years have seen substantial reforms in the traditional non-interventionist 
approach to industrial relations in Britain against a background of fundamental 
economic and structural upheaval. The activity of trades unions may be supposed to 
have been curtailed as a consequence of both falling union membership together with 
the labour legislation introduced by the Conservative administration since 1979. 
These institutional changes in particular may have weakened the relative strength of 
1. See Daniel & Millward (1983) and Millward & Stevens (1986) and the discussion in section 4.3 below. " 
f 
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unions thus reducing their ability to - organise ' and -induce their members to take 
industrial action. Additionally, the generally poor economic outlook in the'first half of 
the 1980s may have led unions to alter the balance of their relative preferences from 
wages to employment protection for their members. Finally, it seems probable that 
there will be differences in the (net) impact of these changes on strike and non-strike 
activity; much of the legislation has been concerned with overt strike action and, in 
the face of high unemployment and weak domestic demand, sanctions such as go- 
slows and working-to-rule may have become relatively more attractive grievance 
activities for both employers and employees. 
Utilising the Workplace Industrial relations Survey data, this chapter documents the 
changes in conflict activity in the 1980s and attempts to provide plausible 
explanations for the observed patterns in industrial conflict at the establishment level 
in light of the various transitions in the structural, economic and' legislative 
background. The chapter therefore provides an alternative measure of conflict activity 
to the aggregate and disaggregate measures of strike frequency as investigated in 
chapter 3, while also providing an opportunity to extend the analysis of the 
determinants of strikes to include a wider range of institutional factors than is possible 
in the aggregate studies. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The major changes in the 
bargaining environment in the 1980s and some likely implications for industrial 
conflict are described briefly in section 4.22. The data source is described in 
section 4.3 and the evidence it contains- pertaining -to industrial conflict is 
summarised. The divergence between strike frequency as described in section 3.2 and 
strike incidence is also highlighted in this section. Results from estimating conflict 
activity equations for 1980 and 1984 utilising the Workplace Industrial Relations 
2. The emphasis is on the early 1980s since this is the period on which the remainder of the chapter concentrates. 
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Surveys are reported in section 4.4 and appropriate comparisons between strike and 
non-strike activity are made. Finally section 4.5 presents some concluding comments. 
4.2. Structural, Economic and Legislative Developments in the 1980s. 
Structural Changes in the 1980s. 
With reference to industrial conflict, arguably the most significant structural change 
that took place in the early 1980s was the dramatic fall in union membership both in 
absolute number and relative to total employment. Union membership fell from over 
13 million in 1979 to around 10 million by 1988 while union density (as a proportion 
of employment) fell from 58% in 1979 to just over 50% by 1984, and to around only 
40% by the end of the decade, a rate rather lower than that which prevailed in the 
1950s and 1960s. These movements have been well documented by Disney & 
Mudambi (1987), Carruth & Disney (1988), Disney (1990) and Freeman & Pelletier 
(1990) among several others. The hypotheses suggested in the literature for the 
decline in union density are diverse and are difficult to separately identify empirically 
in a precise manner. The 1980s have seen a major restructuring of UK labour markets 
and, undoubtedly, some of the fall in union density can be accounted for by the 
compositional transitions that have taken place, in particular, the shake-out in 
manufacturing industry in the early 1980s. As Towers (1989) notes, the relevant 
structural factors that have contributed to the fall in union membership include: 
"... the shift in the balance of the economy towards services; the 
increasing number of women and white-collar workers; the growing 
incidence of temporary, part-time and peripheral employment; and the 
decline in the number of workplaces employing large groups of 
people. " (p. 180) 
However, such arguments fail to account for the rise in density in the 1970s. In 
addition, as Disney (1990) notes, much of the decline in 'heavy' manufacturing 
occurred in the 1970s before the downturn in unionisation, while the recession 
particularly affected industries such as clothing and textiles which were not highly 
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unionised. Hence others attribute the trends ' in union " density primarily to cyclical 
economic factors and/or legislative changes. 
Millward & Stevens (1986, p. 52) attribute the decline in the proportion of private 
manufacturing workplaces with manual trade union members from -76% to 66% as 
being almost entirely, due to the disproportionate) closure - of. large (and -therefore 
generally - unionised) . establishments between 1980 and 1984. Alternative 
explanations, such as newer establishments being less likely to be unionised or 
significant de-recognition of unions cannot account for such a substantial fall; indeed, 
union recognition -in unionised establishments was unchanged between the two 
surveys at about 85%. It is also clear that, -although aggregate density and coverage 
may have fallen significantly, union density in . unionised establishments changed 
little. The implication- is that there was a large increase in the proportion of 
establishments with no union representation. 
Whatever the explanation for the decline, in unionisation in " the 1980s, the 
consequences for union bargaining strength are also not straightforward and seem 
likely to -differ by industrial sector. Where bargaining takes place at the firm or 
establishment level, the increased competition from non-unionised firms may act as a 
moderating influence in negotiations, and thus reduce the likelihood of overt action 
being undertaken in support of any wage claim. Alternatively, increased resistance by 
employers in the face of this stronger competition may result in unions having to 
press harder for any given gain. In contrast, however, where bargaining is conducted 
at the regional or national level, the collective strength of the union may still be 
sufficient that such considerations are unnecessary. For the UK, while company level 
bargaining has certainly increased in the last decade, there are still industrial sectors 
which negotiate mainly at the national level and thus these may be less affected by the 
increase in non-unionised establishments. However, on balance, the aggregate effect 
would seem likely to have reduced the likelihood of industrial action across all 
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establishments, although there may be an offsetting increase among some -highly 
unionised establishments and industries. This may be particularly true for the public 
sector, which having faced the general incomes policies in the 1970s was then faced 
with strict cash-limits in the early 1980s in order to restrict public spending. The 
resulting erosion of their position relative to the private sector is well documented. 
Chapter 5 examines the distinctions between public and private sector conflict activity 
in much greater detail. 
Economic Changes in the 1980s. 
The most important macroeconomic change with respect to conflict activity was 
undoubtedly the more than doubling of the rate of unemployment from around 5% in 
1979 to over 10% by 1983. Unemployment finally peaked at about 12% in 1985, 
before declining continuously until 1990. In addition, although the early 1980s was a 
period of world-wide recession, the UK suffered relatively severely under the 
generally deflationary stance and tight monetary policy which characterised the early 
Thatcher government. Since 1985, Britain's growth rate has finally reached the levels 
attained by the other OECD countries following a period of comparatively poor 
performance in the early 1980s. In summary therefore, there were severe pressures on 
the labour market for much of the decade and even after the downturn' in 
unemployment, extreme regional-disparities still exist. 
With high unemployment, the threat of a strike becomes less credible since it 
represents a more costly action for the union given the lack of alternative employment 
prospects, and is less costly to the firm given the general slackness in demand. 
Reinforcing this effect is the probable shift in union preferences from wage increases 
to employment protection for union members. However, this lower pressure for wage 
increases in recession will only result in fewer recorded incidences of industrial 
conflict if the reduced likelihood of action over wage increases is not simply offset by 
the increase in industrial action in relation to protecting employment levels. There 
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may also be a corresponding switch from strike to non-strike action at such times, the 
latter, being a lower- cost form "- of action to both -, employee : and employer. Any 
associated decrease in, the risk of workers being dismissed may also be- a factor- in 
unions substituting non-strike sanctions for overt strike activity. 
Stewart (1991) also highlights the improvement in. international competitiveness, in 
the period resulting from the fall in exchange rates against most major currencies and 
in particular those of our trading partners. This served to increase the profitability of 
those firms operating in international markets, although, these tend-to be the - least 
unionised firms and hence those experiencing little industrial action. Although the 
aggregate impact is likely to be small, -this would serve to further reduce conflict 
activity since these firms could more easily meet demands for wage increases. - 
Legislative Changes in the 1980s. _ 
Perhaps the most significant changes in industrial conflict would be expected to result 
from the impact of the legislative reforms introduced since 1979. It is clear that the 
tradition of 'voluntarism' or 'abstentionism' in British industrial relations in the post- 
war period has now been largely superseded, firstly by a more interventionist role for 
the state in collective bargaining and secondly, by an individualistic legal framework 
which it is difficult to reconcile with the notion of collective industrial relations. The 
increasing juridification of British post-war industrial relations has been quantified by 
Hepple (1983) who notes, 
"Compared with some five general Acts ... regulating employment passed from 1950 to 1959, and sixteen from 1960 to 1969, there were 
thirty from 1970 to 1979 and a further eight from. 1980 to 1982. " 
(p. 393) 
However, while there were fundamental changes in labour law throughout the 1970s, 
the incoming Conservative administration in 1979 introduced a radically different 
approach, encapsulated in the Employment Acts of 1980,1982 and 1988 and the 
Trade Union Act of 1984. There were new restrictions on employment protection; 
x 
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much of the legislation regarding minimum conditions for less well organised or low 
paid workers was dismantled in pursuit of the free operation of market forces; with 
respect to industrial action, restrictions were placed on picketing, especially 
secondary action which dominated much of the debate regarding the winter of 
discontent of 1978/79; changes were made in the laws relating to the dismissal of 
strikers, closed shops, election of union officials, political subscriptions and so on. 
While purporting to support individual rights in the employment relationship, it is 
clear that this has been largely at the expense of collective rights as acclaimed by 
trades unions. Most significantly perhaps, compulsory ballots for official strikes were 
introduced in the 1984 Trade Union Act. The question prescribed by the Act is 
whether the worker is prepared to take part in a strike involving him in a breach of 
his contract of employment. Wedderburn (1986) and others have argued that, the 
question is hardly neutral, and does not include a statement to the effect that strikes 
are usually a breach. The new changes and those yet proposed (with respect to closed 
shops and unofficial action for example) mark a significant departure from preceding 
legislation supporting collectivism and many of the clauses would seem to reflect a 
rejection of the legitimacy of collective action. 
The effect of this body of legislation depends on the extent to which individuals, 
unions and employers actually utilise the new Acts, or whether they retain much of 
the 'custom and practice' in their collective bargaining behaviour. Evans (1985,1987) 
records 34 applications for injunctions in industrial disputes between September 1980 
and September 1984, half of which related to picketing, whereas between May 1984 
and April 1987, he records a total of 77. Batstone (1988) notes only 70 uses of post- 
1979 labour legislation which resulted in legal action being taken in the period 1980- 
85. Thus it is clear that employers have not rushed to take legal action in any 
i 
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circumstances and most disputes are still settled without recourse to the courts3. 
The clauses in the various Acts relating to strike action would appear to substantially 
increase its potential cost and therefore decrease its probability of occurring. 
Moreover, the unions' effective power is diminished once a strike has begun by 
restrictions imposed on secondary action and hence the likelihood that strike action is 
effective is correspondingly reduced. Together, these effects would serve to decrease 
the probability of direct action, although whether grievances are simply translated into 
non-strike action or somehow dissipated is unclear. For the period of interest between 
1980 and 1984, it should be noted that the full impact of the 1984 Trade Union Act 
will not have been felt, although its ramifications certainly dominated much of the 
debate with respect to industrial action at that time. Of greater importance therefore 
were the two Employment Acts (1980,1982) and perhaps in particular, their impact 
on closed shops and secondary action. Millward & Stevens (1986, chapter 4) 
document these changes in full and reveal that the proportion of manual workers in a 
closed shop fell from 40% to 30% between 1980 and 1984. This seems likely to have 
reduced the bargaining strength of unions at the establishment level. With respect to 
picketing, the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys reveal that the overall extent 
declined by almost one half, from 11% of all establishments in the twelve months 
preceding the 1980 survey, to only 6% in 1984 (Millward & Stevens (1986, pp. 282- 
294))4. 
The net impact of these structural, economic and legislative changes in the early 
3. However, it should be noted that the threat of such action has probably been a sufficient deterrent in many more 
incidences since the law has been rigidly applied in the vast majority of cases that have reached the courts, with 
some notable cases of large fines and sequestration of union funds. 
4. Manning (1989) considers a theoretical model of the effects of the restrictions on secondary action on 
employment, wages and investment. However, his model is one of complete information and hence effectively 
precludes industrial action taking place. It is therefore inappropriate for the analysis of the realisations of conflict 
investigated in this paper. 
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1980s would appear to have severely weakened trades unions and thus diminished 
their ability to organise collective industrial action in support of their claims. 
Moreover, the discussion above indicates the potential advantages of a shift away 
from overt strike action in favour of non-strike sanctions; these are less costly, less 
risky in terms of employment, easier to organise, and less likely to invoke legal action 
against the unions. Against these factors, the weakened trades unions may have had to 
resort to taking strike action more frequently in order to legitimise their claims if their 
threat effect has been significantly eroded. Whether these expected transitions in 
industrial conflict have indeed taken place is examined in the remainder of the 
chapter. 
4.3. The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and Conflict Activity. 
This section of the chapter briefly outlines the structure and composition of the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and summarises the evidence that the surveys 
yield on the incidence of conflict activity at the establishment level. The differences 
in the recorded levels of strike frequency and (establishment level) strike incidence 
are also highlighted. 
43.1. The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys. 
The Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys of 1980 (WIRS80) and 1984 (WIRS84) 
are described in detail by Daniel & Millward (1983) and Miliward & Stevens (1986) 
respectively. The sampling frame in each case was the Census of Employment (1977 
and 1981 respectively) but both surveys exclude agricultural, farming and coalmining 
establishments and all those with less than 25 employees. The sampling design 
incorporates varying sampling fractions according to the number of employees at a 
'census unit' to ensure that large establishments were adequately represented in the 
sample. Hence the data needs to be weighted to adjust for the sampling stratification. 
Over 2000 establishments were surveyed in both 1980 and 1984, and responses were 
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obtained from both manager and worker representatives where possibles. One major 
advantage of the WIRS is that the broad consistency of the two surveys permits 
comparisons between 1980 and 1984. 
There is a wealth of information about workplace industrial relations contained in the 
two surveys and a number of authors have already utilised various aspects of the data, 
in particular that on wages (Blanchflower (1984), Stewart (1987, ' 1990)), share 
ownership and other profit sharing schemes (Blanchflower & Oswald (1986), Gregg 
& Machin (1987)), financial performance (Machin & Stewart (1990)) and the impact 
of unions on economic performance (Blanchflower et al (1991), Machin & Wadhwani 
(1991a, 1991b)). 
The WIRS contains several questions relating to the nature and incidence of industral 
conflict including the number, duration, cause of strikes and non-strike sanctions at 
the unit of observation which is the establishment. The two surveys have several 
advantages over simple deflation of the statistics for strike frequency as a measure of 
strike incidence as suggested by Stern (1978) and described in section 3.2. Firstly, it is 
possible to calculate directly the incidence of conflict activity at this level of 
disaggregation. Secondly, the important effects of establishment and firm size that 
have been noted by Shorey (1975), George et al (1977), Prais (1978), Edwards (1980) 
and many other researchers in this field can be identified. Thirdly, the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys yield information on the incidence of non-strike 
sanctions, specifically overtime restrictions, work-to-rules and go-slows. The study of 
realisations of conflict other than strikes has been largely neglected in the literature, 
most probably because non-strike sanctions have a lower profile than strike action and 
5. There is also a small panel of establishments at which interviews were conducted in both surveys but this subset 
proved too small for useful analysis. 
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because data have previously been less readily available6. But these other forms of 
collective action are undoubtedly of considerable importance, -either as an 
accompaniment preceding, or as an alternative to a strike and they certainly deserve 
much greater -consideration than has been afforded to 
date. There has been some 
limited discussion of unorganised and individual manifestations of conflict such as 
absenteeism and labour turnover, and these have been found to be positively 
correlated with strike activity across plants and between industries and regions (Bean 
(1975), Edwards 
. 
(1979)). However it remains to be seen whether a similar 
relationship exists between strike action and collectively organised non-strike activity. 
Finally, in an important sense strike frequency and strike incidence comprise different 
dimensions of strike activity; Millward & Stevens (1986, p. 265) suggest that the latter 
is a measure of the extensiveness of strikes. In the past however, frequency and 
incidence have often been used interchangeably, and models of strike incidence 
estimated using statistics for strike frequency. Although clearly untenable, such bold 
assumptions may ultimately not be significant. Some legitimacy for the procedure 
may be therefore provided by the current study if the conclusions reached with regard 
to the incidence of strikes are qualitatively similar to those obtained for strike 
frequency. 
4.3.2. Conflict Incidence as Recorded by the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys ?- 
This section concentrates exclusively on the responses to and problems associated 
with the questions regarding the incidence of conflict activity in the two Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys. At approximately half of all establishments at which 
interviews were conducted with management representatives in the two surveys, there 
6. Certainly it has only been with the advent of detailed surveys of industrial relations that information relating to 
non-strike sanctions has become available. These are discussed in the appendix to chapter 3. 
7. Summary statistics are generated using SPSSx. 
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was also a secondary questionnaire conducted with a representative of the manual 
and/or non-manual workers. For both management and worker representatives; ' the 
questions referred to the twelve months prior to interview, and thus cover the periods 
mid-1979 to mid-1980 for the 1980 survey and mid-1983 to mid-1984 for the 1984 
survey. 
As would be expected, incomplete and imperfect recall and differing perceptions of 
industrial action and its various forms imply that workers and managers will often 
record the incidence of industrial action differently. This is clearly illustrated in 
table 4.1 which records for those establishments where both manager and worker 
representatives were interviewed, their responses to questions regarding the incidence 
of strike and non-strike activity8.9. 
These 2x2 contingency tables clearly demonstrate the degree of disagreement. In 
particular, it is apparent that with the exception of manual workers strike activity in 
1980, workers' representatives more frequently report both strike and non-strike 
activity. Of perhaps greater significance is that there are a large number of 
establishments where one but not both of the respondents reported industrial action of 
some kind. For example, the cross-tabulation for manual workers in 1980 reveals that 
while in 9.0% of establishments both respondents reported strike action in the 
previous twelve months, in an additional 12.8% either the management or the worker 
representative (but not both) also reported a strike. And it is clear that this does not 
simply represent systematic over-reporting by worker representatives since there are a 
large number of establishments for which it is only the management representative 
who reports industrial action, particularly for manual workers. 
8. All the statistics are weighted to correct for the stratified sampling scheme used in the compilation of the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys (see Millward & Stevens (1986, pp. 329-332)). 
9. 'Any Action' is defined as either strike and/or non-strike action. 
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The problem is thus to somehow reconcile these differing rates of conflict activity as 
reported by the two types of respondent. Given that there are a substantial number of 
establishments where industrial action was reported by only one of the respondents, it 
would appear that the most significant problem is one of incomplete recall. This 
supposition accords with the finding of Daniel & Millward (1983) who conclude, 
"In consequence, the balance of possible error is in the direction of 
under-reporting industrial action ... (and) reliance on a single 
respondent's account will almost certainly lead to underestimation of 
the extent of industrial action. " (p. 216) 
Therefore, following Daniel & Millward (1983) and Millward & Stevens (1986), the 
strategy adopted here is to integrate the reports of both management and worker 
representatives where possible. Thus establishments are assumed to have incurred 
conflict activity if either respondent reports industrial action. Note, however, that for 
those workplaces where no interview was conducted with a worker representative, the 
only information available is that from the management respondent and hence the 
possibility of under-recording still exists in this subsamplelO. 
Table 4.2 presents incidence rates of various manifestations of industrial action as 
computed in the manner described abovell. It is apparent that there have been 
important changes in the incidence of conflict at the establishment level between 1980 
and 1984, although these have not affected manual and non-manual workers 
identically. Conflict activity among manual workers actually fell by about one fifth 
while the substantial increase in non-manual industrial action was sufficient to yield 
an overall increase in the rate of conflict activity for all establishments from 22% to 
over 25%. Much of this can be seen to derive from the increase in strike activity 
among non-manual workers and, in particular, short strikes of one day or less. The 
nearly 50% increase in the proportion of establishments incurring strike action 
10. Full consideration of the possible bias arising from combining the responses in this manner is given in the 
estimates reported in section 4.4 below. 
11. Table 4.2 can be seen to partially replicate table 10.1 from Millward & Stevens (1986, p. 264). 
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contrasts quite starkly with the finding in, section 3.2 above- that strike frequency 
continued to fall quite rapidly throughout s the 1980s. -This -distinction is . 
discussed 
further below. ... I. , .., .,.. ,,, 
In part, these changes in conflict incidence undoubtedly reflect the particular disputes 
that occurred in the twelve months prior to each of the survey's interviews; the 1980 
figures are therefore affected by the 1979 engineering workers' dispute while the 
statistics for 1984 are heavily influenced by the widespread disruptions in education 
and the public service sector more generally. Clearly, these period-specific sectoral 
differences need to be taken into account when attempting to identify and explain the 
more general patterns in the incidence of industrial action., Table 4.3 presents the 
broad measures of conflict broken down by the industrial sector of the establishment 
in order to investigate this sectoral specificity in more detail. 
It is immediately apparent that the overall increase in conflict is entirely accounted for 
by public service establishments, and in particular strike action -among 
their non- 
manual employees. This highly unionised sector has therefore failed to respond to the 
multiple pressures mitigating against strike activity as outlined in section 4.2. As 
noted previously, the public sector received the additional burden of government 
imposed limits on pay increases, culminating in widespread dissent among certain 
service sector unions and their members. It is this, and in particular the dispute in 
education, that the statistics for this sector therefore reflect. 
Conflict activity in the other sectors perhaps more closely accords with the thoughts 
expressed in section 4.2. This is particularly true for private manufacturing; the 
overall rate of conflict activity fell by one third in this sector but, while strike activity 
was halved, non-strike activity only fell by one quarter12. Hence there is some 
12. Note that for non-manual workers in private manufacturing, strike incidence falls while non-strike incidence 
actually increases. 
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evidence for the predicted 'switching' . into non-strike activity (within the. overall 
decrease in conflict). That this sector should appear to have been more responsive to 
the forces that were prevalent in the early 1980s is of little surprise since it was the 
highly unionised manufacturing sector that was particularly affected by the economic 
recession of the early 1980s, and which faced the most severe domestic: and 
. international competitive pressures. 
There is one final important distinction that the survey data reveal. A prerequisite for 
industrial action would seem to be that workers cooperate in ýa formal and explicit 
manner and unionisation will be the form of organisation utilised in the vast majority 
of cases. Indeed, it is difficult to conceptualise what might be implied by a 'strike' 
among non-organised workers. 'Unionised' establishments were therefore defined as 
those in which any union members present were recognised for the purpose of 
bargaining and negotiation; table 4.4 disaggregates the broad measures of conflict 
incidence from table 4.2 according to the unionisation status of the establishment. It 
can be seen that virtually all of the recorded conflict incidence is for 'unionised' 
establishments while 'non-unionised' establishments report very few occurrences of 
any type of industrial action as surmised above13. When further disaggregated by 
sector as in table 4.3, similar patterns are revealed, with evidence of switching 
between strike and non-strike activity in the unionised private sector. 
It is important to note that the recorded overall increase in strike incidence in table 4.2 
from 13.2% in 1980 to 19.1% in 1984 is not incompatible with the decrease in strike 
frequency as reported by the Department of Employment in its statistics published in 
the Employment Gazette. These reveal a fall in the number of strikes from 1,871 in 
13. Note that for most (all) of the 'non-unionised' establishments in 1980 (1984), the only respondent was the 
manager representative; few (no) worker representatives were interviewed at establishments which did not have 
recognised union members simply because a worker 'representative' could not be identified. Thus there remains the 
possibility that these statistics may underestimate the true proportion of establishments incurring industrial action. 
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the year to May 1980 to 1,416 in the year to May-1984, a decrease of one quarter14. 
The implication is that although there may have been fewer strikes in 1984, they were 
more widespread and thus affected a higher proportion of establishments than in 
1980. This difference serves to highlight the fact that these alternative data sources 
are measuring very different dimensions of strike activity and further emphasises the 
important distinction between strike, frequency and (establishment level) strike 
incidence. 
The analysis above indicates that while models for strike frequency abound in the 
literature, they fail to describe the distribution of strike incidence since this differs 
substantially from strike- frequency. In particular, large disputes -such as that in 
education in 1983/4 are recorded as a single strike in the frequency statistics despite 
the wide-spread disruption caused. The measures of strike incidence therefore more 
appropriately reflect disputes of this kind. A further advantage is that statistics for 
incidence will only record conflict a single time where action at the establishment is 
intermittent but essentially concerned with a continuing 'grievance; ' frequency 
statistics would indicate that several strikes have occurred. 
Of course, there are also inherent weaknesses in survey data such as the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys. In particular, they tend to reflect the dominant disputes 
in progress at the time that they are compiled. Additionally, intertemporal 
comparisons are limited to changes occurring between survey dates, while it would be 
of greater interest to compare the impact of the transitions identified in section 4.2 on 
industrial relations and conflict activity over a rather longer period than that allowed 
by the two survey dates. - Within these limitations, however, the surveys provide some 
interesting and important evidence pertaining to the changing incidence of conflict 
14 The median interview date for both of the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys was sometime in May 
(Millward & Stevens (1986, pp. 323-324)) and hence the periods chosen are those relevant for comparison. These 
statistics exclude stoppages in the coal industry in order to be comparable to the two WIRS. 
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activity; in Britain in the 1980s. Section 4.4 therefore presents an analysis of the 
determinants of conflict activity as identified by the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys. 
4.4. The Determinants of Conflict Incidence: Evidence from the Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys. 
There have been two previous studies of the incidence of industrial action utilising the 
Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and hence some rationale must be provided to 
justify yet another. Blanchflower & Cubbin (1986) (hereafter B&CUB) who utilise 
the 1980 survey and Booth & Cressy (1990) (hereafter B&CRE) who examine the 
second survey both consider manual workers only. Neither incorporate the reports of 
worker representatives where these were available and hence both are liable to 
underestimate the incidence of conflict. Additionally, B&CUB argue that 
"... there is a high degree of correspondence between the pattern of 
responses of the two groups for our dependent. variables. '. ' (p. 23) j 114. 
This is clearly at variance with the analysis reported in sub-section 4.3.2 above which 
shows that there are large discrepancies between the responses of, the two sets of 
representatives. In particular, the mean, of. B&CUB's dependent variable for any 
industrial action among manual workers in 1980 (STK1) is 12.1% using management 
respondents only. This should be contrasted with the figure in table 4.2 of 16.0% 
using the combined reports of management and worker representatives and thus they 
understate the extent of industrial action by around one quarter15. Similarly, B&CRE 
calculate the mean for manual strike incidence in 1984 as 6.4% compared with the 
figure in table 4.2 of 8.4% utilising both sets of respondents and consequently their 
results may also be biased. 
Although there is no formal theoretical structure, B&CUB base the selection of their 
15 A similar underestimation of the mean is apparent for both 'short strikes' (STK2) and long strikes' (SM) 
which B&CUB give as 3.3% and 5.6% respectively, in comparison with 4.4% and 7.5% from table 4.2. 
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large number of 'relevant' variables in their model on ideas borrowed from game., 
theory. Some apparently spurious results are obtained; the coefficient on the union 
recognition dummy is significantly negative in the short strike equation, and 
significantly positive in the long strike equation.. Additionally, predicted strike 
probabilities for unionised and non-unionised establishments are presented, yet as 
seen in table 4.4, industrial action is very seldom defined for those establishments 
which do not recognise unions and hence there are too few observations on which to 
base predictions of this kind. 
In contrast, B&CRE test a formal game-theoretic bargaining model which 
presupposes that the union has an informational disadvantage relative to the firm, and 
is similar in many respects to the work of Tracy (1984,1987). However, their 
empirical estimation is rather poor. It is not clear what criteria have been used to 
eliminate 'irrelevant' variables since many of those retained are still insignificant at 
conventional levels; improvements are claimed to be made in terms of "goodness of 
fit" (B&CRE, p. 284) although the only diagnostic reported is McFadden's (1974) 
pseudo-R2 which has dubious merit (Maddala (1988)). Furthermore, their inclusion of 
union density separately for where unions are recognised (together with its squared 
value) and where they are not recognised presents problems in interpreting their 
results. In particular, and as clearly illustrated in table 4.4, very few establishments in 
which unions are not recognised experience any form of industrial action. Finally, 
their conclusions show only rather weak support for the theoretical specification 
outlined. This may be a consequence of the unsuitability of the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey data for several of the more important parameters of their game- 
theoretic, asymmetric information model. 
The empirical specifications chosen by B&CUB and B&CRE are very different with 
respect to both dependent and explanatory variables, and thus no comparisons are 
possible between the two years. Moreover, neither consider non-strike action and no 
156 
attempts are made to assess in an appropriate manner the-validity of the specifications 
chosen. The investigation presented below circumvents . these shortcomings 
in-the 
previous studies and also examines a. wider set of. issues. Firstly,, a more consistent 
measure of conflict incidence is utilised, based on both management and worker 
representative responses. Secondly, the incidence of any. industrial action and of strike 
and non-strike activity are estimated separately within a uniform framework and this 
allows the similarities. and differences ý in. the determinants. of conflict incidence 
between the two years to be revealed. V Thirdly, the dichotomy that exists , between 
strike and non-strike activity is explicitly incorporated in an appropriate empirical 
model. Finally, suitable diagnostic tests for misspecification are employed in order to 
assess the statistical validity of the model. 
The subsample of the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys chosen for the current 
study is restricted to private sector-manual workers-There are several reasons for this 
limitation on the scope of the chapter. Firstly, it is apparent that most of the 
theoretical models of conflict activity refer to production technologies and workplace 
organisations that are most characteristic of this sector. Additionally, the intention 
here is to describe and explain not only the incidence of conflict, but also of the inter- 
relationship between strike and non-strike activity. and this task is facilitated by 
concentrating on a single, relatively homogeneous sector of the economy16. Finally, 
chapter 5 compares and contrasts strike activity in the public and private sectors for 
both manual and non-manual workers and thus provides a complementary study of 
wider sectoral coverage, even if more restricted in terms of the nature of conflict 
considered. 
An empirical model for the incidence of conflict behaviour at the establishment level 
is formulated in sub-section 4.4.1 and estimates are presented for the occurrence of 
16, Additionally, given that both of the previous studies are limited to a study of manual workers, then an attempt 
can be made to partially encompass their findings if a similarly restricted sample is chosen. 
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any form of industrial action in sub-section 4.4.2. This measure perhaps represents a 
more general indicator of employees' grievances than captured simply by the'number. 
of strikes as. used in other studies, especially given the more recent 'legislative, 
restrictions placed on overt strike activity'7. In addition, it may be expected that the 
incidence of strike and non-strike activity will be correlated, either positively ' or 
negatively according to whether they are complements or substitutes. However, there 
have been no previous studies measuring the strength of this inter-relationship and 
thus a model for their joint determination is estimated and the results presented in 
sub-section 4.4.3. This serves to reveal their similarities and differences and enables 
the postulated hypothesis of switching between strike and non-strike activity to be 
examined in detail18. 
4.4.1. The Determinants of Industrial Conflict. ' 
Numerous theories have been proposed in the literature to explain the incidence 
and/or frequency of strike action and these have been. reviewed in chapter 2 of this 
thesis. Here, however, an empirical model is specified which is only loosely based on 
extant theory since there is little consensus as to what comprises an adequate model. 
In this way, it is hoped to be able to identify those factors that are pertinent to the 
determination of conflict activity more generally since all the existing theories 
concentrate solely on strike- action. This should also allow the data to reveal the 
relative support for competing theories of conflict activity, rather than imposing a 
particular model and associated specification on the data. In this manner, the models 
can perhaps be empirically discriminated in an informal fashion. 
17. Admittedly, only some of these had been implemented by the date of the second survey 
18. Note that any correlation between strike and non-strike activity at the establishment level is not an indicator of 
switching from one to the other over time. For example, establishments which are conflict prone are likely to have 
incidents of both strike and non-strike action and thus these should be positively related in both 1980 and 1984. 
Switching is revealed by the relative use of strike and non-strike sanctions and, as shown in table 4.3, this would 
appear to have changed somewhat between 1980 and 1984. 
F 
} 
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The first control included in the equations, is a. dummy variable indicating whether a 
manual worker representative was interviewed at the, establishment (MWREP). As 
described in sub-section 4.3.2, the construction of the measures of conflict activity 
imply that in establishments where only, management - representatives were 
interviewed, the incidence of conflict is. likely, to be under-stated. due to incomplete 
recall. The MWREP dummy is included to capture this effect and would therefore be 
expected to have a positive coefficient.. _: : _. 
.., -,, 
The explanatory variables chosen for the basic specification can be subdivided into 
four main groups, with, the selection of variables being conditioned by their 
availablility in both WIRS80 and WIRS84 in order that comparisons can be made19. 
The first set incorporates measures of establishment size (ESIZE) since there is a 
large literature that indicates that there is a relationship between plant size and 
workplace industrial action. The explanations proffered for this empirical observation 
differ widely; while George et al (1977) summarise many of the arguments, - it is clear 
that there is no commonly- accepted causal link and plant size may be acting as a 
proxy for some other phenomenon, such as bureaucratisation or technology. Prais 
(1978), Edwards (1980) and Marginson (1984) concentrate r solely ý on the-intrinsic 
effect of size in the determination of strike activity.. Prais predicts that the number of 
strikes should increase proportionately with employment and finds some support for 
his hierarchical model using data from the Department of Employment. jln contrast, 
Edwards observes a less than proportionate relationship' using survey data and 
suggests that this may be the result of the number of bargaining groups increasing less 
than proportionately with plant size. Finally, Marginson extends the analysis to 
include the distinct effects of company size, which he argues may have an additional 
effect on strike activity due to management specialisation, standardisation and 
formalisation and through these, on unionisation. Both plant and company size are 
19. A full description of the variables together with their weighted means is presented in the appendix to this 
chapter, table A4.2. 
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found to be important ý in his study, utilising - the Warwick Workplace : Survey of 
Industrial Relations (see Brown (1981)). 
An obvious problem with these three studies is that they are not- ceteris paribus 
comparisons, and thus. size could be acting as a proxy for any " number of other, 
excluded differences between plants. However, existing multiple regression models 
controlling for these additional distinctions between establishments have typically had 
too few observations on which to base any robust conclusions. In the current study 
however, the effects of establishment and company size can both be identified more 
precisely. Banded measures of establishment size are used . since. these, can 
accommodate any non-linearities in the probability of conflict across establishment 
size. Any additional effects of company size on conflict incidence ° are tested for 
explicitly in a similar fashion. Pr 
The second set of variables relate to differences in"union presence and organisation at 
the establishment level. The first variable records whether the establishment is 
unionised in that it has recognised manual union members (UNION). As seen, in 
table 4.4, few non unionised establishments report, industrial - action of any kind. 
Indeed there is a strong case for estimating the equations conditional on the 
unionisation status of the establishment given the paucity of conflict activity in 
establishments that are not unionised20. However the- results would not then be 
comparable to those obtained by B&CUB and B&CRE and thus separate estimates 
for all establishments and for unionised establishments only (i. e. UNION=1) are both 
presented below. Next, banded measures of union density among manual workers are 
included to capture the impact of the extent of union organisation at the establishment 
(DENSM). At low levels of coverage, the union may simply be unable to organise, 
. Additionally, Naylor & Gregg (1989) demonstrate that the determinants of union membership differ according 
20 
to the unionisation status of the establishment. By estimating separate equations therefore, the differential impact 
on industrial conflict can also be identified. 
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and indeed may not even be recognised by the management. In contrast, at very high 
levels the union's threat effect may be more effective and thus overt action may- be 
unnecessary. At intermediate levels of union density, the balance between (positive) 
coverage and (negative) threat effects is unclear and hence the profile of conflict 
activity across the full range of union density.. is uncertain. However, it does seem 
likely that level of membership is likely to be important in, determining the probability 
of success in any action taken. 
The next variable, CSHOP, indicates whether there is either a pre-entry or post-entry 
closed shop for any group of manual workers at the establishment. This contrasts with 
DENSM5 which takes a value of unity if all manual workers at the establishment are 
union members. Clearly unions have potentially more power where they are able to 
organise all the workers within a particular group, and more so if this covers all 
workers at the establishment. Of course, this does not imply that they necessarily need 
to exercise this power. Finally in this group, MUNION records whether there are 
multiple manual trades unions at the establishment. This is included to act both as a 
proxy for the number of negotiating groups (which, although recorded in 1984, was 
not reported in the 1980 survey) and. any inefficiencies arising from. inter-union 
disagreements (demarcation) which may lead to delays or breakdowns in bargaining 
and subsequent conflict activity. Thus its expected effect on the level of conflict 
activity is positive. 
The third set of explanatory variables control for characteristics of the firm and its 
organisation which may contribute to the likelihood - of conflict activity. 
That the 
British manufacturing sector is particularly strike prone is well established in the 
literature, and some studies have concentrated exclusively on this sector (e. g. 
Edwards (1981)). Certainly table 4.3 reveals that manufacturing establishments were 
between three and five times more likely to incur industrial action than those in the 
service sector. Of course, this is not a ceteris paribus comparison, and may be related 
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to differences in establishment size, the level of unionisation and so on. The inclusion 
of a dummy' can' perhaps be - justified on, the grounds that there are remaining 
workplace characteristics in manufacturing establishments that are not accounted for 
by the other controls included in the -equations, such -as the 'nature' of the work. 
However, it is possible that conflict activity is more heterogeneous by industry than 
can be adequately captured by this simple dummy, and thus it may be necessary to 
include a more. extensive range of controls to compensate for the differing 
propensities to incur industrial action across industrial sectors. This possibility is also 
investigated. 
Secondly in this group, SINGLE takes a value of one if the firm comprises just a 
single establishment. This is likely to be an important determinant of the propensity to 
incur industrial action for a number of reasons. Employees may have greater loyalty 
to a single establishment enterprise than to a multi-establishment organisation with 
distant parent company. Additionally, the workforce may be more aware of the 
financial position of the firm where it exists as a single establishment, thus leading to 
fewer incorrect assessments of its ability to meet any wage claims, and hence a lower 
probability of conflict. Next, a variable indicating whether the establishment is a 
member of an employers' association (EMPASS) is included to capture the effect of 
solidarity and benefits that the management may derive from its cooperation with 
other employers. Fourthly, LEVEL takes a value of unity when the most important 
level of negotiation is at the plant level. This is intended to capture any effects 
deriving from profit-centre accountability and the closeness of any management- 
employee relationship at the local level. Finally, a variable which records whether the 
management's own assessment of the relative financial performance of the 
establishment is above average (FINPERF) is included as a (rather imperfect) proxy 
for the ability to pay any wage claim. If this information is widely available, it may 
affect the workers' assessment of the firm too and thus may be, an important 
consideration in determining their bargaining behaviour. 
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It is clearly important to consider the nature' of the product market that the' firm. is 
facing. In firms faced with a high degree of competition, there- are stronger incentives 
for both management and unions to avoid strike activity. For. the firm, any disruption 
to production is liable to -lead to a rapid erosion of. market share since other 
firms are 
easily able to provide similar products. For the union, potential closure; presents a 
greater threat to their job security than in firms facing less competitive conditions, and 
thus they too should be more willing to concede demands and reach a settlement2l. 
The 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey contains some limited information 
on the degree of competition in the product market, but the corresponding questions 
were not asked in 1980. In order to be able to make direct comparisons between the 
1980 and 1984 surveys, it is important that the same controls are included for each 
year. Thus a full analysis of this particular issue for the 1984 survey is relegated to the 
appendix to this chapter. 
The fourth and final set of controls encompass various descriptive measures of the 
workforce and (implicitly) the workplace and the nature of employment. Women have 
historically been less well organised and less militant than men and the proportion of 
the manual workforce who are female (P_FE) is therefore included to capture this 
effect. On similar grounds, the proportion of the workforce who are part-time (P_PT) 
is included to control for the more general difficulties in organising among flexibly 
employed persons and subsequently mobilising them into taking industrial action in 
support of any claim. Inclusion of the proportion of the workforce who are skilled 
(P_SK) is an attempt to capture the notion that certain groups of workers are essential 
to the running of the enterprise, and thus these employees may be prepared to take 
strike action more readily in support of any claim or grievance- since there is little 
21. However note that private information theories of strike behaviour predict a negative correlation between the 
size of the rents for division and the probability of a strike. Given that the rents are greater in firms facing less 
competitive conditions, this suggests the opposite. 
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chance of them being dismissed. However, skilled workers with high human capital 
may be able to command a premium in any negotiations and hence need to strike less 
in support of any claim.. Thus the sign on this variable is uncertain. Finally, whether 
there are payment by results schemes (PBR) or shift work at the establishment 
(SHIFT) are included in an, attempt to capture additional . workplace environment 
considerations; the presence of PBR schemes can lead to a higher frequency of 
negotiations (because of changes in products and production processes) and thus to a 
greater chance of any conflict at the establishment while shift working can -lead to 
difficulties in communication and/or organisation, although may also be associated 
with lower worker satisfaction22.. -I 
As can be seen from the sectoral disaggregation of conflict activity in table 4.3, the 
incidence of industrial action among private- sector manual workers decreased quite 
substantially -between 1980 and 198423. The decline was most ; marked for 
manufacturing establishments in which the incidence of strike action fell ý by more 
than 50%. However, whether this represents any change in collective bargaining 
behaviour, or is simply due to the changing composition of the private sector between 
1980 and 1984 can only be resolved empirically. The analysis in section 4.2 suggests 
that both of these factors could have served to reduce conflict activity between 1980 
and 1984, and may also have resulted in 'switching' from strike to non-strike activity. 
The changing composition of the private sector is revealed by the weighted means 
presented in the appendix to this chapter, table A4.2. There has been a noticeable 
downward shift in the size distribution of establishments together with a decline in the 
22. It may be considered that some measure of the level of remuneration should be included in the specification 
However, there are two problems with such a strategy. Firstly, it is not possible to assess whether wage rates are at 
pre- or post-strike levels, and this is dearly essential in order to gauge the responsiveness of conflict to pay. A 
second, and closely related, problem is that it is not apparent that wages are exogenous in a model of conflict 
activity. 
23. Figures in the appendix, table A4.2, show that the incidence of any form of action by manual workers in all 
private sector establishments decreased from 15.1% to 10.7%. This was composed of a fall from 10.6% to 6.0% in 
strike action and from 9.8% to 8.0% in non-strike action. 
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representation and coverage. of unions,. especially the closed shop. Given' the -clear 
evidence of a positive correlation between the level of industrial conflict and both size. ' 
and unionism, this would, imply y-a decrease. in conflict, ceteris paribus. The relative' 
importance of this composition effect vis a vis. any actual change- in behaviour in. 
response to the, changed 'economic, and legislative environment (as detailed in 
section 4.2) is considered in detail in sub-sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 below. 
In any empirically based model such as this, it is essential to rigourously test the 
adequacy of the selected specification. Yet as noted above,, neither of B&CUB or' 
B&CRE make any attempt to assess the econometric validity of the model on which 
their conclusions are based24: However, Chesher & Irish (1987) develop score- tests 
for limited dependent variable models using the generalised -residuals devised by 
Gourieroux et al (1987) and these are used here to test the estimated Probit equations 
for various forms of misspecification. As reported at the bottom of each table along 
with their critical values (at 5%), they thereby provide an assessment of the models'- 
empirical adequacy. 
Firstly, any remaining heterogeneity by establishment size (HETSIZE) is tested for 
explicitly to ensure that all size effects have been correctly incorporated25. Secondly, 
a RESET type test (Ramsey (1969), Ramsey & Schmidt (1976)) based on the square, 
cube and fourth power of the fitted values is constructed for general functional form. 
misspecification (FF). Thirdly, NN is a test for non-normality constructed from the 
third and fourth sample moments of the residuals. The final two tests are tests for 
24. In that B&CRE claim that their specification is empirically determined, this is a cause of particular concern. In 
contrast, B&CUB adopt the 'kitchen sink' approach and probably err on the side of over-inclusion of variables thus 
obtaining inefficient estimates. 
25. Given the stratified sampling used in the compilation of the WIRS, some researchers have estimated under a 
weighting scheme to correct for the over-sampling of large establishments. However, as noted by DuMouchel & 
Duncan (1983) for the linear case, as long as the model is correctly specified, the unweighted estimator is MVUE 
and thus would be preferred given that the weighted estimator is only consistent. Since suitable diagnostic checks 
are being used here to ensure that the specification is acceptable, then unweighted estimation is appropriate. 
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omitted variables; OSIZE tests for omitted. organisation (or company) size effects 
since these were found to be important by Marginson (1984) in addition to the impact 
of increasing establishment size, while - INDY tests for omitted one-digit industry 
dummies in comparison to simply dichotomising the sample by manufacturing 
status26. Clearly for inference' to, be: % valid- the, ' estimated equations' should 
simultaneously satisfy all of these various misspecification tests. 
4.4.2. The Incidence of Industrial Conflict. 2 
Given that the incidence of conflict is recorded as a 1-0 dummy, appropriate limited 
dependent variable estimation techniques must be applied (see, for example, Maddala 
(1983)). Accordingly, Probit estimates of the empirical model - described in sub- 
section 4.4.1 are presented in table 4.5A, columns 1 and 2 for the incidence of any 
industrial action in private sector manual establishments. There would appear to be at 
least partial support for the proposed determinants of conflict activity. The coefficient 
on MWREP is positive as expected, although only significant in 1984. This accords 
with the suspicion that incomplete recall -leads to the incidence of conflict' being 
underestimated ° in establishments in which workers representatives were not 
interviewed. More importantly, as found in many previous studies, conflict incidence 
increases with establishment size although not linearly. An alternative specification of 
the size effects is to include a polynomial in establishment size such as the quadratic 
utilised by B&CUB. However, the set of banded dummies utilised here dominate (in 
likelihood) all such continuous functions and thus are to be preferred. For 1984 this 
comes as no surprise since the estimated coefficients reveal a sharp increase in the 
propensity to incur industrial action for establishments with more than 500 workers. 
In contrast B&CRE retain establishment size-linearly in their final specification, 
26. At higher levels of disaggregation thanl-digit industries, several of the cell sizes become too small for 
meaningful estimates to be made and the results are liable to be sensitive to any arbitrary grouping of the 
observations. 
27. All estimation in this section of the chapter is conducted using Lirodep (Greene (1990,1991)). 
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together -with two banded dummies of organisation size, neither 'of which -is 
significant (although theirs is purely- a strike activity equation rather than the more 
general measure of industrial, conflict being used here). The test here for omitted 
organisation size effects (OSIZE) yields a similar finding to that of B&CRE; for the 
specification selected, there would appear to be no grounds for including measures of 
firm/organisation size28. This contrasts. with the results of Marginson (1984) who 
found such effects to be. significant determinant of industrial conflict although his 
model was one in which only size matters. -Naylor & Gregg (1989) find that 
organisation size is not a significant determinant of union density and argue instead 
that the company size effect is simply a proxy for union recognition which is typically 
determined at the company level. Since recognition is controlled for explicitly in their 
equations, there is no separate company size effect. Its insignificance in the equations 
for conflict incidence presented here can be explained in a similar fashion; the 
unionisation status of the establishment is certainly important as table 4.4 clearly 
demonstrates, but since this is included as a control (or estimates are made conditional 
upon the union status of the establishment as in columns 3 and 4 of table 4.5A), then 
there is no additional identifiable organisational size effect. 
In an important sense however, controlling for. size is only a scale effect (whether 
linear or otherwise) and the main interest is in the other parameters of the model. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the unionisation variable UNION, though positive, is 
insignificant for both 1980 and 1984 despite the evident dichotomy , illustrated in. 
table 4.4. The reason for this would appear to lie in the inclusion of measures of union 
density at the establishment. Having any recognised union members is not important 
per se; rather it is the coverage that the union has at the establishment which is 
significant in the determination of the likelihood of conflict. For 1984, the profile of 
conflict across union density is an inverted U-shape which accords well with the 
28. In contrast, B&CUB obtain a negative coefficient on organisation size in their 'any action' equation 
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hypotheses outlined- above; . at low 
levels . of coverage, . it is _ difficult,, to.. organise 
collective industrial action, 'while. at very high levels, such action is less necessary 
since the threat of any action is much more effective., Unfortunately, for 1980 the 
pattern is less clear and no regularities can - be . discerned 
from the estimated 
coefficients; in particular, there is a sharp, fall in the propensity to take industrial 
action in establishments which are between 50%. and 75% unionised (DENSM3), 
although this coefficient is not significant. at conventional levels. B&CUB include the 
number of union members at the establishment linearly in their equation together with 
a union recognition -variable (which . is highly correlated with the. UNION variable 
being used here) and report positive and significant coefficients on both variables. 
B&CRE include union membership separately for recognised and unrecognised 
unions which means that it is not possible to distinguish a union recognition effect 
from a union density effect. The coefficients, they report for recognised union 
membership imply a U-shaped quadratic with a minimum well above the variable's 
mean. Hence, they find that strike probability falls with increasing union density for 
the vast majority of establishments and this contrasts strongly. with the results 
reported here. - 
.., e 
The closed shop variable is insignificant in both years, although the presence of 
multiple unions at the establishment led to a significantly higher probability of 
conflict in 1980. A similar finding was obtained by B&CUB. The coefficient on 
MANUF is positive for 1980 indicating the heterogeneity in conflict that exists across 
broad sectors as found by Smith et al (1978) and others, and the apparent greater 
propensity for workers in this sector to take industrial action. Manufacturing status 
was found to be similarly important by B&CUB for 1980, but B&CRE only include 
two 1-digit industry dummies and hence no comparisons are possible for 1984 when 
this result would not appear to hold. That the impact of the manufacturing status of 
the establishment should be smaller in 1984 than in 1980 accords well with the ideas 
expressed in section 4.2 above. It was the manufacturing sector that was particularly 
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hard hit by the recession in the early 1980s and the generally poor state of the much - 
reduced manufacturing base by 1984 would have had implications for its workers in 
terms of the probability of their taking industrial action. - 
As hypothesised above, single establishment firms do indeed. incur less industrial 
action than multi-establishment enterprises, although this effect is not significant for 
either year. Both EMPASS and LEVEL have positive coefficients, although they are 
only, significantly different from zero for 1980. This may reflect the - underlying 
bargaining structure for the particular disputes that were prevalent at the time that the 
surveys were compiled, especially the engineering workers' stoppages for. the 1980 
survey. These findings are analogous to those of B&CUB and B&CRE -. where 
comparisons are possible. B&CRE hypothesise a positive sign on LEVEL since if 
bargaining occurs at plant level in a multi establishment enterprise; the union may 
have poor information of the firm's true profitability. Firms who have above average 
financial performance have a lower probability of conflict at the establishment level 
as predicted above although there is some doubt over the direction of - causation; 
whether this is because they can more easily meet wage claims without conflict, or 
because they have not incurred industrial action- that they are relatively- more 
profitable cannot be ascertained from survey data of this kind. 
Finally, it can be seen that workforce and workplace characteristics are also relevant. 
The proportion female (1980) and the proportion part-time (1984) are particularly 
important; the higher are these proportions, the lower the probability of conflict at the 
establishment. Skilled workers are more likely to take industrial action and a similarly 
positive coefficient was obtained by both B&CUB and B&CRE. Both PBR and 
SHIFT take their expected signs, although the only significant coefficient is for PBR 
in 1980. 
In general, the results would appear to indicate that the determination of conflict 
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activity among private sector manual workers differed somewhat between 1980 and 
1984; while the signs on . the coefficients' are, much - the " same'ln" 
both - years, - their 
significance is much reduced in 1984 as, compared with, 19802 In particular, only 
one of the coefficients on the 'firm' and -'worker' control variables is significant at 
conventional levels for the 1984 survey. One possible explanation lies in the changing 
pattern of unionisation between the two years- since, as-revealed in table 4.4, it is 
almost exclusively unionised establishments that incur strike action. Columns 3 and 4 
of table 4.5A, therefore present the results of estimating the same- empirical model 
over the unionised establishments only. For this i subsample of establishments ý the 
results are qualitatively very similar to those obtained for all private sector manual 
workers and the same variables are significant as before when estimating over both 
unionised and non-unionised establishments., Hence some other explanation is 
required to account for the difference between the two years and the rather poor 
performance of the equation in 1984. ---'- 
While the tests for misspecification indicate that the' empirical model presented in 
table 4.5A is generally acceptable (at a significance level of -5%); it is apparent that 
there are omitted industry effects in both the estimated equations for 1980. The results 
detailed above may therefore be a reflection of uncorrected differences between 
industrial sectors in their propensity to strike rather than in any dissimilarities in the 
determinants of conflict incidence per se;, the union, firm and worker variables are 
then simply acting as proxies for these differences., Table 4.5B investigates this 
hypothesis further by including eight 1-digit industry dummies in the equations rather 
than differentiating only by manufacturing status. As noted by Stewart (1991) in the 
context of union wage differentials, one weakness of such a strategy is that the 
inclusion of industry dummies, 
"... merely formalize[s] our ignorance" (p. 170) 
29. While fifteen (nineteen) of the coefficients are significant at 5% (10%) in the 1980 equation, only ten (eleven) 
are significant in the 1984 equation. 
170 
That is, 'attributing remaining differences in the incidence of conflict to industry` 
dummy variables 'does not- actually contribute to the explanation of, why certain 
industries should be more prone to conflict3Q. 
As would be expected from the INDY test at the bottom of table 4.5A, only for the 
1980 equations does the inclusion of these dummies lead to a significant improvement 
in the log-likelihood. However, the results obtained are qualitatively and 
quantitatively very similar to those in table 4.5A and hence the comments made above 
are appropriate to these estimates too. In conclusion therefore, it would appear that 
the determinants of conflict activity are rather more difficult to identify in 1984 than 
in 1980. Although the estimates are econometrically satisfactory, the general 
performance of the equation for 1984 is quite poor31. 
It is of some interest to decompose the net change in the incidence of conflict into its 
'compositional' and 'behavioural' components in order that some empirical weight can 
be apportioned to the various hypotheses outlined in section 4.2. Compositional 
changes between 1980 and 1984 are reflected in changes in the (means of the) 
variables, while changes, in - collective bargaining behaviour are represented 
by 
changes in the estimated coefficients. One way in which the relative weight of these 
two separate effects can be measured is as follows; define: 
Pij = D(Xi'ßj) i,, 1 = 1,2 (4.1) 
where P is the predicted probability of industrial action at any given establishment 
given a vector of characteristics X and estimated parameter coefficients ß, 1 is the 
30 
. However, an important defence of this strategy in the context of conflict activity 
is that of the lime-specificity' 
of survey data of this kind. Because of the discontinuous nature of conflict, the compilation date of the survey is 
critical. One way of minimising the risk of bias arising from the dominance of any particular dispute that occurred 
in the sample period is to include industry dummies. This may be particularly important for the 1980 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey since it included the 1979 national Engineering workers stoppage. For wages (which 
are continuous) time-specificity is not really an issue, and thus Stewart's (1991) criticism is valid. 
31. However, note that for both years and both specifications, the equations 'predict' over 80% of the observations 
correctly (using a cutoff of 0.5). 
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cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, and subscripts 
i, j = 1,2 refer to 1980 and 1984 respectively. Four expected values can therefore be 
calculated and compared; Poo and P11, which are, respectively, the 1980 and 1984 
mean predicted probabilities of industrial action; P01, which is the mean expected 
probability of conflict in 1984 for a fixed set of (1980) characteristics, and, finally, 
P10 which is the mean expected probability of industrial action in 1984 for given 
(1980) behavioural coefficients. 
Thus the 'composition' effect is measured by comparing Poo with P10 (for given 1980 
coefficients) or Pol with P11 (for given 1984 coefficients). Similarly, the 'behavioural' 
effect is calculated by comparing Poo with Pol (for given 1980 characteristics) or P10 
with P11 (for given 1984 characteristics)32. , 
Performing these decompositions on the specifications in table 4.5A indicates that, for 
all establishments, approximately one-quarter of the decrease in conflict , can 
be 
attributed to changes in the composition of establishments, while three-quarters is a 
result of changes in behaviour.. When attention is restricted - -to unionised 
establishments only (that is, essentially removing the impact of changes in union 
recognition), the composition effect drops to less than 10%. Thus, while the greater 
part of the composition effect is due to a pure union effect, most of the overall 
decrease in conflict is a consequence of changes in collective bargaining behaviour 
between 1980 and 1984. This finding is in contrast to that found by Stewart (1991) 
who concludes that the small net change in the mean union wage differential between 
1980 and 1984 is entirely the result of compositional changes between 1980 and 
1984. 
32. Given the nonlinearity of the Probit model, it is important to note that this decomposition is only approximate. 
However, for the relatively small changes in the means of the dependent variable (for all establishments (unionised 
establishments), a decrease in the unweighted mean from 0.339 (0.501) in 1980 to 0.289 (0.443) in 1984), these 
decompositions are linearly additive to three decimal places in this case. 
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For the specification in table 4.5B -in which industry dummies are 
included in the 
equation, the role of compositional changes in the decline in the incidence of conflict 
is slightly higher (one third for all establishments and 15% for unionised 
establishments). However, the central finding above, that the majority of the decrease 
in conflict activity is - due to changes in - the values, of the coefficients rather than 
changes in establishment composition, is confirmed. In an attempt to ascertain 
whether this behavioural explanation for the decline in conflict activity can be equally 
applied to the changing relative incidence of strike and non-strike sanctions, the next 
sub-section examines the joint determination of these forms of industrial action. 
4.4.3. The Incidence of Strike and NonStrike Activity. 
Incidents of conflict activity at the establishment can be dichotomised into strike and 
non-strike actions. Clearly there may exist a correlation between the incidence of the 
overt and costly sanction of a strike and the incidence of less costly non-strike 
sanctions, although whether these are alternatives or complementary is unclear. 
Action short of a strike may be used to exert pressure during bargaining thus 
providing a threat effect and negating the need for strike action. Alternatively, non- 
strike action may act as a prelude to strike action if the (expected) negotiation period 
is exceeded33. To assess this co-determination of strike and non-strike sanctions, 
Bivariate Probit models are estimated as follows; define 
Ys. = X'ßs + Es (4.2) 
Yn = X'ßn + En (4.3) 
where ys and yA are the underlying propensities to incur strike and non-strike action 
respectively given a vector of establishment characteristics X, and (es, Er) have a 
bivariate standard normal distribution with correlation p. The sign on the estimated 
correlation parameter (RHO) in the bivariate error structure can then be interpreted as 
33. Moene (1988) suggests that strike threats and non-strike threats (and thus presumably action) are mutually 
exclusive regimes whereby the existence of each depends upon the parameters of the bargaining relationship 
between the negotiating parties. He therefore precludes the 'complementary' hypothesis suggested here. 
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indicating the direction of the ceteris paribus correlation between -strike and non- 
strike sanctions. 
It is possible to estimate equations (4.2) and (4.3) (although not p) consistently by 
single equation Probit techniques. This corresponds to LIML and would, however, be 
inefficient in - that - it would fail to take into account the, correlation between the 
disturbances. In addition, the correlation is of particular interest in this case; a positive 
sign on this parameter would indicate that strike and non-strike sanctions -are 
complementary, whereas a negative estimate for the parameter would signify that they 
are being used as alternative forms of action. Thus FIML. estimation which 
appropriately encapsulates the bivariate error structure is preferred.. --. -1 
In practise, of course, the latent variables ys* and yR* are not observable, and instead 
dummy variables ys and y are recorded. These are defined by, 
ys =1 if ys >0 (4.4) 
ys =0 otherwise 
and similarly 
yn =1 if yý >0:.. (4.5) 
yn =0 otherwise 
Thus the zero categories in the bivariate 'model comprise establishments at which 
there is no incidence of, action of the relevant type. - Note that this is not a bivariate 
model with selectivity (i. e. conditional on any action having occurred). The choice is 
not between strike or non-strike action since it is quite possible for both or neither 
forms of action to be undertaken. 
The results from estimating the model defined by equations (4.2) and (4.3) for this 
model are reported in tables 4.6A and 4.6B for all establishments and for unionised 
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establishments only respectively34. The coefficient on MWREP is larger for non- 
strike action thawfot'strike action: =This reflects tflb' greater `degree `bf' disagreement 
over the incidence ý of non-strike sanctions as can, be, seen from a examination of 
table 4.1. The implication is that establishments in which a worker representative was 
not interviewed are relatively less likely to report the occurrence of non-strike action 
as compared to strike action, and thus the MWREP coefficient is larger for the former 
than for the latter. Once again, size is seen- to be particularly important;.. conflict 
incidence increases with establishment size, although at a decreasing rate. A contrast 
between strike and non-strike activity is also evident, with a higher but flatter profile 
across establishment size for non-strike sanctions. This -implies that smaller 
workplaces are relatively more likely to incur -non-strike action rather than strike 
action, although the relative incidence rates for both are approximately equal for 
larger establishments. The size of the organisation to which the plant belongs 
(OSIZE) appears to have no effect on either strike or non-strike action. 
High union density is again a significant determinant of conflict activity, and, 
moreover, the hypothesised switching from strike to non-strike sanctions is detectable 
in the results presented. For table 4.6A (all establishments), while plants with high 
union density in 1980 were more likely to take strike action, by 1984, their relative 
preference was for non-strike action35. The presence of multiple unions at the 
establishment (MUNION) results in a significantly higher propensity to-incur strike 
action, although it has a smaller and insignificant impact on non-strike activity. For 
firm and worker/workplace characteristics, the patterns are less clear, particularly for 
1984, and this is consistent with the results obtained for the incidence of any 
industrial action as reported in sub-section 4.4.2 above. 
34 
. Once again, the test for omitted 1-digit industry effects indicates that these are required by the model and hence 
they are included in the specification reported in tables 4.6A and 4.68. 
35. The coefficient estimates are only poorly determined however, and this result is not replicated when the sample 
is restricted to unionised establishments only as in table 4.611. 
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Of particular interest is' the parameter-, RHO. Tor, both ' 1980 and 1984, this is 
significantly positive with the implication that strike and non-strike action are used in 
a complementary manner rather than as alternatives, conditional on the included 
explanatory variables36. This may (at least in part) reflect the typical sequential nature 
of disputes which have periods of non-strike action and of overt strike activity, rather 
than only having either form of action in isolation. The strength of this relationship 
indicates just how characteristic this dual use of sanctions is within establishments; 
that is, certain establishments can be characterised as being conflict prone in that they 
incur both strike and non-strike industrial conflict. Finally, the size of the coefficient 
suggests that the complementary use of strike and non-strike sanctions was even more 
common in 1984 than in 1980. 
The decomposition of the changes in the incidence of strike and non-strike activities 
into their compositional and behavioural components is also of interest and reveals 
some interesting conclusions. For strikes, the large net decrease is principally due to 
changes in the behavioural actions of agents to the collective bargaining process. 
Indeed, for unionised establishments, over 90% of the decline is due to such factors. 
This is in sharp contrast to the rather smaller decrease in the proportion of 
establishments reporting the incidence of non-strike action. The reduction in this case 
is primarily the result of compositional changes and around three-quarters of the net 
change can be attributed to differences between establishments in 1980 and 1984. 
These findings lend further, though tentative, support to the 'switching' hypothesis 
from strike to non-strike activity. While changes in behaviour have resulted in a 
decrease in strike activity, conditional on establishment characteristics, there has been 
little corresponding change in the incidence of non-strike action; in the latter case, 
most of the small decrease is simply due to changes in composition. Hence there has 
36 
. The (unweighted) raw correlations between strike and non-strike activity for 1980 and 1984 are 0502 and 0.471 respectively for all establishments, and 0.416 and 0.398 for unionised establishments. 
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been a relative swing towards the use of non-strike sanctions. 
4.5. Summary and Conclusions.. 
This chapter has compared and contrasted the frequency and incidence of industrial 
action in the early 1980s using statistics on the number of strikes compiled by the 
Department of Employment and published in the Employment Gazette together with 
data from the two Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys. That strike frequency and 
incidence are rather different dimensions of strikes and measure different aspects of 
conflict activity is apparent from the analysis presented in section 4.3. While the 
number of strikes continued to fall throughout the 1980s following a trend that began 
in the early 1970s, the incidence of stoppages at the establishment level actually 
increased between 1980 and 1984. The implication, is that strikes, while fewer in 
number in 1984, were more widespread and thus affected a higher proportion of 
establishments. However, in relation to the changes in the bargaining environment in 
the 1980s, and in particular the structural, economic and legislative transitions 
outlined in section 4.2, the incidence of conflict activity37 is of greater interest than 
simply examining the number of strikes that occur. Thus the empirical analysis in 
section 4.4 is concerned with this more general and alternative measure of industrial 
conflict together with how the relative use of strike and non-strike sanctions has 
changed in the 1980s. 
Unlike the previous two studies that have utilised the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys, the responses of both management and worker representatives are used in 
this thesis. This is in an attempt to account for the effects of incomplete recall in the 
responses to the questions regarding the incidence of various forms of conflict 
activity. It is apparent that establishments that are not unionised (in the sense that they 
have no recognised union members) incur very few incidents of industrial action of 
37. That is, both strike and non-strike activity (and their inter-relationship). 
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any form and thus it is important to control appropriately for this distinction in the 
sample. 
In order that comparisons can be drawn, an identical specification is estimated for 
both years, and appropriate tests are carried out to check the econometric adequacy of 
the empirical model. The results confirm the importance of plant size 'found by 
numerous other studies of conflict activity and also reveal that the ' size of the 
organisation to which the establishment belongs is not a significant determinant of the 
likelihood of conflict. Many of the other suggested hypotheses pertaining to conflict 
incidence in Britain are seen to receive at least partial support from the data and, for 
1980 in particular, several important determinants of the incidence of industrial action 
are identified. Overall, establishment size and union density would appear to 
dominate however, even when sectoral identifiers have been explicitly included to 
account for the time specificity of industrial action in cross-section survey data of this 
kind. Most of the net decrease in the incidence of industrial conflict among private 
sector manual workers is seen to result from changes in the behaviour of agents, 
rather than changes in the composition of establishments between 1980 and 1984. 
This lends support to the hypotheses discussed in section 4.2, especially the view that 
the net impact of the economic and legislative changes would serve to reduce the 
level of conflict activity at the establishment, over and above any decrease resulting 
from the changing structural composition of establishments. 
Estimates for the joint determination of strike and non-strike activity reveal similar 
patterns as for the incidence of any form of conflict activity as would be expected. In 
addition, these two forms of sanctions tend to be used together at any establishment 
which incurs industrial action, rather than as substitute forms of grievance activity. 
This most probably reflects the nature of disputes in the early 1980s. In addition, there 
is some evidence to support the 'switching' hypothesis whereby, in times of recession, 
both employers and employees have a relative preference for less costly non-strike 
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sanctions if breakdowns in bargaining cannot be,. avoided. While the incidence of 
strikes has fallen due to changes in'behaviour fora given set'of characteristics, the 
proportion of establishments incurring _non-strike-sanctions-has only 
fallen slightly, 
and, moreover, this decrease is seen to be primarily due to changes in composition. 
In general, the estimates for 1984 are less satisfactory than those for 1980 and, with 
the exception of establishment size and union density, most variables are not 
significant at conventional levels. The generally poor results for 1984 may indicate a 
fundamental change in the way in which conflict is organised, or may perhaps be a 
reflection of the fact that by 1983/84, with high and increasing unemployment, 
conflict among private sector manual workers was potentially much more costly to 
both employees and employers than was perceived in 1979/80. In such circumstances, 
any systematic occurrence of conflict activity would be carefully eliminated where 
ever possible. An alternative explanation may lie in the uncertainty created by the 
new industrial relations legislation. This may have led to' ambiguity on the part of 
unions as to the type of action that they could organise effectively without incurring 
severe penalties, and thereby shifting the 'balance of power' in the employers' favour. 
Together with the other transitions outlined in section 4.2, this would be likely to 
destabilise any previously established regularities in union behaviour and consequent 
conflict activity. It will therefore be of some interest to replicate the current study 
when the next Workplace Industrial Relations Survey is published since, by 1990, the 
full impact of much of the early 1980s labour legislation should be apparent. 
Finally, it should be recalled that the sample considered in the empirical estimation 
presented in section 4.4 is confined to private sector manual workers. It was shown in 
table 4.3 that the incidence of industrial action differed considerably across sector and 
worker type. The next chapter therefore presents a complementary study, in that it 
considers, separately for manual and non-manual workers, the relative strike 
proneness of the public sector. 
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Table 4.1 
The Incidence of Industrial Conflict as Reported by Various Respondents 
Manual Workers -" 
1980: Base (Weighted) 713 
Manage- 
ment Rep. 
Strike Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 78.1 5.6 83.7 
YES 7.2 - 9.0 16.3 
85.4 14.6 100.0 
NO 178.1 5.6 183.7 
YES 7.2 - 9.0 16.3 
85.4 14.6 1100.0 85.7 14.3 1100.0 
1984: Base (Weighted) 554 
Manage- 
ment Rep. 
Strike Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 80.1 6.3 86.4 
YES 4.6 9.0 13.6 
84.7 15.3 100.0 
NO 80.1 6.3 86.4 
YES 4.6 9.0 13.6 
84.7 15.3 100.0 83.6 16.4 100.0 
Non-Manual Workers 
1980: Base (Weighted) 643 
Manage- 
ment Rep. 
Strike Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 89.3 2.9 92.2 
YES 2.6 5.1 7.8 
91.9 8.1 100.0 
NO 89.3 2.9 92.2 
YES 2.6 5.1 7.8 
91.9 8.1 1 100.0 83.5 16.5 1100.0 
1984: Base (Weighted) 560 
Manage- 
ment Rep. 
64.7 35.3 1100.0 73.1 26.9 1 100.0 
Any Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 67.8 8.0 75.8 
YES 10.4 13.8 24.2 
78.2 -. 21.8 100.0 
NO 67.8 8.0 75.8 
YES 10.4 13.8 24.2 
78.2 -. 21.8 100.0 
Any Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO - YES NO 68.7 10.3 78.9 
YES 6.7 14.4 21.1 
75.3 24.7 100.0 
NO 68.7 10.3 78.9 
YES 6.7 14.4 21.1 
75.3 24.7 1100.0 
Any Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 73.7 9.8 83.4 
YES 5.1 11.5 16.6 
78.8 21.2 100.0 
NO 73.7 9.8 83.4 
YES 5.1 11.5 16.6 
78.8 21.2 1100.0 
Any Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 55.7 12.1 67.8 
YES 2.9 29.3 32.2 
58.6 41.4 100.0 
NO 55.7 12.1 67.8 
YES 2.9 29.3 32.2 
58.6 41.4 1100.0 
Strike Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 62.5 9.9 72.3 
YES 2.2 25.5 27.7 
64.7 35.3 100.0 
NO 62.5 9.9 72.3 
YES 2.2 25.5 27.7 
Non-Strike Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 78.9 7.4 863 
YES 6.8 6.9 13.7 
Non-Strike Action 
NOI78.5 9.1ý 87.7 
YES 5.0 7.3_j 1_2.3 
Non-Strike Action 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 79.1 9.3 88.4 
YES 4.4 7.2 11.6 
83.5 16.5 100.0 
Non-Strike Action 
NO 169.0 12.3 1 81.3 
YES 4.1 14.6 18.7 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 78.5 9.1 87.7 
YES 5.0 7.3 12.3 
83.6 16.4 100.0 
NO 79.1 9.3 88.4 
YES 4.4 7.2 11.6 
Worker Rep. 
NO YES 
NO 69.0 12.3 81.3 
YES 4.1 14.6 18.7 
73.1 26.9 100.0 
Notes: 
1. Allýthe statistics are weighted to correct for the stratified sampling scheme used in the compilation 
of the Workplace Industrial Relations Suveys. 
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Table 4.2 . 
The Incidence of Industrial Conflict as Re ported b y Either Respondent 
Establishments with Worker types 
Manual or 
Non-manual Manual Non-Manual 
Type of Action 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 22.0 25.5 16.0 13.1 10.9 17.8 
Strike Action 13.2 19.1 11.0 8.4 4.5 14.4 
Non-Strike Action 16.1 18.1 10.0 8.3 8.7 12.1 
Strike Action: 
Less than one day 5.9 13.7 4.4 5.2 . 2.2 10.4 More than one day 9.0 11.7 7.5 5.1 3.1 8.8 
One day - one week - 11.2 - 4.6 - 8.8 
More than one week - 0.9 - 0.9 - 0.1 
Non-Strike Action: 
Over-time ban 10.5 11.2 7.0 6.3 5.1 6.3 
Work-to-rule 6.8 8.2 4.0 2.3 3.6 - 6.4 Blacking of work 5.2 3.5 2.4 2.1 3.2 2.0 
Other 2.7 2.8 2.1 1.2 0.9 1.9 
Base: Weighted 2000 2000 1823 1749 1988 1985 
Unweighted 2040 2019 1898 1853 2034 2010 
Notes: 
1. See table4.1. 
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Table 4.3 -, 
The Incidence of Industrial Conflict by Industrial Sector 
Manual and No Workers 
Private Nationälised Private Public 
Manufacturing Industries Services Services 
Type of Action 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 29.8 19.9 48.1 44.5 8.0 8.2 33.3 49.2 
Strike Action 21.1 10.4 33.7 33.2 4.4 5.4 17.1 40.9 
Non-Strike Action 21.0 15.9 31.0 25.5 5.1 4.7 26.9 36.4 
Base: Weighted 498 424 69 106 865 843 568 627 
Unweighted 746 592 134 196 584 597- 576 634 
Manual Workers 
Private Nationalised Private Public 
Manufacturing Industries Services Services 
Type of Action 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 29.3 18.7 41.2 37.6 6.2 5.8 14.5 13.3 
Strike Action - 20.5 10.1 24.0 30.5 4.1 3.5 10.3 9.1 
Non-Strike Action 20.5 14.3 24.7 20.4 3.3 4.1 7.8 6.8 
Base: Weighted 492 412 66 103 761 689 504 545 
Unweighted 736 580 . 130 191 . 
519 515 513 567 
Non-Manual Workers 
Private Nationalised Private Public 
Manufacturing Industries Services Services 
Type of Action 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 4.4 4.6 27.0 19.0 3.6 4.8 26.0 44.2 
Strike Action 2.7 1.4 20.3 10.1 1.4 3.7 9.0 38.2 
Non-Strike Action 2.9 3.9 14.2 10.8 2.5 1.7 22.7 32.0 
Base: Weighted 498 424 68 105 860 836 562 621 
Un eighted 746 592 133 194 582 593 573 631 
Notes: 
stable 4.1. 
2. The four-way sectoral decomposition is mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 
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Table 4.411-11, -11 -7 
The Incidence of Industrial Conflict by Union Status 
All Unionised Establishments 
Establishments with Worker types 
Manual or 
Non-manual Manual Non-Manual 
Type of Action 1980 1984 1980 1984" 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 32.7 38.1 26.7- - 20.8 21.8 33.1 
Strike Action 19.5 28.7 18.1 13.4 8.8 26.7 
Non-Strike Action 24.1 27.1 16.8 13.3 17.4 22.5 
Base: Weighted 1277 1327 1009 1077 943 1069 
Unveighted 1574 1593 1363 1405 1277.1397 
All Non-Unionised Establishments 
Establishments'with Worker types 
Manual or 
Non-manual Manual Non-Manual 
Type of Action 1980 1984 1980 1984 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 3.1 0.5 2.8 0.7 1.2 0.0 
Strike Action 2.0 0.2 2.1 0.4 0.6 0.0 
Non-Strike Action " 2.0 0.4 1.6 0.4 0.9 0.0 
Base: Weighted 723 673 814 672 1045 917 
Unwtighted 466 426 535 448 757 613 
Notes: 
stable 4.1. 
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Table 4.5A 
Probit Estimates: Any Industrial Action 
Private Sector Manual Workers 
All Establishments Unionised Establishments 
1980 
CNST 
MWREP 
size: 
ESIZE2 
ESIZE3 
ESIZE4 
ESIZE5 
ESIZE6 
union: 
UNION 
DENSM2 
DENSM3 
DENSM4 
DENSM5 
CSHOP 
MUNION 
firm: 
MANUF 
SINGLE 
EMPASS 
LEVEL 
FINPERF 
workers: 
PFE 
P_PT 
PSK 
PBR 
SHIFT 
Industry 
Effects: 
-2.729 (0.248)* 
0.068 (0.117) 
0382 (0.201) 
0.534 (0.206)* 
0.854 (0.213)* 
0.937 (0.226)* 
1.227 (0.250)* 
0.354 (0.208) 
0.753 (0.233)* 
0.405 (0.238) 
0.769 (0.216)* 
0.942 (0.224)* 
-0.017 (0.117) 
0.359 (0.112)* 
0.272 (0.127)* 
-0.084 (0.135) 
0.273 (0.100)* 
0.522 (0.111)* 
-0.157 (0.099) 
-0.879 (0.253)* 
0.148 (0.467) 
0.624 (0.247)* 
0.316 (0.099)* 
0.217 (0.116) 
NO 
n 
1nL 
1197 
-459.45 
1984 
-2.852 (0303)* 
0.468 (0.125)* 
0.791 '(0.247)* 
0.884 (0.250)* 
0.808 ' (0.249)* 
1.174 (0.262)* 
1.260 (0.268)* 
0.443 (0.284) 
0.258 (0.319) 
0.435 (0.296) 
0.827 (0.278)* 
0.758 (0.287)* 
0.185 (0.123) 
0.094 (0.125) 
0.071 (0.135) 
-0.076 (0.167) 
0.062 (0.112) 
0.134 (0.116) 
-0.067 (0.105) 
-0.246 (0.255) 
-1.396 (0.447)* 
0.402 (0.290) 
0.094 (0.114) 
0.222 (0.131) 
1980 
-2.081 (0.347)* 
0.012 (0.126) 
0.276 (0.225) 
0.431 (0.226) 
0.754 (0.233)* 
0.857 (0.244)* 
1.169 (0.272)* 
0.741 
0.352 
0.695 
0.833 
0.019 
0.291 
0.321 
-0.052 
0.217 
0.515 
-0.127 
-0.951 
-0.262 
OS40 
0.251 
0.193 
NO 
Diagnostics 
1048 
-402.72 
(0.289)* 
(0.279) 
(0.261)* 
(0.271)* 
(0.119) 
(0.120)* 
(0.140)* 
(0.150) 
(0.106)* 
(0.112)* 
(0.105) 
(0.268)* 
(0.587) 
(0.269) 
(0.106)* 
(0.126) 
NO 
777 
-409.55 
1984 
-2.233 (0.422)* 
0.469 (0.126)* 
0.764 (0.261)* 
0.763 (0.264)* 
0.761 (0.260)* 
1.114 (0.273)* 
1.207 (0.279)* 
0.133 (0386) 
0.400 (0.353) 
0.759 (0341)* 
0.686 (0.349)* 
0.187 (0.124) 
0.113 (0.129) 
-0.008 (0.145) 
-0.200 (0.186) 
-0.001 (0.117) 
0.153 (0.117) 
-0.083 (0.111) 
-0.238 (0.269) 
-1.500 (0.483)* 
0.430 (0.303) 
0.116 (0.118) 
0.249 (0.139) 
NO 
668 
-371.99 
HETSIZE 7.41 (11.07) 0.75 (11.07) 1.15 (11.07) 5.08 (11.07) 
FF 1.62 (7.81) 2.12 (7.81) 3.27 (7.81) 7.08 (7.81) 
NN 1.28 (5.99) 2.01 (5.99) 1.27 (5.99) 4.12 (5.99) 
OSIZE 1.19 (11.07) 7.63 (11.07) 0.40 (11.07) 8.56 (11.07) 
INDY 36.06 (14.07) 9.28 (14.07) 32.67 (14.07) 12.12 (14.07) 
Notes: 
1. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. 
2. * denotes significant at 5% or better. 
3. The figures in parentheses beside the diagnostic test statistics are the relevant 5% 
critical values. 
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Table 4.5B 
Probit Estimates: Any Industrial Action,: 
Private Sector Manual Workers 
All Establishments Unionised Establishments 
1980 1984 1980,1984 
CNST 
MWREP 
size: 
ESIZE2 
ESIZE3 
ESIZE4 
ESIZE5 
ESIZE6 
union: 
UNION 
DENSM2 
DENSM3 
DENSM4 
DENSM5 
CSHOP 
MUNION 
firm: 
MANUF 
SINGLE 
EMPASS 
LEVEL 
FINPERF 
workers: 
P_FE 
P PT 
PSK 
PBR 
SHIFT 
Industry 
Effects: 
-2.588 (0.294)* 
0.053 (0.120) 
0.425 (0.205)* 
0.498 (0.211)* 
0.842 (0.218)* 
0.904 (0.230)* 
1.131 (0.256)* 
0.406 (0.215) 
0.777 (0.241)* 
0.495 (0.245)* 
0.855 (0.224)* 
1.037 (0.232)* 
0.043 (0.122) 
0.355 (0.116)* 
-0.086 (0.137) 
0.263 (0.105)* 
0.413 (0.116)* 
-0.151 (0.101) 
-0.738 (0.267)* 
0.259 (0.486) 
0.619 (0.260)* 
0.319 (0.103)* 
0.284 (0.123)* 
YES 
-2.633 (0.391)* 
0.453 (0.126)* 
0.836 (0.252) * 
0.945 (0.257)*- 
0.867 (0.257)* 
1.228 (0.272)* 
1.305 (0.281)* 
0.428 (0.290) 
0.236 (0.325) 
0.426 (0302) 
0.822 (0.286)* 
0.742 (0.298)* 
0.179 (0.125) 
0.078 (0.127) 
-0.128 (0.177) 
0.081- (0.117) 
0.099 (0.122) 
-0.042 (0.106) 
-0.239 (0.261) 
-1.427 (0.465)* 
0.382 (0.299) 
0.093 (0.116) 
0.224 (0.134) 
YES 
-1.815 (0.408)* 
-0.015- (0.129). 
0.291 (0.231) 
0.386- (0.233). 
0.722 (0.240)* 
0.810 (0.250)* 
1.050 (0.280) * 
0.730 (0.298)* 0.157 (0.403) 
0.395 (0.287) 0.435 (0.367) 
0.754 (0.269)* 0.811 (0357)* 
0.891 (0.278)* 0.720 (0.366)* 
0.085 (0.124) 0.179 (0.126) 
0.295 (0.124)* 0.085 (0.133) 
-0.052 (0.152) 
0.197 (0.110) 
0.414 (0.118)* 
-0.132 (0.108) 
-0.793 (0.285) * 
-0.078 (0.630), 
0.564 (0.282)* 
0.249 (0.110)* 
0.280 (0.134)* 
YES 
-0.292 (0.202) 
0.007 (0.122), 
0.108 (0.124) 
-0.051 (0.113) 
-0.223 (0.277) 
-1.534 (0.511)* 
0.424 (0.314) 
0.111 (0.120) 
0.274 (0.143) 
YES 
-1.926 (0.513)* 
0.452 (0.127)*' 
0.823 (0.273)* 
0.847 (0.278) * 
0.833 (0.276)* 
1.170 (0.291)* 
1.246 (0.299)* 
Diagnostics 
n 
lnL 
HETSIZE 
FF 
NN 
OSIZE 
INDY 
1197 
-443.07 
8.49 (11.07) 
6.41 (7.81) 
5.21 (5.99) 
1.52 (11.07) 
N/A 
1048 
-398.32 
0.88 (11.07) 
3.05 (7.81) 
3.04 (5.99) 
7.48 (11.07) 
N/A 
777 
-394.05 
6.95 (11.07) 
7.66 (7.81) 
4.29 (5.99) 
0.55 (11.07) 
N/A 
668 
-365.49 
3.15 (11.07) 
5.39 (7.81) 
2.67 (5.99) 
8.32 (11.07) 
N/A 
Notes: 
e table 4. SA. 
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Table 4.6A 
Bivariate Probit Estimates: Strike and Non-Strike Action 
Private Sector Manual Workers 
All Establishments 
CNST 
MWREP 
size: 
ESIZE2 
ESIZE3 
ESIZE4 
ESIZE5 
ESIZE6 
union: 
UNION 
DENSM2 
DENSM3 
DENSM4 
DENSM5 
CSHOP 
MUNION 
firm: 
MANUF 
SINGLE 
EMPASS 
LEVEL 
FINPERF 
workers: 
P FE 
PPT 
P _SK 
PBR 
SHIFT 
Industry 
Effects: 
RHO 
1980 1984 
Strike Action Non-Strike Action Strike Action Non-Strike Action 
-2.645 (0.402)* -3.130 (0.423)* -2.625 (0.527)* -3.106 (0.582)* 
0.078 (0.139) 0.167 (0.131) 0.312 (0.152)* 0.499 (0.140)* 
0.361 (0.258) 0.541 (0.268)* 0.483 (0.344) 0.845 (0.320)* 
0547 (0.269)* 0.577 (0.285)* 0.571 (0.329) 1.045 (0.323)* 
0.897 (0.268)* 0.751 (0.284)* 0.585 (0.347) 0.905 (0.326)* 
0.849 (0.274)* 0.936 (0.292)* 1.028 (0.354)* 1.203 (0.340)* 
1.172 (0.302)* 1.135 (0.325)* 1.093 (0.363)* 1.325 (0.352)* 
0.240 (0.277) 0.240 (0.268) 0.640 (0.702) 0.359 (0.366) 
0.785 (0.331)* 0.675 (0.306)* -0.086 (0.713) 0.266 (0.381) 
0.460 (0335) 0.696 (0.294)* 0.200 (0.684) 0.464 (0.369) 
0.933 (0.307)* 0.789 (0.272)* 0.611 (0.686) 0.688 (0.335)* 
1.136 (0.308)* 0.930 (0.270)* 0.559 (0.687) 0.702 (0.355)* 
-0.120 (0.128) 0.192 (0.128) 0.003 (0.133) 0.095 (0.137) 
0.358 (0.133)* 0.201 (0.125) 0321 (0.154)* -0.073 (0.144) 
-0.061 (0.157) ' 0.024 (0.154) 0.085 (0.222) -0.282 (0.226) 
0321 (0.115)* 0.165 (0.115) 0.032 (0.134) 0.019 (0.128) 
0.457 (0.121)* 0.198 (0.116) 0.001 (0.133) 0.161 (0.128) 
-0.181 (0.112) -0.165 (0.111) -0.033 (0.123) -0.029 (0.117) 
-0.147 (0.328) -1.210 (0.338)* 0.082 (0.298) -0.250 (0.302) 
-0.200 (0.682) 1.026 (0.630) -0.994 (0.619) -1.147 (0.597) 
0.300 (0.308) 0.668 (0.319)* 0.345 (0.379) 0.491 (0.347) 
0.322 (0.111)* 0.315 (0.111)* 0.110 (0.134) 0.014 (0.124) 
0.082 (0.140) 0.319 (0.141)* 0.020 (0.176) 0.282 (0.161) 
YES YES YES YES 
0.462 ( 0.059)* 0.512 ( 0.059)* 
Diagnostics 
n 
1nL 
HETSIZE 5.71 (11.07) 
FF 5.51 (7.81) 
NN 2.89 (5.99) 
OSIZE 1.45 (11.07) 
INDY N/A 
1197 
-82833 
3.22 (11.07) 
4.93 (7.81) 
2.99 (5.99) 
3.95 (11.07) 
N/A 
1048 
-704.31 
7.24 (11.07) 3.47 (11.07) 
5.06 (7.81) 3.63 (7.81) 
4.17 (5.99) 2.73 (5.99) 
8.65 (11.07) 8.30 (11.07) 
N/A N/A 
Notes: 
1. Tee table 4.5A. 
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Table 4.6B -' 
Bivariate Probit Estimates: Strike and Non-Strike Action 
Private Sector Manual Workers 
Unionised Establishments 
1980 1984 
Strike Action Non-Strike Action Strike Action Non-Strike Action 
CNST -2.153, (0.535)* -2.629 (0357)* -1.989 (0.789)*_ -2.284 (0.680)* 
MWREP 0.034" ' (0.148) 0.146 (0.139) 0.291 (0.154) 0.509 (0.141)* 
size: 
ESIZE2 0.245 (0.276) 0.468 (0.291) 0.424 (0.348) ' 0.807 (0.325)* 
ESIZE3 0.435 (0.295) 0.554 (0.303) 0.480 (0.336) 0.893 (0.330)* 
ESIZE4 0.814 (0.287)* 0.684 (0.301)* 0.495 (0.350) 0.858 (0.326)* 
ESIZE5 0.805 (0.293)* 0.878 (0.309)* 0.941 (0.357)* 1.114 (0.340)* 
ESIZE6 1.099 (0.324)* 1.122 (0.344)* 0.991 (0.368)* 1.243 (0.353)* 
union: 
UNION - - - -' - - - - DENSM2 0.840 (0.433) 0.555 (0.378) . 0.120 (0.789) -0.019 (0.572) DENSM3 0.443 ' (0.430) 0.549 (0.358) 0.431 (0.766) 0.283 (0.531) 
DENSM4 0.938 (0.399)* 0.578 
' 
(0341) 0.848 (0.770) 0.475 (0.515) 
DENSM5 1.109 (0.403)* 0.687 (0.344)* 0.797 (0.771) 0.483 (0.523) 
CSHOP -0.089 (0.130) 0.231 (0.129) -0.007 (0.134) 0.098 (0.138) MUNION 0.326 (0.138)* 0.153 (0.135) 0.307 (0.158) -0.048 (0.148) firm: 
MANUF - - - - - - - - SINGLE 0.022 
, 
(0.163) 0.019 (0.167) 0.025 (0.234) -0.529, (0.250)* EMPASS 0.259 (0.119)* 0.138 (0.118) -0.033 (0.137) -0.042 (0.130) LEVEL 0.450 (0.125)* 0.196 (0.118) -0.008 (0.134) 0.177 (0.129) FINPERF -0.186 (0.116) -0.132 (0.115) -0.013 (0.126) -0.078 (0.122) 
workers: 
P FE -0.184 (0334) -1.276 (0.349)* ' 0.139 ' (0.301) -0.260 (0.315) P_PT -0.460 . 
(0.816) 0.694 (0.920) -0.925 (0.623) _ -1.220 
(0.620)* 
P SK 0.162 (0.337) 0.653 (0.343) 0.322 (0.384) 0.546 (0.360) 
PBR 0.235 (0.116)* 0.309 (0.115)* 0.132, (0.135) 0.016 (0.128) 
SHIFT 0.054 (0.155) 0.308 (0.148)* 0.072 (0.177) 0.305 (0.166) 
Industry 
Effects. - YES YES YES YES 
RHO 0.434 (0.064)* 0.505 (0.061)* 
Diagnostics 
n 777 668 
InL -757.57 -664.86 
HETSIZE 7.22 (11.07) 2.07 (11.07) 8.61 (11.07) 
, 
3.58 (11.07) 
FF 4.43 (7.81) 4.78 (7.81) 5.94 (7.81) 4.97 (7.81) 
NN 4.40 ) 1 1 ) 2.93 2.21 (5.99) 
OSIZE 2.29 ( 11.07 3. 7 ( 1.0 8 . 93 07) (11.07) 8.65 1.0 INDY 
- 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: 
1. See table4.5A. 
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
A4.1 The Impact of Product Market Conditions in 1984. 
The 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
. 
contains some limited information 
on the degree of product market conditions facing the firm. As discussed in sub- 
section 4.4.1., this is likely to be important for both the firm and the union since each 
will have incentives to avoid industrial action if the firm faces competitive market 
conditions. The purpose of this section is to_ investigate the extent to which such 
influences are apparent in the 1984 survey responses. 
The information provided is in three categories; whether the market is dominated by 
the organisation, whether there were 'few' competitors or whether there were 'many'. 
The question is asked with respect to the establishment's sole, main or range of 
products as determined by other questions to be appropriate. For the purposes of the 
analysis in this section, the first two categories are amalgamated as in Stewart (1990) 
and referred to as facing 'non-competitive' (FEW) conditions, while those facing 
many competitors are labelled 'competitive' (MANY) 1. 
This distinction was incorporated into the equations estimated in the body of the 
chapter by augmenting the specifications with the MANY variable (so that the 
omitted category is firms facing few competitors or head offices); the expected sign 
on this variable is therefore negative. However, in every case, the conclusions reached 
in sub-sections 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 are unchanged by the addition of this variable; it never 
achieves statistical significance in any equation and the estimated coefficients on the 
remaining variables are robust to its inclusion. 
To illustrate this finding, a subset of the results for unionised establishments only is 
presented in table A4.1. The first column for the incidence of any industrial action 
1. The relevant questions were not asked of head offices or other administrative establishments. 
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corresponds to table 4.5A, column 4, and a* comparison reveals that the estimated' 
coefficients are little changed by the inclusion of MANY and that the; variable is iiself 
insignificant at conventional levels. Column 2 includes the industry dummies and 
conforms with table 4.5B, column 4. Once again, MANY is statistically insignificant. 
Finally, the results in columns 3 and 4 of table A4.1 mirror those in table 4.6B, 
columns 3 and 4 for the incidence of strike and non-strike activity. Not only are the 
same variables significant in each equation in the bivariate probit model, but the 
estimated value for RHO is the same to three decimal places. 
This exercise would therefore appear to suggest that the incidence of industrial action 
is not affected by the product market conditions facing the firm. One interpretation is 
that such influences have already been accounted for by the other variables present in 
the model. However, it should be recalled that the equations for 1984 in general do 
not perform well statistically since many variables are insignificant even though they 
are econometrically satisfactory. Thus any conclusions about the impact of the degree 
of competition on the incidence of industrial action among private sector manual 
workers can only be very tentative. 
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Table A4.1 
- ,... , 
The-Imp act of Comp etitive Market Conditions: 1984 
Private Sector Manual Workers 
Unionised Establishments 
Any Action - Any"Action,. - Strike Action Non-Strike Action 
CNST "-2.310 (0.431)* -1.985 (0.518)*, r -2.033- (0.805)*- -2.363 (0.685)* 
MWREP 0.465 (0.126)* 0.447 (0.128)* 0.286 (0.154) 0.501 (0.141)* 
size: 
ESIZE2 0.792 (0.263)* 0.852 (0.275)* 0.452 (0.356) 0.851 (0.333)* 
ESIZE3 0.790 (0.266)* 0.874 (0.281)* 0.502_, (0.338) 0.932 (0.336)* 
ESIZE4 0.795 (0.264)* 0.867 (0.279)* 0.525 (0.354) 0.908 (0.334)* 
ESIZE5 1.144 (0.276)* 1.199 (0.294)* " " 0.967. (0.360)* 1.157 (0.346)* 
ESIZE6 1.236 (0.282)* 1.276 (0.302)* 1.019 (0.370)* 1.289 (0.360)* 
union: 
UNION - - - - - - - - 
DENSM2 0.154 (0.390) 0.176 (0.403) 0.132 (0.794) 0.010 (0.570) 
DENSM3 0.422 (0.354) 0.457 (0.368) 0.445 (0.776) 0.310 (0.528) 
DENSM4 0.784 (0343)* 0.835 (0.358)* 0.866 (0.783) 0.504 (0513) 
DENSM5 0.708 (0.350)* 0.743 (0.367)* 0.812 (0.784) 0.507 (0.523) 
CSHOP 0.185 (0.124) 0.177 (0.126) -0.007 (0.135) 0.097 (0.140) 
MUNION 0.112 (0.130) 0.084 (0.133) 0.304 (0.159) -0.053 (0.149) 
firm: 
MANUF -0.017 (0.146) - - - - - - 
SINGLE -0.180 (0.188) -0.277 (0.202) 0.038 (0.236) -0.510 (0.252)* 
EMPASS -0.001 (0.117) 0.008 (0.122) -0.032 (0.137) -0.042 (0.131) 
LEVEL 0.147 (0.117) 0.104 (0.124). -0.011. (0.135) 0.171 (0.129) 
FINPERF -0.079 (0.112) -0.048 (0.113) -0.009 (0.126) -0.073 (0.123) 
MANY 0.102 (0.113), 0.100- (0.115) 0.089 (0.132) 0.141 (0.125) 
workers: 
P_FE -0.243 (0.269) -0.231 (0.277) '"" 0.131-- (0.302) -0.272 (0.3 14) - 
P_PT -1.521 (0.483)* -1.560 (0.512)* -0.951 (0.624) -1.264 (0.630)* P SK 0.403 (0.305) -0.399 (0316) 0.297. (0.389)- 0.509 (0.363) PBR 0.124 (0.119) 0.120 (0.120) 0.141 (0.136) 0.029 (0.129) 
SHIFT 0.252 (0.140) 0.275 (0.144)* - 0.073- (0.177) 0.308 (0.166) 
Industry 
Effects: NO YES YES - YES 
RHO 0.505 ( 0.061)* - -- 
Diagnostics 
n " 668 668 668 
lnL -371.58 -365.11 -664.86 
HETSIZE 5.20 (11.07) 2.92 (11.07) 8.08 (11.07) 3.14 (11.07) 
FF 6.68 (7.81) 4.73 " (7.81) - -5.86. (7.81) -- - 2.63 (7.81) NN 4.90 (5.99) 2.92 (5.99) 2.32 (5.99) 1.89 (5.99) 
OSIZE 8.37 (11.07) 8.13 (11.07) 8.83 (11.07) 8.59 (11.07) 
INDY 12.04 (14.07) N/A N/A N/A 
Notes: 
1. See table 4.5A. 
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Table A4.2 - 
Description of Variables and Weighted Means . ". 
Private Sector Manual Workers 
All Unionised 
Establishments Establishments 
Key Description of Variable 1980 1984 1980 1984 
Any Industrial Action 0.151 0.107 0.311 0.232 
Any Strike Action 0.106 0.060 0.216 0.131 
Any Non-Strike Action 0.098 0.080 0.200 0.176 
MWREP Manual Worker Representative Interviewed 0.377 0.277 0.714, 0.630 
size: 
ESIZE1 Establishment size 25- 49 0.520 0.510 . 0.385 0.402 ESIZE2 Establishment size 50- 99 0.259 0.270 0.278 0.280 
ESIZE3 Establishment size 100- 199 0.120 0.126, 0.162 0.164 
ESIZE4 Establishment size 200- 499 0.068 0.067 0.111 0.102 
ESIZE5 Establishment size 500- 999 0.019 0.017 0.037 0.033 
ESIZE6 Establishment size1000 + 0.013 0.009 0.026 0.019 
union: 
UNION Manual Union Members Recognised 0.452 0.441 1.000 1.000 
DENSMI Manual Union Density0% - 24% 0.532 0.561 0.077 0.112 
DENSM2 Manual Union Density25% -49% 0.077 0.083 0.117 0.130 
DENSM3 Manual Union Density50% -74% 0.071 0.080 0.144 0.160 
DENSM4 Manual Union Density75% -99% 0.140 0.159 0.294 0.338 
DENSMS Manual Union Density100% 0.180 0.117 0.368 0.260 
CSHOP Closed Shop for Some Workers 0.183 0.128 0.405 0.291 
MUNION Multiple Unions at Establishment 0.174 0.166 0.319 0.342 
firm: 
MANUF Manufacturing Establishment 0.396 0.377 0.560 0.476 
SINGLE Single Establishment Enterprise 0.315 0.297 0.192 0.207 
EMPASS Member of Employers' Association 0.303 0.244 0.450 0.377 
LEVEL Plant Level Bargaining 0.125 0.105 0.275 0.239 
FINPERF Above Average Financial Performance 0.389 0.405 0.365 0.372 
workers: 
_ 
PFE Proportion Female 0.207 0.145 0.181. 0.140 
_PT 
P Proportion Part Time 0.185 0.166 0.114 0.116 
P_SK Proportion Skilled 0.202 0.197 0.241 0.249 
PBR Payment by Results for Manuals 0.243 0.197 0.317 0.253 
SHIFT Shift Work at Establishment 0.343 0.361 0.405 0.418 
n Number of Observations 1197 . 
1048 777 668 
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..., 
CHAPTERS, 
Is the Public Sector Strike Prone? 1 
5.1. Introduction. 
During the rail dispute of summer 1989 the Prime Minister of the day suggested in the 
House of Commons that such things would not happen in the private sector and 
agreed with a questioner that privatisation would reduce the likelihood of strikes, 
declaring that, 
... privatised services are less likely to strike than public ones. 
"2 
While it is not directly stated, the implicit assertion behind such statements is that, 
ceteris paribus, an establishment is less likely to experience a strike if it is in the 
private sector than if it is in the public sector. There is however little empirical 
evidence available on which to judge the veracity of this hypothesis. This chapter 
provides an empirical analysis based on two very different types of data and examines 
what support there is for the proposition. 
The data utilised in the analysis presented below corresponds to that used in the 
previous two chapters of the thesis; strike frequency and establishment-level strike 
incidence. The first approach is based on establishment-level data from the 1980 and 
1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys as utilised in chapter 4. The raw 
frequencies given by Millward and Stevens (1986, table 10.2) indicate that the 
proportion of establishments reporting at least one strike in the twelve months prior to 
interview was higher in the public sector than in the private sector for both the 
1. The majority of the work in this chapter represents joint research with my thesis supervisor Mark Stewart. 
2.29 June 1969. Hansard. Sixth Series, Volume 155, p. 1105. 
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services and manufacturing sectors in both 1980 and 19843: It is important, to recall 
that the Workplace, Industrial, Relations Surveys do not include, establishments in 
coal-mining, and thus the potential distortion in the statistics arising from the high 
stoppage activity in this sector; and described in chapter 3 of the thesis, is avoided. 
However- the " figures given by Millward and Stevens are proportions of all 
establishments including non-union ones while strikes are extremely rare where there 
are no union members as seen in table 4.4. As is well known, union presence is much 
greater in the public sector, both in terms of membership and in terms of recognition 
and this potentially distorts the comparison between the sectors. The focus here will 
be on the probability of a unionised establishment experiencing a strike. 
The first panel of table 5.1 presents the raw strike incidence figures from the two 
surveys for the public - and private sectors with attention restricted to those 
establishments in which there are union members and the union or unions are 
recognised by management4. While the broad' picture is the same as reported by 
Millward and Stevens, the differences between the public and private sector are much 
reduced, and in 1980 for " manual workers, strikes were more likely in private 
manufacturing than in the nationalised industries. 
However this comparison still does not address the ceteris paribus question posed 
above, since public and private sector establishments differ systematically in a 
number of important ways which might reasonably be expected to be related to the 
probability of a strike occurring. One covariate serves to clearly illustrate this point. 
There is considerable evidence that large plants are more likely to experience strikes 
than small ones and plants are on average larger in the public sector. The remaining 
3. Millward & Stevens record a strike having occured if either the management or worker representative reports a 
strike. This is the same strategy that has been adopted in the previous chapter of the thesis. 
4. The responses of both management and worker representatives are combined as advocated by Millward & 
Stevens (1986, p. 263) while the statistics in this and the following tables in this section are weighted to account for 
the stratified sampling used in the two surveys (see Millward & Stevens (1986, pp. 329-332)). 
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panels of table 5.1 present corresponding figures, separately for establishments with 
less than 100,100 to-499; and `500 - or- more employees: - Further reductions. in* the 
differences between the , public and private sectors are-evident when attention in 
restricted to larger establishments. It is clearly important to control for establishment 
size and other factors when comparing strike probabilities between the public and 
private sectors. 
A second important covariate is also worth mentioning at this . stage: The conceptual 
experiment- under consideration in this chapter is the transfer of a public sector 
establishment into the private sector; ceteris paribus. In this hypothetical comparison 
it is important to control for the product market conditions faced by the establishment. 
These are-, of course typically very different for public and " private sector 
establishments. As discussed below, -there are likely to be greater incentives for both 
management and unions to avoid strike activity in firms facing a high degree of 
competition in the product market. The 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
contains some limited information on this, but the corresponding questions were not 
asked in 1980. In 1984 there is a marked tendency for private sector unionised 
establishments which face many' competitors to be less prone to strike action. For 
manual workers 10% of private sector establishments that faced many competitors 
experienced strike activity compared with 17% of those who were the dominant 
organisation in the market or faced few competitors. The corresponding figures for 
non-manual workers were 5% and 15% respectively. The impact of the extent of 
product market competition clearly also needs to be considered in any comparison. 
The first objective of this chapter is to consider the ceteris paribus difference in the 
probability of a strike between otherwise comparable establishments in the public and 
private sectors using the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data, controlling for 
as many relevant and appropriate covariates as possible. There are, however, a 
number of problems, with this establishment-based approach to the question. 
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Therefore comparisons are also made between the sectors - on ' the basis of strike 
frequency measures constructed from the official Department of- Employment 
industrial stoppages data as used in chapter 3. This provides the second approach to 
the question posed in the title to the chapter. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2.1 presents a brief 
discussion of the previously published evidence pertaining to differences in the strike 
propensities of the public and private sectors. This leads to the formulation of an 
empirical model for the determination of the probability of strike action at the 
establishment level which allows the required ceteris paribus comparisons between 
the private and public sectors to be made. Essentially this is a modified version of the 
specification considered in chapter 4. The empirical results of this analysis are 
presented in section 5.2.2. The results of the alternative approach based on adjusted 
strike frequency measures are reported in section 5.3 and some concluding comments 
presented in section 5.4. 
5.2. Public-Private Strike Differentials: Evidence from the WIRS. 
5.2.1. Evidence from Previous Studies of Strike Activity. 
The majority of empirical studies for the UK have been time-series econometric 
analyses of aggregate strike frequency. However, none of them have addressed 
directly, and few throw any light on, the question of interest here. In particular, no 
comparisons are made between public and private sector strikes. There have also been 
a number of studies examining inter-industry differences in strike activity, but again 
little attention has been paid to differences between the private and public sectors. 
The two published studies which utilise the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys 
discussed in section 4.4 above (Blanchflower & Cubbin (1986) (hereafter B&CUB) 
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who utilise WIRS80 and Booth & Cressy (1990) (hereafter B&CRE) who, use 
WIRS84) also fail to provide satisfactory information, on which to consider the 
question being posed in this chapter. Both papers use a_measure of strike activity 
based solely on the management questionnaire, taking no account of the responses 
from worker representatives and the discrepancies between the two. However, Daniel 
& Millward (1983) suggest that, 
"... reliance upon a single respondent's account will almost certainly 
lead to underestimation of the extent of industrial action" (p. 216). 
They therefore advise integrating the reports of managers and workers wherever 
possible. The differences are indeed quite large and both B&CUB and B&CRE 
understate the extent of industrial action by around one quarter. 
A public sector dummy variable is included by B&CUB to control for the fact that 
this sector had 
".., experienced considerable industrial unrest over the relevant period" 
(p. 27). 
However, a negative coefficient is then estimated in all three specifications used5, in 
contrast to this justification for the variable's inclusion. But since the commentary 
then reports that 
"... as expected, the manufacturing sector, public sector and 
engineering industry dummies are also statistically significant with a 
positive coefficient" (p. 33), 
the picture is somewhat unclear. 
Non-union establishments are included in the B&CUB sample and the coefficient on 
the union recognition dummy found to be significantly negative in the short strike 
equation, and significantly positive in the long strike equation. They suggest that this 
may reflect 
"... the use of short strikes in attempts to gain recognition. " (p. 35), 
5. It is significant in the 'any action' and longer strike' equations. It has a similar numerical value in the equation 
for shorter strikes, but is insignificantly different from zero. 
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However, : on the basis -of - the definition of : strike. action used (management 
respondents only) the 1980 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data indicate 
almost no strikes in establishments without recognised unions6 At a conceptual level; 
the comparison required for the focus of attention in this chapter is between unionised 
establishments. - 
B&CRE test a private information model . similar. in many respects to the work of 
Tracy (1987). They exclude much of the public sector from their study, arguing that 
their model in which. organisation profitability is a prime- concern is only strictly- 
relevant to the private sector. However, they do include bodies such as government- 
owned limited companies and the nationalised industries along with the private sector 
establishments, arguing that for these'quasi-public'bodies the 
"... profitability of the organisation is arguably relevant to the union's 
wage demands" (p. 280). 
The coefficient on the dummy variable for these 'quasi-public' bodies is negative, but 
insignificantly different from zero. However two relevant 1-digit industry dummies 
are also included. Both have significant positive effects. One is for transport, post and 
telecommunications and the other is for an amalgam of industries dominated by 
electricity, gas and water. They too include non-union establishments in their sample, 
and include measures of union density separately for establishments where unions are 
recognised and for where they are not. This makes interpretation somewhat difficult. 
In addition, as noted above, there are very few strikes in establishments which are not 
unionised. 
Neither study seems to provide satisfactory information to form a judgement on the 
question being posed in this chapter. In addition both papers include a number of 
variables that would not seem suitable as exogenous controls; for example, an index 
6. In establishments without recognised unions, only 2% of management respondents reported strike action 
(compared to over 14% in unionised establishments) and furthermore, a mere 0.6% reported the incidence of long' 
strikes. 
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of capital utilisation, changes in the value of sales (included in B&CRE) and the 
existence of short-time working in the previous year (in B&CUB); In the next sub- 
section a model is formulated and estimated for the probability of strike activity at an 
establishment explicitly to estimate the ceteris paribus difference y in -this probability 
between the public and private sectors. 
S. Y 
5.2.2. Establishment-level Analysis of the Probability of a Strike.? 
In this section Probit models for the probability of a strike at an establishment in the 
previous twelve months are estimated using data from the 1980 and-1984 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Surveys. Although very similar in nature; the questionnaires used 
in the two years were not identical. For example the information on the number of 
competitors faced referred to in the introduction is only available in 1984. However 
for purposes of comparison a consistent specification is required., Two alternative 
strategies are adopted. Initially the control variables selected are restricted to those 
which appeared in both surveys. Subsequently, for 1984 only, we investigate the 
incorporation of product market competition effects into the model. As in chapter 4 
and section 5.1, strike action is deemed to have taken place if either the management 
or the worker representative reported strike action to have occurred in the previous 
twelve months in order to minimise the effects of incomplete recall by respondents. 
The robustness of the results to this particular course of action is considered below. 
Given the differences illustrated in table 5.1, it is evident that separate equations 
should be estimated for manual and non-manual workers. In addition the samples are 
restricted to those establishments that recognised unions for, the purposes of 
bargaining. 
A description and summary statistics of the variables used is given in the appendix to 
this chapter, table A5.1. Two specifications of the control vector are used. The first 
7. The estimation in this section of the chapter is conducted using Limdep (Greene (1990,1991)). , 
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contains only establishment, size 1 variables, while _ the second 
incorporates the 
additional variables reflecting other major differences between the establishments in 
each sector as outlined above8. Controls for the size of the organisation as opposed to 
the establishment are not included. This is because the focus of attention here is on 
the public-private difference and in, this case it is not clear. that- one would wish to 
control for organisational size if the conceptual experiment under consideration is the 
transfer of a public sector plant. into the private- sector. Related, to this, there are 
worries about how the questions on organisational size are interpreted and answered 
by establishments in the public sector. This difficulty of interpretation is supported by 
the fact that in 1984 among non-single establishments, 25.5% of those in local or, 
central government replied 'don't know' when asked roughly how many employees the 
organisation of which they were a part employed in the UK as compared with 9.2% of 
private sector limited companies. Therefore, - controls for this are not included in our 
basic model, although diagnostic checks are conducted for the possibility of it being a 
relevant omitted factor. 
To each of the vectors of controls is added a set of dummy variables to capture the 
sectoral effects of interest. Again two versions are employed. Variant A uses one 
dummy variable to indicate whether the establishment is in the production sector and 
another to indicate whether it is in the public sector. The base group is thus private 
sector service establishments and there is a constraint that the production effect is the 
same in the public and private sectors, or equivalently that the public sector effect is 
the same in the production and service sectors. The differential implied by the 
coefficient on the public sector dummy will be the one of interest here. Variant B lifts 
this restriction by including dummy variables for establishments in the nationalised 
industries, those in the services sector and those in the public services sector. In this 
8. In essence, this is because size is a'scale effect' and thus controlling for size enables the focus to be concentrated 
on 'scale-flee differences in strike propensities. However, other differences between establishments also warrant 
consideration since these would presumably also remain essentially unchanged whatever sector the establishment 
is in. Hence we are also interested in the differences derived from the second vector of control variables. 
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case the base group consists of private manufacturing establishments and the - two 
public sector differentials implied by the coefficients on the nationalised industries 
and public services dummies are the focus of attention. 
The central focus in this chapter is on the ceteris paribus differences in strike activity 
between comparable public and private sector establishments. The probabilities of 
strike action in the two sectors for an establishment with a given set of characteristics 
can be written °4? N 
Pr(Strikel D=O, X') = c(k) (5.1) 
Pr(Strikel D=1, X') = (1)(k+ß) (5.2) 
where ß is the coefficient on D, the public sector dummy variable of interest, X* is a 
particular valuation of the control vector and k= X'y, with y the vector of coefficients 
on the Xs. Then the proportionate ceteris paribus difference in the probability of a 
strike is given by 
A= (D(k+ß) - (D(k) " (5.3) 
(D(k) 
Clearly the differential varies with the value of k. For summary purposes a 
representative value is chosen. While there are several possibilities, one of the easiest 
to implement and interpret is that given as the solution to c(k) = p, where p is the 
sample proportion of establishments in the base sector which incur strike action. Then 
A= {[ (D"1(p)+ß)Vp} -1 (5.4) 
Thus A is the proportionate increase in the probability of a strike for an establishment 
with characteristics which give it a strike probability equal to the sample proportion 
of establishments in the base sector experiencing a strike. 
The estimated Probit coefficients and implied differentials for both variants of the 
model and both specifications of the control vector are given in table 5.2. The table 
also gives the raw (unweighted) differentials. These indicate that for manual workers 
in 1980, the public sector was 42% less strike prone, while for non-manual workers in 
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1984, it was 167% more strike prone than the private sector. For the other two cases 
(non-manual workers in 1980 and manual workers in, 1984) the raw differentials are 
small in comparison. 'A' further, decomposition into production and service sectors 
indicates that the 1980 manual workers result is driven by the relatively low level of 
strike action in the. nationalised industries.: In contrast, the apparent strike proneness 
of non-manual workers in the public sector in 1984 results from a very high relative 
level -of strike activity . in the. public: - services sector; almost 
40% of such 
establishments had experienced at least one strike in the previous twelve month 
period, while the comparative figure for private service establishments was only 16%. 
This difference is likely to be partly due to the teachers' disputes of that year. 
For non-manual workers in 1980, the proportionate public-private differences for the 
production and service sectors are actually quite high at 34% and 45% respectively. 
However, these statistics are derived from low group averages and, in aggregate, the 
public and private sector means are quite similar. As a result, the proportionate 
difference is fairly small at under 12%. For manual workers in 1984, although over 
40% of establishments in the nationalised industries experienced strike action in the 
previous twelve' months, - this comprises a relatively. small proportion of the public 
sector total, while the -33% of private manufacturing establishments reporting strike 
action is based on a much larger proportion of the private sector. Thus in aggregate, 
the public and private sector probabilities are once again similar, with a proportionate 
difference of only 3%. 
The -introduction of controls -for establishment size (specification 1) reduces the 
magnitude of the two large raw differentials and increases that of the other two. 
Manual workers in 1980 have a significant negative differential even after controlling 
for establishment size, while in the other three cases the differential is significantly 
positive. The introduction of the further controls in specification 2 renders both 
differentials for 1980 insignificantly different from zero. Those for 1984 are both 
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significant and positive. - That for non-manuals is further reduced, but is - still: very 
large. Likelihood-ratio tests indicate that in all cases a single equation with a public 
sector dummy is acceptable against separate equations for the two sectors.. --t, I 
The results for variant B are also presented in table 5.2.. In this case the base group 
differs for the two public sector differentials. For the nationalised industry effect, the 
differential is calculated relative to private manufacturing while the public service 
differential is measured relative to the average- private sector service establishment. 
For the nationalised industries for specification 1, the proportionate probability effects 
are all significant and greater than their comparable raw differences in the top of the 
table, and this is a consequence of the rather perverse size distribution in the sample9. 
However, once the additional controls are included as in specification 2, the As are all 
smaller than those derived under specification 1 and there are no significant 
differences in strike proneness between the nationalised industries and the base of 
private manufacturing, although for non-manuals in 1980 the effect is quite large. 
For service sector employees in 1980, there were no significant differences in strike 
propensities between-.. public and private service establishments in either 
specification 1 or specification 2. In 1984, however, : public sector -. service 
establishments were significantly more strike prone than their private sector 
counterparts. The effect is very large for non-manual workers, and while this is 
smaller once all the controls are included in the equation as in specification 2, it is not 
reduced much below the raw proportionate difference of 149%. Again the strategy of 
estimating a single equation rather than separate public and private equations is not 
rejected for either specification. 
9. This rather unexpected result is a consequence of the fact that for the unionised sample under consideration, the 
private sector establishments are, on average, larger than the public sector establishments. Thus controlling for 
establishment size increases the public sector relative strike probability and hence the proportionate differences in 
the probability of a strike are greater than the raw differentials. 
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The final section of table S. 2 presents likelihood ratio tests. of the restrictions implied 
by variant A against variant B. Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, for most of the groups 
of workers and for both specifications, distinguishing the production and services 
effects is not required by the data in general, and thus Variant A-with just the 
production and public sector dummies is data - sufficient. The one exception is non- 
manual workers in 1984, and thus- this grouping requires separate production and 
services dummies as in Variant B. 
Diagnostic tests for the models presented in -table 5.2 are- given in table 5.3. It is 
important in empirically based models of the kind used here to test for various forms 
of potential misspecification of the chosen econometric specification. Table 5.3 
presents score tests for heteroskedasticity, functional form misspecification, non- 
normality 
.., 
and omitted variables in the two specifications of the two variants of the 
model presented in table 5.210. 
For the models for manual workers in both 1980 and 1984, the diagnostic test 
statistics are satisfactory, both with and without the additional controls of 
specification 2. The model for non-manual workers in 1980 has satisfactory 
diagnostics once the additional explanatory variables are introduced in 
specification 2. Without them there is considerable evidence of misspecification. The 
diagnostics for the 1984 non-manual workers models indicate serious misspecification 
and in this case the problems are not solved by the introduction of the extra controls 
of specification 2. As seen by the likelihood-ratio test in table 5.2, variant B of the 
model is required for this group but there is still strong evidence of heteroscedasticity 
with respect to establishment size and of omitted organisation size effects (although 
earlier caveats with regard to this variable need to be kept in mind). Thus some 
caution should be applied to the results for this group. One might suspect that the 
10. The tests, based on the concept of generalised residuals (Gourieroux et al, (1987)), are described in Chesher 
and Irish (1987). 
1 
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wide-spread disputes in, education in the particular year covered may dominate the 
results for this group. This possibility is investigated further below. "-I 
First however it seems useful to summarise the results for this basic set of 
specifications. Once adequate controls have been introduced for the dissimilarities 
between sectors, most of the raw differences are found not to be significant at 
conventional levels. This conclusion is applicable to both production and service 
sectors. Despite this, the differentials in some cases, though statistically insignificant, 
are quite large. For example for non-manual workers in the, nationalised industries in 
1980 the probability differential - is 51%. Significant differentials are found for the 
public services - sector in 1984. In - the case of non-manual workers, such 
establishments were more than twice as likely to incur strike action as their equivalent 
private service sector workplaces. There are however doubts about the specification 
of the model for this group., 
The conceptual experiment under consideration in this chapter is the transfer of a 
public sector establishment into the private sector, ceteris paribus. It might 
reasonably be argued that the estimated models presented so far do not correspond to 
such an experiment, since they do not control for the product market conditions faced 
by the establishment, which are typically very different for public and private sector 
establishments. As indicated in the introduction, the 1984 survey contains some 
limited information * on this for private sector establishments, but the corresponding 
questions were not asked in 1980. The relevant questions were also not asked of head 
offices or other administrative establishments. The information provided is in three 
categories; whether the market is dominated by the organisation, whether there were 
'few' competitors or whether there were 'many'. The question is asked with respect to 
the establishment's sole, main or range of products as determined by other questions, 
to be appropriate. For the purposes of the analysis in this chapter, the first two 
categories are amalgamated as in Stewart (1990) and referred to as facing 'non- 
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competitive' conditions, - while those facing', many competitors are labelled 
'competitive'. ,. "- `. A. " 
In firms faced with a high degree of competition, there are stronger incentives for 
both management and unions to avoid strike activity. For the firm, any disruption to 
production is liable to lead to a rapid erosion of market share since other firms are 
easily able to provide similar products. For the union, potential closure presents a 
greater threat to their job security than in firms facing less competitive conditions, and 
thus they too should be more willing to concede demands and reach a settlement. 
However note that private information theories of strike behaviour predict a negative 
correlation between the size of the rents for division and the probability of a strike. 
Given that the rents are greater in firms facing less' competitive conditions, this 
suggests the opposite. Public 'sector establishments typically face little or no 
(domestic) competition and therefore the impact of this factor requires some 
investigation. 
This distinction is incorporated into the strike probability model by dividing private 
sector establishments into those, facing competitive and non-competitive product 
market conditions; interactive dummies for head-offices and missing information are 
also included. The results are given in table 5.4. For variant A, the base group for 
comparison now becomes private sector establishments facing non-competitive 
conditions. The public sector ceteris paribus differentials are smaller than those given 
in table 5.2 and are all no longer significantly different from zero (although for non- 
manuals this occurs, only when the full set of controls is included as in 
specification 2). However, as can be seen from the likelihood ratio test statistics at the 
bottom of the table, variant B of the model in which the production and service 
sectors are distinguished is required for both manual and non-manual workers. For the 
nationalised industries, the ceteris paribus difference in strike probability is now 
measured relative to private manufacturing establishments facing non-competitive 
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conditions, while for the public service sector, the. As' are calculated relative to non- 
competitive private sector -service establishments. For manual workers, the 
differentials are insignificant, while those. for non-manuals are substantially reduced 
compared to, those in table 5.2, and are again insignificant once a full vector of 
controls is included in the model. However, the diagnostics for table 5.4 presented in 
table 5.5 indicate that there are still problems- with the econometric specification of 
the equation for non-manual workers in this year... 
Further investigation of this issue seems warranted, and in particular, the role played 
by the disputes in the education sector. For variant A, public sector establishments 
were dichotomised into schools and non-schools, and separate differentials calculated 
for each sub-sector, both measured relative to the non-competitive private sector. For 
variant B, the public service sector establishments were partitioned, and differentials 
calculated relative to private service establishments facing non-competitive 
conditions. The proportionate probability differences relative to private services for 
the schools are much higher than for non-school establishments and the -latter are 
small and insignificantll. The diagnostics, indicate a more satisfactory specification 
although the statistic for the test for non-normality is now (marginally) significant and 
there remains evidence of omitted organisation size effects. In conclusion it would 
appear that much of the public sector effect ' for non-manual workers in 1984 is 
attributable to the educational disputes of that year, and for the remainder of the 
public sector, the ceteris paribus difference is again negligible and insignificant. 
Another issue requiring further consideration is the definition of the dependent 
variable being used. This has been based on the combined responses of management 
and worker respondents to minimise the impact of imperfect and, incomplete recall. 
The degree of disagreement between the survey participants in reporting strike action 
11. Variant B, specification 2 gives As of 1.573 for schools and 0.098 for non-school service establishments. 
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is considerable. Interestingly, there would appear to be greater, disagreement between 
management and worker respondents in the public- sector than in. the private sector 
(with the exception of non-manuals in 1984). The impact of this disagreement on the 
estimated ceteris paribus differentials is investigated in a number of ways. A potential 
problem with the approach adopted above is that in some establishments no worker 
representative was - 
interviewed., There were two main -" reasons - for , this in 
establishments that recognised unions. The first was that the management respondent 
could identify no worker representative at the establishment; and the second was 
refusal by management to allow an interview with the worker representative. In these 
establishments the dependent variable used so far is therefore constructed on the basis 
of the management questionnaire only. As a result there is likely to be an under- 
reporting of strikes in these establishments. This may distort the estimated effects. 
As a first method of examining this a dummy variable indicating these establishments 
is included in the model. This makes very little difference to the As reported in 
table 5.2. An alternative is to rely solely on the management questionnaire to indicate 
strike activity. This results in about 20% of the strikes captured by the variable used 
so far being lost. To the extent that the differences are systematic, this will induce a 
bias in the estimated coefficients. The results from re-estimating the models described 
above for this strike variable show the estimated As to generally have the same sign 
and similar magnitude. One exception is manual workers in 1984 where management 
respondents reported substantially fewer strikes especially in the public sector. As a 
result the public sector differential is cut by about a third. As a final alternative, the 
models were re-estimated with the establishments in which there was no worker 
representative interview excluded. Again the magnitudes of the estimated differentials 
are similar. A major problem with both these latter methods is that management 
refusal to allow an interview with the worker representative may not be exogenous 
with respect to the recent strike record at the establishment. 
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The above analysis focuses solely on whether an-establishment experienced any strike 
action during the twelve month period prior to the interview. It does not take account 
of the fact that many of. the establishments that did had more than one- strike during 
the period or that, in some cases, strikes involve more than one establishment. On the 
first. of these, points, the Workplace -Industrial. Relations Survey provide some 
information on the frequency of strikes at a given establishment. A Poisson model for 
this count variable produced qualitatively " similar estimates of the public-private 
differential to those -presented above. The second- of the -above points cannot be 
addressed using the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey but is taken account of in 
the next section where a frequency-based approach is adopted., 
5.3. A Comparison of Adjusted Strike Frequency Measures. 12 
For a number of reasons, the analysis based on the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys in the previous section cannot provide a full picture of the differences 
between public and private sector strike activity. Firstly, it is establishment based. 
This means that figures can be dominated by a single strike that covered many 
establishments as noted above with reference to the national engineering and teaching 
disputes. This raises the interesting question of whether the comparison that should be 
made should be based, as in the previous section, on the probability of an 
establishment having at least one strike in a twelve month period or on some other 
probability. Potential alternatives include the probability of a given bargaining pair 
producing a strike in a given period, the probability of a given round of contract 
negotiations leading to a strike, the number of strikes per establishment during a given 
period, the number of strikes per employee during the period, the number of strikes 
per union member during the period and so on. Secondly, the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey data is a sample and although designed to be representative 
inevitably has rather small numbers of observations in certain cells. Thirdly, the 
12. The analysis in this section utilises the Stata package, version 2 (Stata (1990)). 
208 
Workplace Industrial Relations Survey only provide survey, information for -two 
particular years and this, does not permit the identification of any trends in the -relative 
strike proneness of the two sectors. 
This section presents an alternative approach to the public vs private sector strike 
question based on the Industrial Stoppages data files compiled by the Department of 
Employment. This source alleviates many of the weaknesses described above; ' it 
comprises all strikes13,, and records stoppages with a' common, 'cause' as a single 
stoppage, regardless of the number of workplaces affected. In addition it covers a 
fairly long time period and hence can be used to identify any trends. 
Table 5.6 presents summary data for strikes in the public and private sectors for 1974 
to 198414. In aggregate,, the declining total number of strikes throughout the 1970s 
and into the 1980s (from the unprecedented peak of 3,906 stoppages- in 1970) can be 
seen to result entirely from the fall in the number of strikes in the private sector. The 
frequency of public sector strikes shows no discernible trend and thus movements in 
total strike frequency are dominated by those for the private sector15. The latter 
comprised over 80% of the total at the start of the period, but only aound 60% ten 
years later. In addition the number of strikes in the public sector displays much less 
variability around its mean as shown by the coefficients of variation at the bottom of 
the table. The figures deflated by number of employees indicate that strikes per 
13. The Department of Employment collates information from local Unemployment Benefit Offices, returns from 
Nationalised Industries, public bodies and large firms, reports in the national and local press and, for some larger 
stoppages, directly from the organisations involved. There obviously exist problems in ensuring complete coverage 
and partly for this reason, stoppages involving fewer than ten workers and those lasting less than one day are 
excluded from the statistics unless the total number of working days lost exceeds one hundred. 
14. Although the tapes are also available for 1966-1973, there is no public sector coding for these years. One 
possibility would be to (subjectively) allocate strikes to the public and private sectors according to their SIC 
classification since this information is given on the tapes. However, it was considered preferable to work with a 
consistently compiled series, and hence the analysis is restricted to 1974 onwards. The omission of statistics for 
1981 is due to current data deficiencies. 
15. The correlation between the series for total and public sector strikes is only 0.07, while that for total and 
private sector strikes is 0.99. 
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employee in the publicsector were about one third lower than in the private sector in 
the 1970s, but almost 50% higher than in the private sector in the 1980s. However as 
before . this turn-around is, due to changes 
in the private sector, with, public sector 
strikes per employee showing no discernible trend. 
If union membership is taken as the deflator a rather different picture emerges for the 
early 1980s, since union density is considerably greater in the public sector than in the 
private sector. As a rough calculation, the density by sector figures from Bailey and 
Kelly (1990) is applied to the years 1982-84. They estimate union density to be 29.6% 
in the private sector and 69.0% in the public sector. The next panel for each sector in 
table 5.6 gives estimated figures per union member. Strikes per union member are 
found to be higher in the private sector than the public sector in the early 1980s. - 
Clearly the same will be true of the 1970s. 
Table 5.6 also indicates that- typically strikes in the private sector involve more 
workers than those in the public sector. Hence if one wants to adopt an individual- 
based measure of strike activity, the figures for strike frequency will overstate the 
relative activity in the public sector. An estimate of the number of 'strikers', per 
employee for each sector is also presented in table 5.6 and reveals that while the 
private sector was comparatively more strike prone in the 1970s, the individual-level 
strike intensity of the two sectors was not substantially different in the 1980s. 
Several explanations can be advanced for these important findings. The relatively 
high levels of unionisation found in the public sector may imply that, although there 
is a greater tendency for strike action, there also exists well-defined and established 
negotiation and bargaining structures which can be invoked to generate earlier 
settlements and prevent the spread of the dispute beyond the immediate group of 
employees involved. Alternatively, or additionally, public sector employers may 
conceed more easily to workers' claims since they do not face the same competitive 
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pressures as private sector employers. Certainly, product market conditions were seen 
to be important in. the analysis of strike incidence in section 5.2. Unfortunately, 
further details of the strike or terms of settlement are not included on the Department 
of Employment tapes, and hence these (or. any other) rationales cannot be 
discriminated in any way. In particular, - the. kind of ceteris paribus comparisons made 
in the previous section utilising the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data 
cannot be repeated since there is no base group against which to. compare those 
situations which resulted in strike action. 
As an alternative to the number of strikes per head one might wish to compare the 
number of strikes per establishment. To do this, the measures of strike frequency from 
the Department of Employment tapes is combined with the size distribution of 
establishments taken from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. One immediate 
problem is that the Department of Employment tapes do not identify the exact starting 
date of each of the stoppages (only the year) and hence the strikes series cannot be 
matched to the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey compilation period which had 
a median survey date of sometime in May for both survey years (Millward & Stevens 
(1986, pp. 323-324)). However, it seems likely that the size distribution of 
establishments changes very slowly over time, and hence strike frequency for both 
1979 and 1980 is related to Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1980, while the 
number of strikes in both 1983 and 1984 are matched with Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey 1984. 
The distribution of establishments by sector16 and the total number of strikes together 
with the ratio, 0, of the proportion of strikes to the proportion of establishments are 
shown in table 5.7. It can be seen that the public sector comprised a rather higher 
proportion of all establishments in 1984 than in 1980, principally due to the 
16. These are weighted to account for the stratified sampling scheme used to compile the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey. 
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widespread closure of private sector manufacturing establishments in the recession of 
1980/81. The index of *ihtei=sectör'strike prörieness, ' 9, '- takes a value öf'u'ciity if the 
distribution of strikes exactly matches the distribution of establishments between 
sectors. Thus it can be seen that for 1979, the private sector was relatively more strike 
prone, while for 1980 and 1983, the public sector had a higher strike propensity. 
Finally, ' for 1984, the relative propensities per establishment can be seen to be 
approximately equal. 
To examine how these aggregate changes in strike propensities have been distributed 
across establishment size is a slightly more difficult exercise. Several qualifications 
need to be noted before the results are presented. Firstly, the analysis only includes 
strikes which occurred at a single establishment since the concept of 'establishment 
size' obviously has no meaning for multi-establishment strikes'7. This affects a 
disproportionately large number of the public sector strikes in 1979 and 1980 and thus 
the results in table 5.8 are biased to the extent that these more extensive strikes are 
omitted from the analysis. The exact coverage proportions for each year are given in 
the table for reference. Secondly, the sample of strikes chosen has been correctly 
selected to include only those which occurred at establishments with at least 
25 workers in order that the comparisons with Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 
are valid. Thirdly, the establishment size information for 1983 and 1984 is already 
grouped on the Department of Employment tapes, and the size bands chosen 
necessitate amalgamating the bottom two size divisions. This group, labelled 
Esizel & 2, therefore incorporates strikes at establishments with between 25 and 99 
workers. 
As expected public sector establishments are larger than private sector establishments, 
with higher proportions of public sector establishments in size categories 3 to 6 for 
17. Establishment size is not recorded for such strikes in the Department of Employment statistics. 
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both of the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys: Secondly, - the size'distribution of 
strikes is highly skewed; as noted above, strikes are much more' common at large': 
establishments and this is illustrated very clearly in table 5.8. Public sector strikes are 
more -heavily skewed to the left (i. e. concentrated 
to the' right) than private sector 
ones. However, this may simply reflect the skewness of- the size distribution of 
establishments and thus whether the relative size distribution differs between public 
and private sectors can only be ascertained by comparing the inter-establishment 
relative strike propensities. These are also presented in the table. A value of 0=1 
would indicate an exactly ' proportionate relationship between strikes and 
establishments and given the previously noted impact of size on strike propensity, it is 
expected that 0 will increase sharply with size and this is indeed evident from the 
table. More importantly in the current context, the Os for the private sector are almost 
without exception larger than those for the public sector in every size category. The 
interpretation is that while there are more strikes at larger establishments in both 
sectors yielding Os greater than unity, the private sector incurs single establishment 
strikes disproportionately more in every size category when compared to the public 
sector. That is, the private sector distribution of strikes is even more highly skewed to 
the left when compared to that of the public sector, having controlled for the relative 
skewness of the distribution of -establishment size. This would indicate that single 
establishment strikes are larger, on average, in the private sector. 
Although the principal focus of this chapter is on the incidence of strikes and/or the 
number of strike starts, it is of some interest to briefly compare the differences 
between the public and private sectors in some of the other dimensions of stoppages 
as recorded by the two sources of data utilised here. Firstly, in an identical manner to 
the investigation of the incidence of strikes using the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Surveys in section 5.2, proportionate probability differences for the relative incidence 
of non-strike action were calculated. -Once again, the combined responses of 
management and worker representatives were used in the construction of the 
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dependent variables. The raw incidence statistics. reveal that while manual workers in 
public sector establishments are less likely to take non-strike action than those in 
private sector establishments, for non-manual workers this pattern is reversed. This 
lower incidence of non-strike action among manual workers is seen to be confined 
mainly to the production sector, while the higher incidence among non-manual 
workers is principally a characteristic of the service sector. These observations are 
valid for both the 1980 and the 1984 Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys. 
However, once again, when a full vector of control vaiables is added to the equations, 
few of these differences are significant at conventioanl levels. 
In addition to the strike frequency statistics, the Department of Employment Industrial 
Stoppages Data Tapes also contain information on the size and duration of each 
stoppage, as well as the total number of days lost. Much of these data are only 
recorded as grouped measures. Table 5.9 presents summary statistics separately for 
the public and private sector for each of these other dimensions of strikes. The top 
panel disaggregates strikes by the number of workers involved and shows that strikes 
in the public sector tend to be smaller on average, with over one fifth involving less 
than 25 employees18. The second panel shows that public sector strikes are also 
typically of shorter duration; 45% last one day or less compared with a figure of only 
14% in this category for the private sector. At the other end of the scale, less than one 
fifth of public sector disputes last six days or more compared with almost one half of 
all private sector stoppages19. The final panel of the table reflects the combined 
impact of these observations since the mean number of days lost per strike is 
identically equal to the product of average strike size and duration. It can be seen that 
almost 60% of public sector stoppages result in fewer than 250 days lost, while 35% 
18. The figures for the median number of workers involved in table 5.6 are derived from these data. 
19. While the last of the duration categories encompasses nearly 20% of public sector strikes and over 45% of 
private sector strikes, more disaggregated statistics are actually available on the tapes for strikes in excess of 
6 days. However the grouping band intervals were changed from 1979 (from 12 groups to 11), and in consequence, 
a better consistent comparison across all eleven years is not available. 
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of private sector disputes lead to at least. 1; 000 days lost: Clearly further research into 
these rather marked distinctions between public and private sector stoppages is 
needed. 
5.4. Summary and Conclusions. 
This chapter has examined differentials between public and private sector strike 
activity. The empirical evidence from the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey data 
in section 5.2 reveals that the apparent greater propensity for strike action in the 
public sector is largely due to the characteristics of public sector establishments, 
which tend to be larger, more highly unionised and face less competitive product 
market conditions. The differentials between the sectors are very different for manual 
and non-manual workers. For manual workers the estimated differential in 1980 is 
roughly zero, while in 1984 a public sector establishment is 37% more likely to have 
had a strike than a comparable private sector one at the mean without control for 
product market conditions. it is 21% more likely than a comparable private sector 
establishment facing few competitors in the product market (but not statistically 
significant). 
The pattern of non-manual strikes is completely different. In 1980 there is a 
differential at the mean without control for product market factors of 21%. This is 
entirely due to the differential in the manufacturing sector, that in the services sector 
being zero. In 1984 the differential at the mean without control for product market 
factors is 89%. Incorporation of product market effects reduces this to 45%. Unlike in 
1980 this is found to be entirely due to the effect in the services sector. This in turn is 
entirely the result of the series of strikes in the school sector. The differential in the 
remainder of the services sector is less than 10% and statistically insignificant. 
One of the problems of using survey data to investigate such issues is apparent in the 
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analysis using the Workplace: Industrial Relations Surveys; single widespread disputes 
in the survey sampling period can dominate the statistics. The analysis'in"section 5.3 
based on aggregate strike frequency data is not able to distinguish manual and non- 
manual strikes. These aggregate strike frequency figures deflated by employment 
indicate that strikes per employee were lower in the public sector in the late 1970s 
and higher in the early 1980s. However this turn-around was seen to be due to 
frequency changes in the private sector. When frequency is deflated by an estimate of 
union membership in the sector, strikes per union member are found to also be lower 
in the early 1980s in the public sector than in the private sector. Strikes in the private 
sector are found on average to involve more' workers and to be of longer duration. 
Thus when a measure taking account of this is used the relative strike proneness of the 
public sector is further reduced. 
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Table 5.1 
Percentage of Establishments Experiencing Strikes Durin the Year by., 
Sector 
All establishments with union members and recognition 
Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man 
Sector 1980 1980 1984 1984 
Private Manufacturing 30 10- 18 5 
Nationalised Industries 24 17 31 10 
Private Services 10 4 9 13 
Public Services 12 10 10 39 
Total 18 9 13 27 
Establishments with less than 100 employees 
Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man 
Sector 1980 1980 1984 1984 
Private Manufacturing 21 0 10 2 
Nationalised Industries ' 25 21 29 8 
Private Services 9 1 6 12 
Public Services 9 8 7 38 
Total 13 6 9 27 
Establishments with 100-499 employees 
Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man 
Sector 1980 1980 1984 1984 
Private Manufacturing 37 11 23 6 
Nationalised Industries 19 10 31 12 
Private Services 11 14 15 13 
Public Services 17 13 17 41 
Total 24 12 20 26 
Establishments with more than 500 employees 
Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man 
Sector 1980 1980 1984 1984 
Private Manufacturing 56 23 46 10 
Nationalised Industries 44 23 45 18 
Private Services 53 31' 32 25 
Public Services 24 28 30 40 
Total 44 25 38 26 
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Table 5.2 
Ceteris Paribus Comparisons of the Probability of Strike Action 
Manual Non-Manual Manual Non-Manual 
1980 1980,, 1984 1984 
Number of Observations 1363 1277- 1405 1397 
Mean Strike Probability 0.311 (0.463) 0.154 (0.361) 0.283 (0.451) 0.252 (0.434) 
Raw Proportionate Probability differences: 
PUBLIC vs PRIVATE -0.416 0.117 0.034 1.667 
NATINDY vs PRIMANF -0.309 0.338 0.225 0.619 
PUBSERV vs PRISERV 0.101 0.445 0.384 1.491 
Variant A: Single Public dummy 
Spec 1: PROD coeff 0.480 (. 090) 0.022 (. 108) 0.346 (. 083) -0.506 (. 091) 
PUBLIC coeff -0.223 (. 090) 0.237 (. 103) 0.208 (. 082) 0.594 (. 086) 
A -0.217 0.420 0.265 1.299 
Spec 2: PROD coeff 0.144 (. 102) -0.035 (. 129) -0.047 (. 102) -0.454 (. 116) 
PUBLIC coeff 0.047 (. 105) 0.124 (. 119) 0.283 (. 097) 0.434 (. 108) 
A 0.048 0.209 0.366 0.888 
LR tests for single equation vs separate Public and Private equations: 
Specification 1 6.74 11.44 5.94 11.41 
Specification 2 18.10 21.76 23.38 25.58 
Variant B: Separate Production and Services effects 
Spec 1: NATINDYcoeff -0.352 (. 131) 0.362 (. 148) 0.276 (. 113) 0.342 (. 141) 
A -0.297 0.635 0.318 0.715 
SERVICE coeff -0.579 (. 118) 0.075 (. 152) -0.258 (. 121) 0.303 (. 141) 
PUBSERVcoeff -0.096 (. 128) 0.139 (. 142) 0.130 (. 120) 0.733 (. 113) 
A -0.136 0.266 0.202 1.496 
Spec 2: NATINDYcoeff -0.124 (. 152) 0.297 (. 173) 0.211 (. 131) 0.022 (. 174) 
A -0.108 0.508 0.241 0.039 
SERVICE coeff -0.278 (. 132) 0.167 (. 176) -0.007 (. 137) 0.124 (. 171) 
PUBSERVcoeff 0.203 (. 144) 0.002 (. 153) 0.350 (. 135) 0.627 (. 130) 
0 0.331 0.004 0.591 1.241 
LR tests for single equation vs separate Public and Private equations: 
Specification 1 5.52 10.16 6.37 3.67 
Specification 2 15.54 20.10 22.69 14.23 
LR tests on Variant A vs Variant B 
Specification 1 1.22 1.27 0.43 7.74* 
Specification 2 2.55 1.66 0.68 11.35* 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
Definitions and Notes .., - 
Variant A Sectoral dummies: PROD and PUBLIC 
Variant B Sectoral dummies: NATINDY, SERVICE and PUBSERV 
Specification 1 Vector of controls: ESIZE2-ESIZE6 
Specification 2 Vector of controls: ESIZE2-ESIZE6, PROP, P SK, P 
_PT, 
P FE, DENS, 
. MUNION, C SHOP, EMPASS, LEVEL, SINGLE 
A Proportionate change in probability of strike measured relative to the 
appropriate base (see text for detail) 
* Test statistic significant at 5% 
Standard errors are given in parentheses 
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Table 5.2 
Ceteris Paribus Comparisons of the Probability of Strike Action 
Manual Non-Manual Manual Non-Manual 
1980 1980. 1984 1984 
Number of Observations 1363 1277- 1405 1397 
Mean Strike Probability 0.311 (0.463) 0.154 (0.361) 0.283 (0.451) 0.252 (0.434) 
Raw Proportionate Probability differences: 
PUBLIC vs PRIVATE -0.416 0.117 0.034 1.667 
NATINDY vs PRIMANF -0.309 0.338 0.225 0.619 
PUBSERV vs PRISERV 0.101 0.445 0.384 1.491 
Variant A: Single Public dummy 
Spec 1: PROD coeff 0.480 (. 090) 0.022 (. 108) 0.346 (. 083) -0.506 (. 091) 
PUBLIC coeff -0.223 (. 090) 0.237 (. 103) 0.208 (. 082) 0.594 (. 086) 
A -0.217 0.420 0.265 1.299 
Spec 2: PROD coeff 0.144 (. 102) -0.035 (. 129) -0.047 (. 102) -0.454 (. 116) 
PUBLIC coeff 0.047 (. 105) 0.124 (. 119) 0.283 (. 097) 0.434 (. 108) 
1& 0.048 0.209 0.366 0.888 
LR tests for single equation vs separate Public and Private equations: 
Specification 1 6.74 11.44 5.94 11.41 
Specification 2 18.10 21.76 23.38 25.58 
Variant B: Separate Production and Services effects 
Spec 1: NATINDYcoeff -0.352 (. 131) 0.362 (. 148) 0.276 (. 113) 0.342 (. 141) 
A -0.297 0.635 0.318 0.715 
SERVICE coeff -0.579 (. 118) 0.075 (. 152) -0.258 (. 121) 0.303 (. 141) 
PUBSERVcoeff -0.096 (. 128) 0.139 (. 142) 0.130 (. 120) 0.733 (. 113) 
A -0.136 0.266 0.202 1.496 
Spec 2: NATINDYcoeff -0.124 (. 152) 0.297 (. 173) 0.211 (. 131) 0.022 (. 174) 
A -0.108 0.508 0.241 0.039 
SERVICE coeff -0.278 (. 132) 0.167 (. 176) -0.007 (. 137) 0.124 (. 171) PUBSERVcoeff 0.203 (. 144) 0.002 (. 153) 0.350 (. 135) 0.627 (. 130) 
A 0.331 0.004 0.591 1.241 
LR tests for single equation vs separate Public and Private equations: 
Specification 1 5.52 10.16 6.37 3.67 
Specification 2 15.54 20.10 22.69 14.23 
LR tests on Variant A vs Variant B 
Specification 1 1.22 1.27 0.43 7.74* 
Specification 2 2.55 1.66 0.68 11.35* 
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Table 5.3 
Misspecification Diag nostics and Omitted Variable, Testst ze 
Variant A: Single Public dumm y 
1980 1984 
Test Spec ification 1 Specification 2 Specification 1 Spec ification 2 
Stat Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man 
n 1363 1277 1363 1277 1405 1397 1405 1397 
logL -735.74 -511.52 -672.51 -495.81 -751.18 -721.57 -726.43 -686.17 
Hetsize(5 7.02 11.32* 10.34 3.84 0.79 17.15* 3.11 21.07* 
Hetsec(2 0.64 0.24 2.42 0.26 2.21 0.29 1.38 2.70 
Fform(3) 0.33 8.94* 4.34 3.31 0.99 11.43* 2.66 5.69 
Norm(2) 0.32 8.92* 4.14 3.14 0.76 9.41* 2.49 5.68 
Orgsize( 2.24 4.14 1.66 1.48 7.47 19.68* 7.20 15.97* 
Omits(5) 7.39 2.77 1.58 1.30 10.36 41.45* 7.07 27.67* 
Variant B: Separate Production and Services effects 
1980 1984 
Test 
Stat 
n 
logL 
Fform(3) 
Norm(2) 
Specification 1 
Manual Non-Man 
1363 
-735.12 
1277 
-510.88 
6.84 12.23* 
0.31 0.69 
1.12 13.52* 
0.32 11.61* 
2.24 3.64 
8.02 2.52 
Specification 2 
Manual Non-Man 
1363 1277 
-671.24 -495.02 
9.59 3.06 
4.13 0.24 
3.94 4.00 
3.91 2.80 
1.81 1.34 
1.90 1.08 
Specification 1- 
Manual Non-Man 
1405 1397 
-751.39 -717.70 
1.64 13.89* 
4.37 4.42 
2.05 7.02 
1.71 5.41 
6.97 23.14* 
10.21 45.35* 
Specification 2 
Manual Non-Man 
1405 1397 
-726.30 -680.93 
3.24 14.45 
1.41 3.44 
2.48 3.26 
2.28 3.16 
Definitions and Notes 
7.92 18.83* 
7.27 32.15* 
See notes to table 5.2 
Hetsize Any heteroskedasticity by establishment size 
Hetsec Any heteroskedasticity by sector 
Fform RESET test of general functional form misspecification 
Norm Test for non-normality (higher moments of residuals) 
Orgsize - Test for the exclusion of 5 organisation size dummies 
Omits Test for the omission of FOREIGN, SHIFT, PAY, DIS, IND 
* Test statistic significant at 5% 
Degrees of freedom for score tests are given in parentheses 
220 
Table 5.4 
The Impact of Competitive and Non-Competitive Market Conditions in 1984 
Manual. -Workers'-i y=}4 '-- . -Non, -Manual, 
Workers 
Number of Observations 
Mean Strike Probability 
- 1405 
0.283 (0.451) - 
1397 
0.252 (0.434) 
Raw Proportionate Probability differences: 
PUBLIC vs PRIVATE 
NATINDY vs PRIMANF 
PUBSERV vs PRISERV 
-0.126 
-0.151 
-0.103 
1.272 
0.764 
0.567 
Variant A 
SSpec_1 Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 
PROD coeff 
PUBLIC coeff 
D 
0.330 (. 084) 
0.105 (. 105) 
0.118 
-0.050 (. 103) 
0.188 (. 119) 
0.214 
-0.491 (. 092) 
0.478 (. 118) 
0.922 
-0.452 (. 116) 
. 0.255 (. 139) 0.450 
LR tests for single equation vs separate Public and Private equations: 
6.15 22.40 11.10 23.95 
Variant B 
Spec. 1 
- 
Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 
NATINDY coeff 
A 
PUBSERV coeff 
A 
0.250 (. 134) 
0.274 
-0.195 (. 178) 
-0.222 
0.200 (. 154) 
0.218 
0.055 (. 194) 
0.068 
0.393 (. 178) 
0.554 
0.398 (. 165) 
0.564, 
0.039 (. 211) 
0.070 
0.212 (. 182) 
0.287 
LR tests for single equation vs separate Public and Private equations: 
6.36 - 23.92 3.64 14.69 
LR tests on Variant A vs Variant B 
11.60* 12.97* 18.65* 20.96* 
Definitions and Notes 
See notes to table 5.2 
Variant A 
Variant B 
Sectoral dummies: PROD, PUBLIC, COMP, HEAD, MISS 
Sectoral dummies: NATINDY, PRIMANF*COMP, PRIMANF*HEAD, 
PRIMANF*MISS, SERVICE*(NONCOMP or PUBLIC), 
SERVICE*MANY, SERVICE*HEAD, SERVICE*MISS, PUBSERV 
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Table 5.5 
Missnecification Diagnostics and Omitted Variable Tests 
Manual : Workers , -- Non"ManualWorkers 
Variant A 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 
logL -747.43 -717.71 -718.28 -676.63 
Hetsize(5) 
Hetsec(5) 
Fform(3) 
Norm(2) 
0.30 
4.99 
1.56 
1.46 
2.98 
5.29 
3.18 
2.83 
28.90* 
6.41 
13.70* 
12.93* 
21.80* 
12.48* 
7.66 
7.52* 
Orgsize(5) 
Omits(5) 
6.57 
1135* 
6.47 
6.82 
19.33* 
32.44* 
15.26* 
27.88* 
Variant B 
Spec. 1 Spec. 2 Spec. 1 Spec. 2 
logL -741.63 -711.23 -708.95 -666.15 
Hetsize(5) 
Hetsec(9) 
Fform(3) 
Norm(2) 
5.04 
20.72* 
16.27* 
9.91* 
2.90 
11.35 
3.26 
3.03 
19.61 * 
9.69 
6.14 
5.62 
13.79* 
17.77* 
6.91 
6.62* 
Orgsize(5) 
Omits(5) = 
7.05 
10.45 
8.12 
6.34 . 
25.81* 
36.44* 
20.36* 
32.37* 
Definitions and Notes 
See notes to table 53 
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Table 5.7 
Relative Strike Incidence by Broad Sector 
WIRS80 and DE Tapes 1979 & 1980 
Estab. 1979/80 Strikes 1979 Strikes 1980 
Sector Number % Number_ %6 
. 
Number % 0 
Public 
. 650 31.9 563 27.1 0.85 534 40.1 1.26 Private 1390 68.1 1517 72.9 1.07 796 59.9 0.88 
Total 2040 100.0 2080 100.0 1330 100.0 
WIRS84 and DE Tapes '1983 & 1984 
Estab. 1983/84 Strikes 1983 Strikes 1984 
Sector Number % Number %0 Number % 0 
Public 740 36.6 614 45.4 1.24 433 35.9 0.98 
Private 1297 63.4 738 54.6 0.86 773 64.1 1.01 
Total 2019 100.0 1352 100.0 1206 100.0 
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Table 5.8 
Relative Strike Incidence by Broad Sector and Establishment Size 
(Single Establishment Strikes Only) 
WIRS80 and DE Tapes 1979 & 1980 
Sector Esizel Esize2 Esize3 EL=4 FsizeS Fsize6 T Total Coverage % 
Size Distribution of Establishments 1979/80 (weighted): 
Public 
Private 
0.469 
0.519 
0.232 
0.263 
0.163 
0.121' 
0.093 
0.068 
0.028 
-0.018 
0.015 
0.012 
1.00 650 100.0 
1.00- 1390 ''100.0 
Size Distribution of Single Establishment Strikes: 
1979 Public 
Private 
0.055 
0.060 
0.075 
0.102 
0.104 
0.139 
0.254 
0.219 
0.114 
0.160 
0.398- 
0.320 
1.00 201,35.7 
1.00 1328 87.5 
1980 Public 
Private 
0.072 
0.063 
0.087 
0.130 
0.159 
0.164 
0.196 
0.250 
0.109 
0.144 
0.377 
0.250 
1.00 138 25.8 
1.00 653 82.0 
Inter-Establishment Relative Strike Propensities: 
079 Public 
079 Private 
0.12 
0.12 
0.32 
0.39 
0.64 
1.15 
2.73 
3.22 
4.07, 
8.89 
26.53 
26.67 
- 
080 Public 
080 Private 
0.15 
0.12 
0.38 
0.49 
0.98 
1.36 
2.11 
3.68 
3.89 
8.00 
25.13 
20.83 
WIRS84 and DE Tapes 1983 & 1984 
Sector Fsizel &2 Fsize3 Esize4 Esize5 Fsize6 Total Coverage % 
Size Distribution of Establishments 1983/84 (weighted): 
Public 
Private 
0.726 
0.791- 
0.142 
0.123 
0.088 
0.063 
0.027 
0.016 
0.018 
0.008 
1.00 740 100.0 
1.00 1297 100.0 
Size Distribution of Single Establishment Strikes: 
1983 Public 
Private 
0.033 
0.181 
0.053 
0.169 
0.115 
0.218 
0.254 
0.132 
0.544 
0.299 
1.00 511 83.2 
1.00 568 77.0 
1984 Public 
Private 
0.065 
0.131 
0.097 
0.131 
0.136 
0.252 
0.190 
0.136 
0.513 
0.350 
1.00 279 64.4 
1.00 611 79.0 
Inter-Establishment Relative Strike Propensities: 
083 Public 
083 Private 
0.04 
0.23 
0.37 
1.37 
1.31 
3.46 
9.41 
8.25 
30.22 
37.38 
084 Public 
084 Private 
0.09 
0.17 
0.68 
1.06 
1.54 
4.00 
7.04 
8.50 
28.50 
43.75 
Note: See text for details of results. 
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Table 5.9 _ , 
Strike Size, Durat ion and Days Lost -1974-1984 
Disa e ated by Broad - Sector 
Number of Workers Involved 
Year.. Public Sector 
,, .  
Private Sector 
Workers Involved Workers Involved 
(% o f public sector) (% of private sector) 
1 2 34 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1974 16 17 18 21 14 14 13 16 18 21 14.. 18 
1975 19 16 15 26 11 13 14 16 19 23 12 16 
1976 22 21 18 18 14 8 14 18 16 22 13 16 
1977 21 14 21 20 13 12 12 15 19 24 14 17 
1978. . 17 17 17 23 13 
14 13 15 18 25 13 16 
1979 20 17 13 21 11 17 11 16 16 24 15 19 
1980 24 16 14 19 11 17 13 18 18 22 12 17 
1981 
1982 28 12 15 18 11 17 , 
15 14 16 21 14 20 
1983 33 16 13 15 10 14 13 15 16 25 13 18 
1984. 14 11 17 20 13 . 25 12 12 15 . 22 16 22 
Mean 21 16 16 20 12. 15 13 16 17 23 14 18 
Durations of Stop pages 
Year 
. Public 
Sector Private Sector 
Strike Duration Strike Duration 
(% of public sector). - (% o f private sector) 1 2 34 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1974 32 20 11 7 6 24 11 14 13 8 9 45 
1975 44 18 95 5 20 11 12. 10 8 9 50 
1976 43 21 10 6 5 15 11 14 12 9 9 45 
1977 42 15 12 5 5 22 11 13 11 10 9 48 
1978 39 19 10 7 6 20 11 12 11 9 9 49 
1979 41. 18 12 5 6 18 12 10 9 8 8 53 
1980 50 16 10 6 2 16 11 13 11 8 10 47 
1981 
1982 58 15 63 3 14 21 14 11 8 5 42 
1983 54 14 55 4 17 18 13 9 8 7 45 
1984 46 13 86 4 23 21 14 9 9 7 41 
Mean 45 17 96 5 19 14 13 11 9 8 47 
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Table 5.9 (continued) - 
Strike Size, Duration and Days Lost 1974-1984 Disa e ated by Broad 
Se ctor 
Working Days Lost 
Year Public Sector Private Sector 
Working Days Lost Working Days Lost 
(% of public sector) (% of private sector) 
1, .2 345 .6 .1 
2.. 3 4 5 6 
1974 52 13 12 12 5 7 34 16 16 16 8 10 
1975 58 13 11 10 3 5 33 17 16 17 8 9 
1976 64 12 10 92. 4 35. . 17. 17 16 . 8 8 1977 59- 11 11 10 3 6 33 16 16 16 8 11 
1978 55 15 11 10 5 5 31 18 16 16 9 10 
1979 56 13 11 94 7 30 15 16 16 .9 14 1980 62 10 10 84 6 32 17 16 20 7 8 
1981 
1982 65 9 983 6 38 - 15 14 17 9 8 
1983 65 10 983 5 37 ' 15 15 16 8 9 
1984 51 10 10 12 7 10 34 15 15 16 9 10 
Mean 59 12 10 10 4 6 34 16 16 . 17 8 10 
Source: Department of Employment Industrial Stoppages Data Tapes 
Notes and Definitions: ' 
1. The workers involved categorisation used in the table is as follows: - 
1: less than 25*workers involved 
2: 25 - 49 workers involved 3: 50 - 99 workers involved 4: 100 - 249 workers involved 5: 250 - 499 workers involved 6: 500 or more workers involved 
2. The strike duration categorisation used in the table is as follows: - 1: 1day 
2: 2 days 
3: 3 days 
4: 4 days 
5: 5 days 
6: 6 days or longer 
3. The working days lost categorisation used in the table is as follows: - 1: less than 250 days lost 
2: 250 - 499 days lost 3: 500 - 999 days lost 4: 1000 - 2499 days lost 5: 2500 - 4999 days lost 6: 5000 or more days lost 
III 
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Appendix to Chapter 5 
. 4. 
Table -A5.1;, 
Description of Variables and, Weighted Means 
,, -1980 1984 Key Variable Description Manual Non-Man Manual Non-Man 
Dependent Variable 
STRIKE Proportion incurring-strike action 0.181 "0.088" 0.134 0.267 
Sectoral Dummies: Sample Proportions 
PUBLIC Public Sector 0.429 0.607. ' 0.547 0.667 
PRIVATE Private Sector 0.571 0.393 0.453 0.333 
COMP Private Sector - Many competitors n/a n/a 0.215 0.144 NONCOMP Private Sector - Few competitors n/a n/a 0.155 0.113 
PROD' Production Sector 0.380 0.205 0.308 0.201 
NATINDY Nationalised Industries 0.065, -. 0.067 0.096 0.098 PRIMANF Private Manufacturing 0.315 0.137 0.212 0.102 
SERVICE Service Sector 0.620 0.796 0.692 0.800 
PUBSERV Public Services 0.364.. 0.540 0.451 0.569 
PRISERV Private Services 0.256 0.256 0.241 0.231 
Control Variables 
ESIZE1 Establishment size 25- 49 0.402 0.430 0.444 0.470 
ESIZE2 Establishment size 50- 99 0.252 0.234 0.245 0.230 
ESIZE3 Establishment size 100- 199 0.168 0.158 0.162 0.152 
ESIZE4 Establishment size 200- 499 0.115 0.116 0.098 0.097 
ESIZE5 Establishment size 500- 999 0.039 0.036 0.032 0.031 
ESIZE6 Establishment size 1000+ 0.023 0.025 0.020 0.020 
PROP Proportion in total employment 0.620 0.535 0.574 0.571 
P SK Proportion Skilled 0.181 0.085 0.168 0.092 
P PT Proportion Part-time 0.172 0.196 0.205 0.220 
P FE Proportion Female 0.211 0.270 0.131 0.410 
DENS Union Density 0.644 0.666 0.570 0.684 
MUNION Multiple Unions at Establishment 0.387 0.598 0.367 0.633 
C SHOP Closed Shop 0.376 0.142 0.271 0.110 
EMPASS Member of Employers' Association 0.333 0.248 0.238 0.192 
LEVEL Plant Level Bargaining 0.154 0.089 0.111 0.073 
SINGLE Single Establishment Firm 0.118 0.058 0.098 0.044 
n Number of Observations 1363 1277 1405 1397 
228 
CHAPTER 6 
fi' Unions, Conflict Activity and Efficiencyi 
6.1. Introduction. 
While the previous three chapters have concentrated solely on determining the 
patterns that exist in the incidence and number of stoppage starts, this chapter 
examines the repercussions, rather than the causes, of strikes. The evaluation of both 
the costs and consequences of conflict activity has been much neglected in the 
literature on strike activity. The joint-cost models attributed to Reder & Neumann 
(1980) and Kennan (1980) postulate that where the establishment of suitable strike- 
preventing institutional arrangements or 'protocols' is costly, relative to the cost of 
incurring a strike, there is a greater likelihood of observing strike activity. Thus 
differences in the, costs of strikes can be expected to be related to the observed levels 
of strike activity and hence strike costs are of much importance. 
Despite this observation, apart from the two papers cited above and a recent 
experimental study by Sopher (1990) there has been little analysis of the costs of 
strike activity. In part, this omission is the result of the high level of aggregation 
typically employed in studies of strike activity. In total, the number of days lost in 
Britain due to strikes is a fraction of 1% of all working days as shown by 
Whittingham & Towers (1971) and Turner (1969a). However, such calculations are 
largely inappropriate. Firstly, they fail to discriminate between individual industries 
which differ quite considerably in their strike proneness as found by Smith et al 
(1978) among others. Secondly, aggregating days lost over the duration of a stoppage 
Some of the work in this chapter represents collaborative research with my supervisor. Ben Knight, together 
with Paul Geroski of the London Business School. 
'1 
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does not recognise that output lost during a- strike " may be, compensated for by 
increäses in production before "and/or after the'strike, or by other firms in the same 
industry. Finally, 'counting the number of days lost fails to identify the costs to the 
individual participants which may be substantial. '' 
Related to this inappropriateness of days lost as a measure of strike costs, in situations 
where strikes are precipitated by employers, the concept- of 'days lost' may be 
ambiguous if strikes are used by management as output or inventory reduction 
schemes. Thus while there may be losses to-the actual participants, aggregate output 
may be unchanged either because these losses are small, or because there is 
substitution in production between firms and/or industries. Therefore the first 
objective of this chapter is to assess the effects of strikes on output in Britain at a 
higher level of disaggregation than has previously been employed. 
The consequences of strike activity have also received little attention to date. Apart 
from a series of aggregate time-series studies investigating the implications of strike 
activity for inflation (with strikes typically being' used as a proxy of union power)2, 
there has beeis little evaluation of the direct impact of strikes on economic 
performance. ' The more recent analyses of the effects of unions have typically not 
been able to identify the channels through which unionism has its claimed impact on 
performance. ' However, without such information, the findings of union productivity 
differentials, for example, cannot be attributed to any particular functional 
mechanisms and hence competing theories cannot be adequately discriminated3. A 
positive productivity differential may be the result of unionised establishments hiring 
higher quality workers within a traditional monopoly union model to offset the higher 
2. These include Godfrey (1971), Taylor (1972), Purdy & Zis (1973), Knight (1972) while Ward & Zis (1974) 
provide an international comparison. 
3. In a similar vein, 'a recent paper by Cable & Machin (1991) presents evidence to suggest that the negative 
impact of unions on profitability, as shown by Machin (1989) and Machin & Stewart (1990) for example, is no 
more than a further manifestation of the positive union wage effect. 
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wages', they face. However, such, an observation is also consistent with improved 
morale and motivation among the workforce. together with a decreased quit rate. if the 
'collective voice' or 'institutional response'view of unions is the appropriate model. 
One easily identifiable manifestation of unionisation is collective industrial sanctions. 
Their effect, on output and productivity will differ according to. which of the 
competing models of unions is appropriate and thus strikes can perhaps be used as an 
indicator. to discriminate between the theories. In a monopoly union model, such 
actions will reflect poor relationships between management and workers and lead to 
low workforce morale, little cooperation at the workplace, and will therefore 
adversely affect the performance of the enterprise. However, under the Harvard 
school view of unions as beneficial institutions, to the extent that conflict activity 
reflects the expression of (collective) 'voice' rather than (individual) 'exit' such as 
shirking and absenteeism, it can actually lead to improvements in productivity by 
providing an outlet for frustration and discontentment and by grievances being 
identified and thus more probably settled. Clearly, discrimination between these two 
views is an empirical issue. 
A further aspect of economic performance which has yet to receive adequate attention 
in the literature is the impact of unions on efficiency. While there have been several 
recent studies examining the consequences of unionisation for productivity, 
productivity growth, profitability, employment and investment, the issue of the 
efficiency in which factors of production are utilised (sometimes called total factor 
productivity or TFP) has yet to be addressed. Once again, it is important to postulate 
the route by which unions might have an impact. While union presence per se might 
be fairly unimportant as far as efficiency is concerned, the impact of active 
unionisation in the form of overt conflict activity may be the significant factor. Thus, 
the second empirical section of the chapter therefore concentrates on the possible role 
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of strike activity in the determination of (technical) efficiency4 - having corrected for 
differences in union presence. IýSt 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews 
the relevant extant literature, and in particular, notes the recent work examining the 
impact of unions on economic performance in Britain. Section 6.3 then outlines an 
appropriate model. in which the consequences of strike activity for both output and 
efficiency can be explicitly investigated. The data to be utilised in the chapter is also 
described in this section. The empirical results are detailed ins sections 6.4,6.5 
and 6.6, while the final section presents some brief conclusions. "- 
6.2. The Economic Impact of Unions: A Brief Synopsis of the Evidence. 
The traditional monopoly view of unions as argued by Simons (1944) and Hayek 
(1959) is that they simply raise wages above their competitive level and thus cause a 
misallocation of resources with consequent reduction in economic efficiency. This 
has been forcefully challenged by the alternative view of unionism grounded in 
Hirschman's (1970) exit-voice paradigm and most frequently associated with Freeman 
and Medoffs (1984) seminal work "What do Unions Do? ". The latter argue that 
unions can have a number of beneficial effects which may possibly outweigh the 
adverse effects of the wage premium and consequent reallocation of resources that 
unionisation implies. The relevant theoretical considerations are outlined in sub- 
section 6.2.1 while the empirical evidence for Britain is examined in sub- 
section 6.2.2. 
6.2.1. Theoretical Considerations. 
The orthodox view considers unions to be detrimental institutions for a variety of 
reasons. Most obviously, the higher wages they extract through their monopolistic 
4. Throughout this chapter, by'efficiency' is meant relative efficiency. 
I--] 
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power causes firms to. substitute . capital . 
for labour. and hire higher quality workers. 
Higher productivity may be observed in unionised firms as a result, but this is 
obviously not a consequence of higher, productive, effort by unionised. workers. 
Unions also lower employment since the wage-employment outcome is further up the 
labour demand curves. - The misallocation of resources, they thereby induce has an 
unfavourable effect on welfare. In addition, unions are sometimes argued to reduce 
managerial efficiency through the. introduction of restrictive practices. They. may also 
limit managerial flexibility . though seniority . rules,. and may oppose technological 
change thus adversely affecting economic efficiency. . 
The alternative view of unions, while acknowledging the wage differential accruing to 
unionised workers, emphasises a number of directions in which unions can have 
beneficial effects. In particular, in order to remain competitive, management will be 
'shocked' into reducing organisational slack and technical inefficiency by the presence 
of unions6. Unions thereby perform a monitoring role for the owners of capital. 
Additionally, the public goods dimension of the workplace necessitates collective 
organisation which will be unionism in the majority of cases. This is discussed at 
length by Hirsch & Addison (1986). The union provides a means of expressing 
discontent without quitting and thus unionism can decrease exit behaviour. The lower 
labour turnover, absenteeism and shirking that unionism can, imply will increase 
productivity. Furthermore,, the presence of unions can lead to better communications 
and can encourage cooperation and improve morale with further gains for productive 
efficiency. Note, however, that such gains depend crucially on management's 
response to collective workforce organisations and collective bargaining. Ultimately, 
5. This assumes that the outcome is on the labour demand curve, which if unions set wages and employers then set 
employment, will be optimal. However, such an outcome is Pareto inefficient as shown by McDonald & Solow 
(1981). If unions and employers bargain simultaneously over both wages and employment, efficient contracts are 
no longer on the labour demand schedule, and can yield both higher wages and employment in unionised firms. 
6. The higher X-efficiency in unionised firms presumes pre-union or non-union X-inefficiency however, and this 
may not be appropriate. 
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the impact of unions on productivity and other aspects of economic performance is 
thus an empirical issue: 
6.2.2. Empirical Evidence. - 
Much of the evidence pertaining to the two views of unionism described above has 
been for the US and it is only comparatively recently that studies have examined the 
economic impact of unions in Britain: The seminal American study is that of Brown 
& Medoff (1978) who estimate an augmented Cobb-Douglas production function, 
distinguishing between union and non-union labour. This may be written as 
Y= AKa(L. +cLj1-a (6.1) 
where Y is output, K is capital, Ln and L. are non-union and union labour 
respectively, A is a constant of proportionality, and a and (1-a) are the elasticities of 
capital and labour respectively. The parameter c reflects productivity differences 
between union and non-union labour; if c>1 (c < 1), then union labour is more (less) 
productive as suggested by the Harvard (monopoly) view of unions. Rearrangement 
and manipulation of equation (6.1) yields 
ln(Y/L) - InA+ alnK/L + (1-a)(c-1)D (6.2) 
where D= 4/L is union density. This provides the estimating equation once suitably 
augmented by a vector of control variables to correct for the other differences 
between union and non-union establishments7. The coefficient on D is the (log) 
productivity differential of unionised firms, and thus the union labour productivity 
effect is calculated by dividing this coefficient by (1-a). 
Similar studies to that of Brown & Medoff include Allen (1984,1986a, b), Clark 
(1980a, b, 1984), Ichniowski (1984a, b, 1986), Maki (1983), Noam (1983) and Warren 
(1985) and many" of these are reviewed by Hirsch & Addison (1986) and Machin 
(1986). Several of the studies lend at least some support to the view that unions can 
7. The assumption of constant returns to scale in equations (6.1) and (6.2) can be relaxed by simply including /nL 
as a measure of size. 
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enhance the productive process, although others dissent from this view (e. g. Bemmels 
(1987)). However, most fail to identify precisely the mechanism that links unionism 
to increases (or decreases) in productivity8 and none. can adequately-account for the 
impact of unions on managerial efficiency. The most recent US evidence is reviewed 
by Addison & Hirsch (1989) who report that these newer studies collectively indicate 
that unions inhibit both investment and productivity growth. They also suggest that 
their impact on productivity levels throws some doubt on the Harvard school view. 
The direct aggregate costs of unions in terms of conflict activity are easily calculated 
from the statistics for days lost, but as argued above,. the real costs of strike activity to 
the participants will depend on the extent of substitution in production between firms 
and industries. Neumann & Reder (1984) present the only analysis of the direct 
impact of strikes on output. Their study covers 63, industry groups in US 
manufacturing, and using vector autoregression techniques (as described by Sims 
(1972) for example), they demonstrate that in 38 of these industries, strikes had no net 
effect on output while in a further 6 industries, strikes actually increased output. For 
the 19 industries in which strikes had a significantly -negative effect on output, this 
was shown to be very small. 
For Britain, evidence is more scarce. Pencavel (1977) presents a historical study of 
the coalmining industry while the work of Caves (1980), and Davies & Caves (1987) 
are similar comparative studies of British and American productivity and produce 
conflicting conclusions regarding the impact of unions. Knight (1989) presents an 
analysis using a cross-section of industries for the historically important period 
around 1968. He finds that the impact of strikes on productivity is weakly positive in 
a majority of industries in his sample (supporting the alternative view of unions) but 
also finds negative effects in a significant minority of industries. Machin's (1988) 
8. One exception is Brown & Medoff (1978) who attribute 20% of their positive differential to the lower quit rate in unionised establishments. 
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study of 52 British engineering firms is also cross-sectional' in nature diie to the 
structural characteristics of the firms `only being recorded in 1982. "He 'e6ncludes that 
the overall effect of unionisation is 'insignificant, although significantly negative in 
large firms (especially those with closed shops) perhaps resulting from increased X- 
inef iciency -or the greater" power of unions in such firms. However, his study is 
specific to'a single' industry which has'ä'numberof unique characteristics and thus it 
seems unlikely his results can be safely generalised to other industrial sectors. 
While the precise causes and mechanisms of the celebrated growth in productivity (in 
manufacturing in particular) in the 1980s are not clear, many hypotheses have been 
advanced to explain the phenomenon. Popular and media opinion has often attributed 
Britain's past weak industrial performance to poor industrial relations, high rates of 
strike activity and an over-powerful trades union movement. According to this school 
of thought, recent increases in productivity result from management regaining control 
of the productive process. Metcalf (1988,1989) reviews a number of other studies as 
well as those cited above and suggests that this literature enables the adverse effects 
of unions on performance, the economy and on welfare to be stated with confidence. 
His conclusion is that a combination of fear, competition'and the decentralisation of 
collective bargaining has led to major changes in the industrial relations climate and 
this is the primary factor responsible for the reversal of Britain's poor productivity 
record. 
This conclusion is challenged forcefully by Nolan' & Marginson (1990) who argue 
that the alternative view cannot be dismissed on the weight of current evidence. In 
particular, they argue that unions still may be a source of dynamism and greater 
productivity. Daniel (1987), for example, concludes that unions have not inhibited the 
introduction of new technology in general (although there are obvious exceptions, 
notably printing). Even Metcalf (1988, p. 21) admits that, despite there being greater 
opportunities to increase productivity in highly unionised sectors under the new 
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industrial relations climate, productivity has in -fact grown just as fast in industries 
where union density- is- iow. , Thus the evidence, to date is not at all conclusive, and 
certainly is not as clear cut as Metcalf implies. 
A review of the most recent studies of the effects of unions on economic performance 
in Britain has been presented by Wadhwani (1990). His summary is based upon his 
joint work- reported in Machin & Wadhwani (1989), Wadhwani & Wall (1989) and 
Nickell et al (1989). The first study is based on the, 1984 ý Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (Millward & Stevens (1986)). The results indicate that managerial 
discretion is restricted in larger, especially unionised establishments. This confirms 
some traditional notions of the effects of unions although the same -study also shows 
that organisational change9 was more prevalent in unionised than in non-unionised 
establishments. However, this latter result may be a consequence of the introduction 
of legislation to inhibit the power of unions to resist such change together with the 
removal of restrictive practices over the relevant sample period. 
The impact of unions on investment is also examined' using this data source. Having 
controlled for differences between establishments by including variables capturing 
financial performance, demand, and the extent of organisational change, Machin & 
Wadhwani (1989) find that there is no association between unions and investment in 
new technology. Daniel's (1987) finding that unionised establishments invested more 
is thus attributed to the removal of restrictive practices in the early 1980s and 
differences between industries together with his failure to control for the fact that 
unionised establishments experienced faster TFP growth (and thus invested more) 
over the period. Finally, the authors find that unionisation does not depress 
employment in those establishments which did not experience organisational change, 
while for those in which change was evident, this did lead to reductions in 
9. Organisational change is defined as 'Substantial changes in work organisation or work practices not involving 
new plant, machinery or equipment'. - 
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employment principally through'the elimination of restrictive practices. 
t-- 
The other two papers referenced above use' company accounts data covering large 
manufacturing firms over the period-1972-1986 supplemented by two- questionnaire 
surveys. The results show that unions do not consistently reduce productivity growth, 
contrary to most of the US1findings. - During '1980-1984, unionised firms actually 
experienced faster productivity growth, while by 1985-1986, there was no differential 
between union and non-union firms. If this is again argued to be a consequence of the 
introduction of 'anti-union' legislation in the 1980s leading to a boost in productivity 
growth, there is an important asymmetry which remains unexplained. For the 1970s, 
given the rather more favourable union position which existed for much of the 
decade, together with the Labour government's generally cooperative stance towards 
unions for much of the period, there should be 'evidence of correspondingly poor 
economic performance in unionised firms and industries. However, there is no such 
evidence of a negative productivity growth effect for the 1970s and hence such 
interpretations do not seem to be supported by these data. 
There is also no evidence that unions affect investment in these company accounts 
data; although this was higher for 1980-1984 (as in the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey data), investment in unionised firms may have grown more quickly 
following the recession in the early 1980s which hit unionised firms relatively hard. 
Finally, these data give no evidence for a relationship between unionism and 
employment growth over the period covered. 
On the basis of this evidence, Wadhwani (1990) concludes that some of the previous 
criticism of the union movement has been inappropriate. However, one weakness of 
these studies is that they typically fail to identify the instruments by which unions 
may have an impact on economic performance. The sequence of papers jointly 
authored by Wadhwani hypothesise several likely vehicles but data limitations 
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prevent further -investigation. However, until such transmission mechanisms from 
unionisation to performance are identified, the finding of no net-effect of unionism on 
economic performance is not an adequate test of either the monopoly or Harvard view 
of unions. This chapter investigates whether overt action by - unions is the key to 
unravelling any union impact on productivity and efficiency. A suitable framework 
for such an investigation is outlined in the next section. - 
6.3. Modelling Strategy and Data Description. 
Sub-section 6.3.1 presents an extension to the conventional framework in which 
estimates of the impact of unions on economic performance have been traditionally 
conducted. The approach adopted here is arguably more appropriate and provides for 
greater flexibility. In particular, it exploits the dual time-series cross-section 
dimensions of the data which are described in sub-section 6.3.2. 
6.3.1. Frontier Production' Frontiers and Efficiency. 
Conventionally, and as in the seminal work of Brown & Medoff (1978) and described 
in sub-section 6.2.2 above, a stochastic Cobb-Douglas production function has been 
considered the most appropriate framework for the analysis of the impact of unions on 
productivity. Reiterating, if industry output, Y, is a function of k factor inputs X. 
j=1,..., k, then this can be written as 
Y= Afl XßeE (6.3) 
where es is the stochastic (multiplicative) error component. Union and non-union 
labour are then distinguished and the production function is augmented by a vector of 
controls to account for other differences between industriesi0. Estimation then reveals 
whether the mean production frontier for unionised industries is inside or outside that 
of non-unionised industries according to the sign of the coefficient on the union 
10. The description is in teens of 'industries' since this is the unit of observation for the current study. However, as 
noted above, some of the previous studies have been at the firm level and Warren (1985) is a time series study. 
239 
variable. } 
- 
Here, however, a more tenable' version of this -model is utilised which takes into 
account the 'maximal' nature of production functions. Whereas conventional 
regression techniques : applied to equation. (6.3) estimates the mean output as a 
function of the various inputs, in the literature 'describing frontier production 
functions, it is the relevance of the maximum possible output that is emphasised. This 
permits consideration of more interesting economic- questions, particularly with 
respect to efficiencyll. More, importantly, the concept of a frontier production 
function is clearly also in accord, with the theoretical definition of a production 
function as the maximum of the distribution of output. 
The development of frontier production functions has a long history, originating in the 
initial specification of the problem by Farrell (1957), through the computation of 
deterministic frontiers (Afrait (1972), Aigner & Chu (1968), Richmond (1974)), to 
probabilistic frontiers as advocated by- Timmer (1971), and, more recently, stochastic 
frontier models, for which the seminal papers are Aigner et al (1977) and Meeusen & 
van den Broeck (1977). -Useful surveys of. the relevant literature are presented by 
Forsund et al (1980) and Schmidt (1985). 
Following Aigner et al (1977), the basic model for the Cobb-Douglas case can be 
written as follows 
yisa+ß'x; +vi (6.4) 
where i=1,..., N indexes industries, output y1= lnYi and the k-vector of inputs 
xi =1nX, are in logarithms (so that the ßßs are elasticities), a =1nA and vi represents a 
random (stochastic) error term. Equation (6.4) derives from equation (6.3) taking 
11. Note that the dual of production maximisation is cost minimisation which can (and should) obviously be 
treated in an analogous fashion. There have been a number of applications of the framework described below in 
the context of cost minimisation. These include Schmidt & Lovell (1979,1980). 
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account of the- fact that output Y is constrained from above by. the efficiency in 
resource utilisation. Letting ui a0 represent the shortfall of output from the frontier, 
then equation (6.4) can be rewritten as .. 11 1 
y1=a+ß'x; +v; u; (6.5) 
Thus the disturbance term ei = v1 --ui has two parts; a stochastic component reflecting 
the general randomness inherent in economic data ('noise'), and a second element 
representing technical inefficiency in the utilisation 'of the inputs12 This represents a 
generalisation e. of the traditional production - frontier - models; if a2 =0 then 
equation (6.5) is a deterministic frontier as utilised by Aigner & Chu (1968), whereas 
if a2 =0 then (6.5) becomes a stochastic production function model as first specified 
by Zellner et al (1966) and utilised in many of the previous studies reviewed in sub- 
section 6.2.2 above. 
.. ý-.. ,. 
Estimation of the stochastic frontier production - function (6.4) for a single cross- 
section of industries requires the explicit specification of distributions for v and u. 
Typically, the vi are assumed to be NID(O, a, 2) and independent of ui a 0, while the 
inputs Xj are assumed exogenous, perhaps following the behavioural justification 
suggested by Zellner et al. (1966) of expected profit maximisation. Several 
distributions for u have been considered in the literature,. although by far the most 
commonly employed are the positive half normal and the exponential13. Stevenson 
(1980) disputes the merits of these however since they both have modes of zero; he 
argues that this is tantamount to assuming that the likelihood of efficient behaviour 
declines monotonically with increasing levels of inefficiency14. Clearly this need not 
necessarily be the case, and thus he suggests using direct generalisations of the half 
12. Note that the estimation of production frontiers of this kind can only yield information on technical efficiency 
(as opposed to allocative efficiency) since it only uses data on input quantities and not on input prices. 
13. Other possibilities include gamma (Richmond (1974)) and log-normal (Greene (1980a)). 
14. That is, most industries are very efficient, and the number at increasing 'distance' from the production frontier 
declines monotonically. 
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normal and the exponential (i. e. truncated normal and gamma respectively) and then 
explicitly testing for a zero mode of the distribution. "", -s-". "} -f, - _T, - =r 
Whatever distributions are - chosen, given parameter estimates the . technical 
efficiency of industry i is defined as 
exp(-u1) = Y, /AI Xißexp(v1) (6.6) 
since AlI-X; ßexp(v1) represents the stochastic Cobb-Douglas production level. At the 
individual industry level however, estimates are only- obtained for the total error term 
ej = vi - ui and the separation of ej into its constituent components is not immediately 
apparent. The average technical -inefficiency can -be simply calculated from the 
moments of the distributions and this estimate will be consistent1s. However, to 
compare efficiencies across individuals requires an estimate of E(u); Jondrow et al 
(1982) suggest using the -mean or mode of the conditional distribution E(u; I E) and 
give explicit formulae for both the half normal and exponential cases16 Of course this 
cannot provide a consistent estimate of u; since the variability of v1 is still present. 
Much of the criticism 'surrounding previous single cross-section estimates of frontier 
production functions has been concerned with the strength of the distributional 
assumptions -that must' be made for the parameters of the model to be identified, 
particularly with regard to the measurement of technical efficiency. Although tests of 
these assumptions have been proposed in the literature (see, for example, Lee (1983a) 
and Schmidt & Lin (1984)), these are often very complex. In addition, although a 
more flexible specification for the distribution of u has been advocated by a number 
of authors as noted above, they still require u to be independent of v and this may be 
15, For the half normal, this is given by E(exp(-u)) = 2exp(a22)[1-4)(a)] where (D(. ) is the standard normal 
distribution function, whereas if u is exponential with parameter 0, then it is easily seen that E(exp(-u)) = (1 + 0)-1. 
16. Waldman (1984) considers two alternative unbiased linear estimators of F(u; ) and compares them with the 
conditional expectation suggested by Jondrow et a!. He demonstrates that although the conditional expectation 
estimator is to be preferred (given that it utilises information about the form of the distribution function), its 
advantage is very small over his much simpler linear estimators. All three estimators considered by Waldman 
(1984) give the same ranking of individual level efficiency for his sample. 
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inappropriate as-. -argued. below. - Furthermore;, it is apparent . that alternative 
distributional -assumptions about- the- efficiency disturbance term can lead , to- rather 
different results in empirical applications; especially for the estimates of inefficiency. 
Fortunately, such strong assumptions are not required when a time-series of cross' 
sections is available,, and the use of a panel of industries in the current " chapter 
represents an advance on almost all previous studies. Only Schmidt & Sickles (1984) 
have formulated a similar model, while Schmidt (1985, pp. 312-315) reiterates some 
of the findings from this previous joint work. 4 
Before describing in detail the new framework and its inherent advantages, it should 
first be noted that the important question is whether some component of the industry's 
level of inefficiency can be regarded as constant over time. If not, and thus 
inefficiency is considered to be both independent over time and across industries, then 
the panel nature of the data is irrelevant and the appropriate estimation methodology 
is that presented above in the context of a single cross-section. However, ' if at least 
part of the industry inefficiency can be considered time invariant, then the use of a 
panel of data can yield substantial advantages over a single cross-section. 
The assumption of time-invariant technical inefficiency is clearly a very strong 
hypothesis, and is required for the identification of the model as will be seen below. 
However, following recent work by Kumbhakar (1990) and Cornwell et al (1990), 
this assumption can be partially relaxed by allowing the degree of inefficiency in each 
individual industry to vary over some flexible function of time whose 
parameterisation depends on the industry. Thus the sensitivity of the results to the 
assumption of time-invariant inefficiency can be investigated and this is the approach 
that is considered below. 
There are three principal benefits accruing to panel data in the context of frontier 
production functions. Following the notation of Schmidt (1985), consider the 
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following extension of equation (6.5), where again i indexes industries,. and ° now 
additionally, t indexes time. "The production frontier can be written 
(6.7) Yic=a+ßxic+vic'ui 
for i=1,..., N, t=1,..., T and with u; i 0. This is again a simple Cobb-Douglas 
production frontier, with 'noise' vit and technical inefficiency u; that is constant over 
time but varies across industries. Defining b; =a-u;, then equation (6.7) becomes 
Yi'c = bi + ß'R11 + v1 (6.8) 
and this can be seen to be a" standard fixed-effects panel model (since u1 is non- 
stochastic), with industry fixed-effects 6,17. Unlike for the single cross-section model 
as in equation (6.4), no specific distributional specification of either of the disturbance 
terms in equation (6.8) is necessary to obtain consistent estimation of the ßs and the 
6,518. .r1. 
The second problem that panel frontier production functions can alleviate is that 
associated with , the assumption that inefficiency and factor input levels are 
independent. This may be unrealistic, since 
"... if a firm can foresee its level of technical inefficiency at all, it must 
be expected to affect its decisions. " (Schmidt (1985, p. 314)). 
Any correlation between the regressors X and the level of technical inefficiency u will 
imply that the standard estimates of equation (6.5) are inappropriate. However, the 
fixed-effects model does not require this assumption of independence and, given the 
potential endogeneity illustrated by the above quotation, this is clearly an important 
advantage of estimates based on panel data over those based on single cross-sections. 
17. References to the specification and estimation of panel models include Chamberlain (1984), Hsiao (1985, 
1986) and Mundlak (1978). 
18. Clearly it is still possible within this framework to make specific assumptions about the distribution of vii and 
u;, and Pitt & Lee (1981) use the normal and half normal combination as previously utilised in many of the single 
cross-section studies. If these distributional assumptions are valid, then the estimates obtained will be more 
efficient as compared to simply estimating equation (6.8) as a fixed-effects model. Hence the assumptions can be 
tested explicitly by comparing the difference between the estimators in the usual fashion (see, for example, 
Hausman (1978) and Ruud (1984)). 
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Finally,. panel models can more easily identify at the level of the individual that 
component of the disturbance which is technical inefficiency, separate from that 
which is noise19. Although proposals have been made in the single ý cross-section 
equation to identify, E(u), or more preferably E(u1 I vi-u)), these estimates are still 
contaminated by the noise v and are again. heavily dependent on the distributional 
assumptions made. In particular, the level of individual technical inefficiency cannot 
be consistently estimated in a single cross-section (see Jondrow et al (1982)). With a 
panel of data, this deficiency is resolved essentially because the noise is being 
averaged in the overall, residual. This is clearly not possible in the one dimensional 
case but in the panel becomes feasible because u; is observed T times rather than only 
once20. At the most basic level, technical inefficiency can then be identified from 
equation (6.8) as 
ui =D- 6i where' D= max(6) "° (6.9) 
and this will yield consistent estimates provided N is large enough (see, Schmidt 
(1985, p. 314), and for the single cross-section case with deterministic, frontiers, 
Gabrielson (1975) and Greene (1980a))21. 
Much of commentary above has been with reference to the fixed-effects model. One 
disadvantage with this estimator is that it cannot accommodate regressors which are 
time invariant while varying across industries22. Any industry specific heterogeneity 
is thus labelled as inefficiency and this interpretation clearly may not be appropriate; 
there are clearly likely to be other unobserved differences between industries which 
19. Note that the identification is achieved by virtue of the assumption that the u; are fixed over time. 
20. Note that T must be large enough for the estimation of the 6i to be precise. 
21. This is equivalent to counting one industry as 100% efficient. Schmidt & Sickles (1984, p. 368) provide a 
rationalisation for this, similar to that of Greene (1980a) in the single cross-section case. 
22 
. Alternatively, the Hausman ,& Taylor (1981) estimator allows for only some of the regressors to be correlated 
with the effects and thus is a hybrid of the fixed- and random-effects specifications. Again, consistent estimation of 
the individual effects requires T large (for separation from the residuals) and N large (for separation from the 
intercept), conditions identical to those required under the random effects model. 
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affect productivity and. which cannot be included in the estimating equation. The 
problem could be avoided by assuming that the u; are uncorrelated with the regressors 
and can be treated as random across industries. Then, equation (6.7) can be estimated 
as a random effects model by generalised least squares. For the, panel utilised in this 
study (see sub-section 6.3.2 below), the fact that N. is large and T is small will mean 
that such an assumption will yield estimators which are more efficient than in the 
fixed-effects specification, although, as demonstrated by Schmidt & Sickles (1984, 
p. 369), consistent estimation of industry level technical inefficiency still requires both 
N and T large just as for the fixed-effects specification. 
Thus. the main advantage of the random effects (GIS) specification is that it can 
accommodate time-invariant regressors. The assumption that the u1 are uncorrelated 
with the regressors (and thus the random effects model is appropriate) can of course 
be tested against the fixed-effects specification which. does not make this 
presumption. However, as already noted, it seems improbable that such an assumption 
will be accepted by the data used in the current study. 
An alternative approach is to estimate the fixed-effects model (6.8) and recognise that 
the Sts include unmeasured industry heterogeneity as well as the inefficiency of 
interest. The separate determination of these individual industry intercepts can then be 
ascertained by suitable specification of an industry level equation including controls 
to correct for the remaining industry heterogeneity. In this fashion, the direct impact 
of conflict on efficiency can also be identified. This is therefore the methodological 
approach adopted in this chapter. 1., 
Thus estimation takes place in two distinct stages. The first involves estimating the 
production frontier (6.8) suitably augmented by time-varying variables to correct for 
the observed differences between industries, together with various indicators of strike 
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activity23. The positive (negative) sign of the coefficient on the stoppages variables 
indicates whether the position- of the, frontier for industries which are, relatively strike 
prone is outside (inside) that for industries which incur relatively little strike action 
and thus reveals that strike prone industries-have higher (lower) productivity. The 
analysis of this issue forms the basis of the results reported in section 6.4. 
The individual industry intercepts Si =a-u; thereby obtained include unobserved 
industry heterogeneity together with the estimate of the inefficiency of the industry in 
terms of its distance from the production frontier. Hence, while. equations (6.9) and 
subsequently (6.6) could be, used to generate estimates of the absolute efficiency as 
exp(-u1), the preferred strategy is to interpret the bis as indicators of relative efficiency 
only. The impact of conflict activity in the determination of relative efficiency can 
then be identified by regressing these bis on a vector of industry characteristics which 
seem likely to be important factors , in determining industry productivity and 
efficiency, including measures of strike activity. Section 6.5 reports the results of this 
exercise. S 
Having described at some length the advantages inherent in the frontier approach, 
particularly when a panel of industries is available, the next sub-section describes in 
detail the data to be used in this study. S 
6.3.2. Data Description. 
The data used in this chapter are compiled from a variety of sources. Firstly data on 
employment, output A and industrial concentration are drawn from the Census of 
Production for 3-digit manufacturing industries2. This source is supplemented by 
various measures of industrial stoppages taken from the Department of Employment's 
23. This represents a direct extension of Knight (1989) who performs a similar analysis but with a single cross 
section and estimating a productivity equation. 
24.1 would like to thank Paul Geroski for mating these data available. 
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Industrial Stoppages Data Tapes. Presently, these tapes are -not available for 1981 or 
beyond, 19842S and thus for the purposes of the thesis, it was decided to restrict 
attention to the 1970s for which consistent information is obtainable on the 1968 
Standard Industrial Classification for both sources. This. decade is important 
historically and forms rather a distinct period when compared to. the preceding and 
subsequent decades. -The: 1970s- are.. -often - claimed toi have laid many of the 
foundations for Britain's poor economic performance and the depth of recession 
witnessed in the early 1980s. In addition, the - 1970s, began with, a peak in strike 
frequency, and was a period in which strike activity was at historically high levels; if 
conflict is important in determining either productivity or efficiency, then it seems 
most likely to be a factor in a period when it was so prevalent..: 
4. - 
Figure 6.1 graphs the time-series for average productivity26 and total strike frequency 
for the 114 3-digit manufacturing industries for which information is available from 
the Census of Production for the period 1970 to 197927. The general improvement in 
labour productivity over the early part of the decade is marred by the downturn 
following the 1973 oil price shock, and a full recovery toý 1973 levels is only just 
made by the end of the decade. The trend in strikes in the manufacturing sector 
closely follows the trend in the series for all industries and services. seen in chapter 2, 
and displays a decrease of over 50% from the peak year of 1970. The cross-section 
relationship between output and strike activity at the industry level is depicted in 
figure 6.2, which shows (log) aggregate productivity (scaled to have a mean of 100) 
against per capita strike frequency, both averaged over the decade for each industry. 
Clearly there is no evidence of any direct association between the two measures at 
25. There has been some recent progress with respect to the provision of the tapes for 1981 and it is hoped that 
data for this year and the further provision of data beyond 1984 will soon be made available. 
26. This is computed as output per head deflated by the implicit price index, and indexed to 1970 = 100. 
27. There are in fact 122 3-digit industries but 8 industries are not covered (or not separately identified) in the 
Census of Production. 
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this level of aggregation, although this. is not the ceteris paribus comparison between 
strikes and output that is of central interest. -, - .. --.; 
This panel of 114 industries over 10 years is used in section 6.4 below to investigate 
the impact of strikes on output and productivity at the industry level. For the 
evaluation of the determinants of efficiency a number of additional sources have been 
used to generate variables to control for other differences in industry characteristics. 
Data on male, female, full-time and part-time employment was derived from the June 
1973 Census of -Employment, while information relating to the occupational 
breakdown of employment and wages comes from the 1973 New Earnings Survey. 
These are used in section 6.5 together with industM-Invel summary statistics derived 
from the Census of Production in order to identify the determinants of industry 
efficiency. 
6.4. Output, Productivity and Conflict Activity. 28 
The dependent variable for the stochastic production frontiers estimated in this 
section is (the logarithm of) net output deflated by the implicit price indexes Factor 
inputs are the capital stock (KS) and level of employment (EMP) both entered in 
logarithms. Full data are only available for 98 of the 114 3-digit manufacturing 
industries covered by the Census of Production30. Finally, the central question of 
interest, whether output is adversely affected in industries with high levels of conflict 
activity, is examined by including a vector of measures of strike activity. These are 
defined in the Appendix, table A6.2 which also includes some summary statistics. 
28. The analysis of this section of the chapter was carried out using Limdep (Greene (1990,1991)). 
29. An immediate departure from previous analyses is made at this juncture since typically a productivity equation 
is estimated. Here, emphasis is focussed on production (output) frontiers; the concept of a productivity frontier has 
little intuitive appeal. 
30. The reasons for the 16 omissions are detailed in the Appendix to this chapter, table A6.1. 
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Estimates for the basic fixed-effects production frontier as specified by equation (6.8) 
are presented in table 6.1, column 1. The first co I ncern is over the' functional 
specification and this has been tested in a number of ways. Kmenta (1967) suggests a 
simple (approximate) test of the Cobb-Douglas specification over the more general 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) formulation: To second order, the latter can 
be written äs 'the basic Cobb-Douglas pröduction function plus an' additional 
I term 
(1nKS -1nEMP)2, the coefficient of which will be zero when' the elasticity of 
substitution is unity as in the Cobb-Douglas case (see, for example, Heathfield 
(1971)). A test of this hypothesis cannot be rejected by the data (x2(i) = 2.08) and 
thus a Cobb-Douglas production frontier would seem to be an appropriate description 
of production technologies in the manufacturing sector in Britain in the 1970s. 
Furthermore, and as shown in the table, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
cannot be rejected either, and the relative sizes of the employment and capital 
elasticities do not seem unreasonable for manufacturing as a whole. Finally, a 
Hausman (1978) test of the random' effects specification over this fixed-effects model 
is soundly rejected by the data. This is of little surprise; there are excluded systematic 
differences between industries which affect productivity and'thus the assumption of 
independence of regressors and disturbances is unlikely to be satisfied for these data. 
Hence the fixed-effects model is the appropriate specification. 
The estimates in column 2 incorporate time-effects to control for any systematic 
fixed-effects across time including economy-wide cyclical fluctuations. These are 
clearly collectively significant (as seen by a LR or, equivalently, an F-test against 
column 1). However, the estimated elasticities are fairly robust to their inclusion, and, 
once again, the 'assumption of Cobb-Douglas technology is not rejected by the data 
against a CES production function. Finally, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
is again not rejected. 
It seems probable that the production frontier might not be stable over the whole 
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decade given the. important economic and institutional. changes, in, the period. A full 
treatment of this consideration is presented at the bottom of, table 6.1. The most 
obvious candidate for a structural break is around the oil price shock of 1973/4 and 
this possibility has been investigated in two ways. Firstly, to examine whether there 
were changes in. the elasticities of factor inputs, -. a dummy variable taking value one 
for observations from. 1974-1979 was constructed. For column 1, this was included 
along with its interactions with the capital and labour variables, , while 
for column 2 
which includes time-effects, only the interactions were included to avoid 
multicollinearity. These additional terms are collectively significant for both columns; 
the relevant F-statistic. is given in the table as ELASTICITY together with its 5% 
critical value (CV) in parentheses immediately below. More specifically, it is 
apparent that the elasticity of output with respect to capital fell after 1973, while that 
for labour was insignificantly different from its value over the early part of the decade 
(as was the -overall intercept in column 1 which reflects- the mean efficiency in 
production). This may reflect the fact that a proportion of the capital stock became 
obsolete following the oil crisis or alternatively, may be a consequence of more 
general shifts in production across industries . (and/or time, when considering 
column 2). . 
This latter possibility was investigated by estimating the model specified by 
equation (6.8) separately over 1970-73 and 1974-79 thus allowing the intercepts as 
well as the elasticities of factor inputs to differ. Formal (Chow (1960)) tests for 
structural stability are presented at the bottom of table 6.1 (CHOW) and clearly these 
reject the null hypothesis of parameter stability over the decade31. Finally, estimating 
separate equations over the two time periods can be compared with only allowing the 
elasticities to vary as in the ELASTICITY test described above. This is equivalent to 
31. One caveat is that this test is conditional on homoskedasticity of the disturbances across the two sample 
periods. However a variance-ratio test (also included in the table as V-RATIO) rejects this hypothesis and thus the 
conclusion with regard to structural change should be treated with caution. 
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holding the industry-effects (and, for column 2, time-effects) constant.: This is 
recorded in the table as INTERCEPT and, once again, the null hypothesis of stability 
is resoundingly rejected by the data. (The final combination would be to allow the 
intercepts to vary but test whether the elasticities are constant over time. Since this 
would involve, increasing the number of parameters in the 'model by over, one 
hundred, this strategy was considered to ; be less efficient than the modification 
suggested below). -1--" 
The other potential candidate for a structural break arises from previous work on the 
cyclicality of strikes reported in section 3.4 above. A discernable trough in detrended 
monthly industrial production can be identified in October 1975, and consequently the 
1970s fall fairly evenly into two distinct cycles; the first from November 1971 to 
October 1975 with a peak in June 1973 and the second from October 1975 to March 
1981 with a peak in August 1979. Thus the sample period was split at 1975/76 and a 
similar analysis was performed to that described above for the structural break at 
1973114. Parameter stability is again rejected by the data on all tests, and the 
significant change in the elasticity of output with respect to the capital stock input is 
still evident. 
The finding of non-stability in the production function estimates is perhaps not very 
surprising; industrial production tends to be strongly cyclical and there were several 
major economic fluctuations during the decade. Moreover, not all industries will be 
equally affected, nor will they react to movements in the cycle at the same time. Thus 
it should be expected that both the industry and time fixed-effects will differ over the 
decade. That the elasticities also differ is of more concern since it suggests that there 
were fundamental changes in the production technology over the period of interest. 
However, it should be noted that the Cobb-Douglas specification is not rejected 
against the CES formulation for any of the sub-periods considered, and that, despite 
the change in the elasticity of capital (which, although significant, is typically less 
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than a_5%. fall in. numerical=value); -sconstant returns to scale is never rejected in any 
sub-period:, . v, . r... ; '- ,fE. t... ... ", 11, ,_, _-.. ,, 
,. 'i .,.. 
One possible correction to minimise the effects of any (cyclical) instability in the 
parameters of the production function is to control for cyclical changes at the industry 
level. A cyclical variable: (CYCLE) was-constructed as'the rate of growth of gross 
output (or equivalently, the change in the logarithm of the-index of production), and 
included the estimating equation32. The results are reported in column. 3 of table 6.1; 
clearly CYCLE is strongly significant although the magnitudes of the- elasticities are 
reasonably robust-to the. inclusion of this extra variable. However, the tests for 
structural change reported at the bottom of the table still indicate structural instability 
for the factor! elasticities ý and the intercepts across both of the sample divisions 
investigated above. In particular, there is evidence of a statistically significant fall in 
the capital 'elasticity 'in the second sub-period (although this is again of negligible 
magnitude). The hypothesis' of a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production 
function cannot be rejected however, and this provides further support for the basic 
functional specification selected and represented by the estimates in column 3. 
The principal purpose of this section of the chapter is to examine the effect of strikes 
on output. Column 4 of table 6.1 includes a variable recording the number of strikes 
in each industry in each year (STRIKE), scaled by a factor of 10-3 to facilitate 
presentation of the results. This term is insignificant, and remains so when a non- 
linear formulation is considered as in column 5 which includes a quadratic term 
(STRIKE2). A similar finding is obtained in a crude dynamic specification presented 
in column 6 which additionally includes the level of strike activity in the previous 
year (STRIKE., ). Thus, at first sight, that these measures of strikes are never 
separately or collectively significant would indicate that there is no discernable net 
32. Note that this should not be endogenous; the dependent variable is (the log of) net output, suitably deflated. 
Obviously, one year of data is 'lost' in the construction of this variable. 
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effect of strikes on output in British manufacturing industry33. This finding, is 
unaffected by whether or not the time-effects are included in the specification; and 
thus only the estimates which ' include the time fixed-effects (which are always 
collectively significant) are reported in table 6.1. The production frontier parameters 
are robust to the inclusion of the strikes variables and the hypothesis of constant 
returns to scale still cannot be rejected by the data. 
It is of some interest to consider the trend in the mean growth of TFP throughout the 
period ý under consideration. This can be investigated in two ways; firstly by 
examining the time fixed-effects in a two-way model as considered above, and 
secondly, in one-way model, to include an appropriate polynomial in time and 
calculate the derivative at the median time period, say. For the specification in 
table 6.1, column 4, the estimated time-effects for each year are as follows: 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
-0.0184 0.0289 0.0554 0.0173 0.0031 -0.0240 -0.0549 -0.0222 0.0150 
One problem with the interpretation of these coefficients is that they are constrained 
to sum to zero (to avoid perfect multicollinearity with the industry fixed-effects). 
Thus, only 'relative' TFP growth rather than an 'absolute' growth interpretation is 
really possible. It can be seen that, in general, TFP was increasing in the early 1970s 
(relative to the mean), but that its rate of growth fell from 1973, and was negative 
from 1976 to 1978 inclusive. This accords roughly with what might be expected given 
the 1973 oil shock and other major trends in economic activity in the period. 
The alternative method of estimating TFP growth is to omit the time fixed-effects and 
include a quadratic in time. The coefficient estimates for the remaining variables in 
the model are fairly robust to this strategy and are therefore not reported. The 
. However, this result may be due to substitution in production between firms as discussed in section 6. Z and 
thus there may still be significant effects at the plant or establishment level. However, such effects cannot be 
identified with the data utilised here. 
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coefficients on the quadratic yield a, time-path for TFP which is monotonically 
decreasing for the period 1971 to 1979, and is almost linear. The median time is 
t= 1975, and this yields an average TFP growth for production industries through the 
1970s of -0.42%, i. e. just under one half of one percentage point per year. The range 
is from -0.32% in 1971 to -0.54% in-1979. Note, however, that the coefficients on 
the time variables are rather poorly determined, and thus these estimates should be 
treated with some caution. In particular, the inverted U-shape temporal pattern in TFP 
growth evident in the time-effects presented above is not apparent, and a test of the 
restrictions implied by the quadratic against the freely estimated time-effects as above 
is soundly rejected by the data (x2(7) = 69.46). Thus the two-way model remains the 
favoured specification. -_ 
As discussed in chapter 2, strike frequency is but one dimension of strike activity. 
With regard to, their impact on industrial production, the number of strikes as 
considered above may not be the relevant measure of conflict activity: Thus table 6.2 
presents estimates of the cyclically adjusted production frontier augmented by 
grouped measures of. strike frequency disaggregated, by the number of workers 
involved (SIZE), by strike duration (DUR), and by the number of days lost (DLOST). 
These variables are grouped because the exact size, duration, and days lost for each 
strike are not recorded on the Department of Employment Industrial Stoppages Data 
Tapes, but are categorised into several (typically 10-12) divisions. The variables 
included are broad amalgamations of these classes to reduce the sparseness of the data 
matrix when disaggregated by 3-digit industries. Hence, for each dimension of strikes, 
three categories have been chosen for inclusion (Small, Medium, and Large, or Short, 
Medium and Long, arbitrarily defined), the value that-each takes therefore being the 
number of strikes of that size, duration or days lost which were recorded for each 
industry in each year. A full description of the variables is provided in the Appendix, 
table A6.2. 
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The results from incorporating these, three additional dimensions of strikes are 
reported in table 6.2, columns 1 to 3. It can be seen that the inclusion of measures of 
strike size, duration and days lost are collectively insignificant in every case when 
compared to table 6.1, column 334. Each of the specifications considered is data 
acceptable against the more general alternative as represented by the CES production 
frontier, and the finding of constant returns to scale is robust to the addition of these 
extra variables. Finally, the random effects model is also rejected against the fixed- 
effects estimates presented in the table. Of course, the insignificance of these 
additional strike dimensions is consistent with both a negligible impact of conflict at 
the firm level (and in aggregate at the industry level), or large disruptions at the firm 
level 'which are 'smoothed out' by other firms in the same industry through 
substitutions in production. 
This second possibility is investigated in the following manner. If strikes are prevalent 
in the general industrial category to which the 3-digit industry belongs, then the 
opportunities for substitution in production may be curtailed. Furthermore, there may 
also be indirect' negative spillover effects due to interruptions elsewhere in the 
production chain. Thus a variable recording the number of strikes elsewhere in the 2- 
digit industry group to which the 3-digit industry belongs was constructed (SPILL) 
and included in the production frontier specifications. The results are reported in 
columns 4 to 6 of table 6.2. As can be clearly seen, SPILL is never significant at 
conventional levels, either in current or lagged form, with or without the inclusion of 
lagged strike frequency in the 3-digit industry. In addition, the position of the 
production frontier is hardly changed by these alternative specifications of the vector 
34. Although a high frequency of short duration strikes (DUR S) has a significantly negative impact on output, 
when considered together with the other measures of duration, they are again collectively insignificant 
(X2(3) - 6.72). 
35. In addition, disaggregating the total number of strikes by cause into pay and non-pay strikes had little effect; 
neither variable was individually significant, and collectively their inclusion was easily rejected by the data in a 
variable addition test. 
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of measures of strikes. One obvious weakness here is the omission of some proxy for 
the degree of competition in the industry: --- -r 
The strike variables used in the specifications above are all -aggregate measures of 
strike frequency. As argued in chapter 4 in particular, this may not be the appropriate 
criterion and the level of strike incidence may be- more suitable. In particular, the 
number of strikes may be relatively unimportant for' output if each of these strikes 
affects relatively few workers; a more relevant measure of the level of conflict may be 
the number of strikes per employee. Thus for each of the specifications reported in 
tables 6.1 and 6.2 which include measures of strikes, the model was reestimated using 
strike incidence rather than strike frequency. The results of this exercise- are reported 
in table 6.3. The only column for which the strikes variables are significant is 
column 5 which disaggregates the number of strikes according to their durations. 
Those industries which incur a large number of short strikes (of-1 day or less) per 
employee (DUR S) have their output significantly: reduced. This result seems 
intuitively plausible; frequent short interruptions to production are likely to be 
disruptive and may indicate generally poor industrial -relations within the industry. 
Moreover, if startup costs are high, short strikes may be as costly for output as more 
lengthy disputes. The mean of DUR 
_S 
is small however, and thus the magnitude of 
this effect is fairly negligible. 
Taking these findings together with the results presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2 for 
strike frequency, the central conclusion of this section of the chapter is that strikes 
have little or no net impact on output at the 3-digit industry level. Whether they affect 
the efficiency at which each individual industry operates is investigated in the next 
section. 
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6.5. Efficiency and Conflict Activity. 36, 
The industry intercepts from the production frontier estimates presented in section 6.4 
can be recovered from equation (6.8) as 
bi = Ec(Yic - ß'RitYF, i=1,..., N (6.10) 
These 61s represent the unobserved differences between industries together with a 
measure of their inefficiency- in the utilisation of factor inputs as the 'distance' ui 
inside the production frontier. If industries were homogeneous in terms of the quality 
of labour and capital 4 inputs, the degree of competition they faced, the scale of 
production and so, on,, then the bis would be pure inefficiency parameters, and the 
level of (technical) efficiency could be calculated using equations (6.9) and (6.6). 
However, there are clearly industry level differences which have not been accounted 
for in the ý simple production frontier estimates presented in section 6.4 and hence 
these need to be adequately controlled for before an investigation of the relative 
efficiency -of each industry can be conducted. While a wide, variety of industry 
characteristics have been'utilised in the specifications reported below to correct for 
the unobserved heterogeneity, it should be noted that some of these factors will also 
be important determinants of efficiency. However the primary objective of this 
section is the investigation of the ceteris paribus impact of the level of conflict 
activity on industry level efficiency. 
The postulated relationship between conflict and efficiency can be represented as 
s; =e'z; +Y'S+W; . (6.11) 
where Zi is a vector of industry characteristics and Si is a vector of measures of strike 
activity37, - with possible interactions between the Z; and Si variables. Positive 
36. The analysis of this section of the chapter utilises Microfit (Pesaran & Pesaran (1991)) and Limdep (Greene 
(1990,1991)). 
37. Note that equation (6.9) has not first been used to derive measures of absolute efficiency from the bi since this 
would then entail estimating an equation whose dependent variable was constrained to lie in the interval (0,1]. 
Although this is feasible, it necessarily implies further assumptions about the distribution of the disturbance term 
wi and this was considered undesirable in the present context. The model represented by equation (6.11) is, in fact, 
a model of b, (efficiency), and in this sense is not linear, but log-linear despite its apparent functional specification. 
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coefficients-in the, vectors,, of parameters 0 andy indicate a positive impact on (log) 
efficiency since each of the bi is negatively correlated with the industry's inefficiency.. 
The first set of Z variables control for various plant and company- level factors. 
Differences in the size of, plants are captured by SIZE, which measures the average 
size of plants above the median size, as -a proportion of domestic productions 
Its 
impact on efficiency is indeterminate a priori since returns to scale maybe increasing 
or decreasing in large plants. Differences in the labour input between industries are 
measured by the proportion part-time (P_PT), the proportion female (P_FE) and the 
proportion of operatives (POPS). A more flexibly employed workforce may yield 
opportunities for greater efficiency in the use of factor inputs and labour hours can 
more easily be adjusted where part-time employment is commonplace. The 
proportion - of operatives is included as a proxy for the degree of . supervision and 
bureaucracy. Where most employees are engaged in the productive process, this may 
be because supervision is remote, or because those in management are sufficiently 
competent- that -few supervisors are needed. Thus its net impact on efficiency is 
indeterminate. 
The second set of variables control for wider industry-level differences in 
performance and the degree of competition within the industry. The average 
(logarithm of the) capital to labour ratio (MKL) over the decade is included to capture 
any capital-labour substitution made in response to union wage and strike effects. The 
average 5-firm concentration ratio (MCONC) reflects the degree of competition in the 
market facing the industry and thus acts as a proxy for the pressure on, the industry to 
perform efficiently, while AS records the advertising intensity in the industry, 
commonly used as a proxy for barriers to entry. Finally, a variable measuring average 
growth over the decade (MCYCLE) is included to capture the differences in 
38. Five industries have no data available for this variable and hence are dropped from the subsequent analysis. 
259 
behaviour- that can be expected from industries which are expanding compared with 
those which are in decline. I 
The final set of variables of interest measure differences in unionisation and strike 
activity at the industry level. The proportion covered by collective agreements 
CA) may be expected to have a negative impact if unions are detrimental to 
efficiency as suggested by much of the US literature, while if unions are a spur to 
greater X-efficiency, this variable should enter with a positive coefficient. The mean 
number of strikes over the decade (MSTR) is also hypothesised to have an effect; 
while in section 6.4, strikes were seen to have a negligible impact on industry output, 
they may still affect industry efficiency. The direction of the effect will depend 
crucially on which of the two alternative models of union behaviour described in 
section 6.2 above is most appropriate for these data. 
Table 6.4 presents estimates of the model represented by equation (6.11)39. The 
dependent variable is the industry fixed-effects derived from the results in table 6.1, 
column 6. This represents the estimate of the remaining industry heterogeneity plus 
inefficiency parameter ui, corrected for cyclical deviations and differences in the level 
of strike activity40. Column 1 controls for the various plant and company level factors 
which are likely to be important determinants of output and efficiency. As 
hypothesised above, larger plants do tend to be less efficient, while those employing 
more part time workers are relatively more efficient4l. There would appear to be no 
net impact of the proportion of the workforce who are operatives. These results are 
robust to the inclusion of the second set of variables as shown in column 2, and the 
latter are not individually nor collectively significant at conventional levels 
39. Summe statistics for the explanatory variables are presented in the Appendix, table A6.3. 
40. The results reported below were little changed by utilising bis derived from other columns of table 6.1. 
41. p PT is highly correlated with the proportion female P 
-FE 
(r = 0.825) and so the latter was dropped from the 
estimating equation. 
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OA4) = 4.58). Column 3 includes the unionisation and strike variables. The estimated 
coefficients on these variables are 'statistically' significant ' and' have their expected 
signs. Highly unionised industries tend to be less efficient as do those with' high levels 
of strike activity. 
In order to test the hypothesis that union presence has its impact through collective 
action, column 4 considers interactions of the level of strikes with the proportion of 
the workforce covered by collective agreements and plant size. The importance of 
size for union productivity differentials was emphasised by Machin (1988) while the 
relationship between size and strike activity is well established in the preceding 
chapters of the thesis. While these four additional variables are not collectively 
significant (X2(4) = 6.74), it can be seen that high levels of strike activity in industries 
with high union density serves to detract from the lower levels of efficiency that tend 
to result from the presence of either of these two indicators of unionism. Unions also 
tend to generate less negative efficiency effects in large plants (contrary to the finding 
of Machin (1988) for his sample of engineering firms), although these joint terms are 
not individually significant. These findings are' consistent with the Harvard school 
view of unions as beneficial institutions which alleviate grievances through the 'voice' 
rather than the 'quit' mechanism and can shock management into achieving lower 
levels of X-inefficiency42. 
6.6. Time-Varying Technical Inefficiency. 
In the approach considered in section 6.5 above, the estimated fixed-effect for each 
industry is treated as an indicator of the industry's inefficiency. However, this 
assumes that technical inefficiency is time-invariant and that relative inefficiencies 
42. For completeness, the model was also estimated using measures of average strike incidence (i. e. strikes per 
employee) rather than average strike frequency. The results are qualitatively similar to those presented in table 6.4 
although they are not as statistically significant and the interactions effects between strikes and unionism are not 
identified. 
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between industries are unchanging. Both of these assumptions are far from innocuous 
and are clearly rather unsatisfactory. However, two recent papers have taken the panel 
frontier production literature a stage further by specifying models which, for the first 
time, allow for time-varying inefficiency. These are Kumbhakar (1990) and Cornwell 
et al (1990). The former depends rather heavily on distributional assumptions for 
technical and allocative inefficiency in a manner similar to that utilised in the single 
cross-section frontier literature. The latter, however, follows a similar methodology to 
that of Schmidt & Sickles (1984) and thus complements the results in section 6.5 
above. While retaining the advantages of the panel nature of the data (in particular, 
once again not requiring the assumption of independence between factor inputs and 
inefficiency), Cornwell et al allow for technical inefficiency to be time-variant by 
specifying it as a polynomial in time. Thus output and efficiency can now vary over 
both industries and time. Efficiency measurement focuses on the cross-sectional 
variation and the model allows efficiency levels to vary over time. Conversely, the 
measurement of productivity growth focuses on the temporal variation, and the model 
allows the rate of productivity growth to vary across industries. Once again, the 
measures of efficiency are calculated relative to an industry which is deemed to be 
100% efficient. However, in this new specification, the relatively most efficient 
industry can differ for each time period under consideration. 
Thus while the elasticity estimates are identical to those in table 6.1 and table 6.2, the 
estimates of efficiency for each industry are allowed to change over time. The 
mechanics of this exercise are quite simple; essentially the residuals from the panel 
estimates for each industry are regressed on a constant, time and time-squared. The 
fitted values from this regression form a consistent estimate of bit that is consistent as 
T tends to infinity (see Cornwell et al (1990), p. 192)). Finally, the frontier intercept at 
time t, D. is given by 
Dt = max(6i) for t =1,..., T (6.12) 
where maximisation takes place over i=1,..., N, and the industry-specific estimate of 
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technical inefficiency for industry i at time t is 
. 13) nicý fit' (6.13) 
Full details are provided by Cornwell et al (1990). 
The results from this exercise are quite interesting. For the basic specification in 
column 4 of table 6.1, for almost all industries, the estimated efficiency is broadly 
increasing and then decreasing through the 1970s, despite the presence of the time 
fixed-effects43. Considering first the temporal variation (that is, making comparisons 
within industries through time), for most industries, efficiency peaks in 1973 or 1974, 
although there are a few exceptions in which efficiency is monotonically decreasing 
throughout the 1970s44. 
The industries which were assigned to be 100% efficient according to equation (6.12) 
form an extremely disparate group, and include SIC 216 (Sugar) for both 1973 and 
1974 and SIC 366 (Electronic Computers) for 1977-1979. When compared to these 
industries, the average relative efficiency level in each year varies between 54% and 
93%, with an average for the nine years of around 80%. The temporal variation in 
average relative efficiencies is as follows: 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
75.05 81.93 88.95 90.75 90.78 92.62 80.74 67.07 54.48 
Note that the relative peak appears in 1976. This is not inconsistent with the remark 
above that, when comparisons are made within industries, the relative peak for most 
industries is in 1973 or 1974. The implication is that efficiencies are most similar 
between industries in 1976 and hence relative efficiencies are greatest in this year. 
43. That is, over and above the aggregate trends discussed in section 6.5, individual industries also display the 
same inverted U-shaped movement in TFP. 
44. This finding is even more pronounced if a cubic polynomial is used to describe the time-varying inefficiency, 
although estimating 4 regression coefficients from only 9 observations for each industry is perhaps rather 
ambitious, especially given that the dependent variable is only a residual. 
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6.7. Summary and Conclusions. 
This chapter has examined two very distinct effects of unions. Firstly, using a panel of 
3-digit manufacturing industries for the 1970s, strikes are seen to have a negligible 
net impact on output. A crude attempt was made to investigate whether this was the 
result of output substitution by othecfirms in the industry not affected by strike action 
or was an indicator that strikes have little impact at the firm or establishment level. 
The spillover effects were not significant, although the level of aggregation used is 
probably rather high to identify such microeconomic effects. Indeed, while this is the 
most disaggregated study undertaken to date for the UK, the analysis may yet be 
flawed by being at too high a level of aggregation. 
The second empirical part of the chapter investigates the impact of unions on 
economic efficiency, using strikes as a proxy for active unionisation, rather than 
passive unionisation as recorded by collective bargaining coverage. The impact of 
unions on (technical) efficiency is unambiguously negative. Firstly, there is an effect 
through union presence as recorded by the proportion covered by collective 
agreements, and secondly, through the use of strike action. These both serve to reduce 
the level of efficiency at which the industry operates. Interactive effects are also 
considered, and the detrimental impact of unions on efficiency is seen to be smaller in 
large unionised plants. This may possibly be an economies of scale effect. Finally, in 
industries where both union coverage and strike activity is high, the negative impact 
of unions on efficiency is again ameliorated. One possible interpretation of this 
finding is that only in situations in which there is overt union activity is management 
sufficiently 'shocked' into improving managerial slackness and X-efficiency. 
In conclusion, the costs of strikes would seem to be negligible at the 3-digit level for 
British production industries in the 1970s. However, there is some evidence to 
suggest that the consequences of high levels of strike activity are experienced in terms 
of (technical) inefficiency and that this impact is not simply a result of high' union 
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presence at the industry level. Given the severity of the recession in the early 1980s 
and the changing patterns in unionisation, it will be of some considerable interest to 
replicate the current study for the 1980s when the data become fully available. 
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Table 6.1 
Panel Data Estimates: Basic Production Frontier 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
CONST - -0.9631 -0.9734 -0.9736 -0.9584 -0.9580 
(0.2968) (0.3120) (0.3122) (0.3128) (0.3130) 
In(EMP) 0.5854 0.6166 0.5461 0.5463 0.5365 0.5366 
(0.0474) (0.0584) (0.0597) (0.0598) (0.0609) (0.0610) 
1n(KS) 0.4066 0.4496 0.4967 0.4967 0.4993 0.4992 
(0.0371) (0.0544) (0.0574) (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0576) 
CYCLE - - 0.5492 0.5491 0.5511 0.5509 
(0.0525) (0.0526) (0.0526) (0.0527) 
STRIKE - - - -0.0722 0.9680 0.9620 
X10-3 (0.8218) (1.4548) (1.4595) 
STRIKE2 - - - - -0.0144 -0.0142 
X10-3 (0.0166) (0.0170) 
STRIKE4 - - - - - -0.0419 
X10-3 (0.7242) 
Time NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummies 
Diagnostics 
NxT 98x10 98x10 98x9 98x9 98x9 98x9 
lnL 218337 274.188 351.097 351.098 351.603 351.605 
R2 0.8741 0.8877 0.9099 0.9099 0.9100 0.9100 
Test for Constant Returns to Scale 
a+ 0.9920 1.0662 1.0429 1.0431 1.0358 1.0358 
(0.0655) (0.0635) (0.0660) (0.0661) (0.0666) (0.0667) 
Tests for Structural Change 
Structural Break at 1973/74 
ELAS ICI 9.15 5.38 3.93 
CV (2.60) (3.00) (3.00) 
CHOW 5.37 4.93 3.81 
CV (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) 
V-RATIO 1.20 1.37 1.71 
CV (1.19) (1.19) (1.23) 
INTERCEPT 5.02 4.42 3.50 
CV (1.24) (1.23) (1.23) 
Structural Break at 1975/76 
ELASTI CI 4.41 3.88 5.18 
CV (2.60) (3.00) (3.00) 
CHOW 4.35 4.87 4.90 
CV (1.24) (1.24) (1.24) 
V-RATIO 1.47 1.30 1.20 
CV (1.19) (1.19) (1.20) 
INTERCE 4.21 4.41 4.39 
CV (1.24) (1.23) (1.23) 
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Notes: 
1. Only fixed effects estimates are presented. The random effects specification is rejected 
by Hausman tests for every column in the table (results not reported). 
2. Standard errors are given in italicised parentheses. 
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Table 6.2 
Panel Data Estimates: Other Dimensions of Strike Activity 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 Column 5 Column 6 
CONST -0.9962 -0.9025 -0.9704. . -0.9536 -0.9518 -0.9440 (0.3128) (0.3130) (0.3114) (0.3132) (0.3135) (0.3150) 
In(EMP) 0.5539 0.5394 0.5450 0.5432 0.5430 0.5413 
(0.0601) (0.0598) (0.0602) (0.0600) (0.0600) (0.0604) 
1n(KS) 0.4959. 0.4884... . 0.4969 0.4972 
0.4972 0.4974 
(0.0574) (0.0574) 
_ 
(0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0576) 
CYCLE 0.5527 0.5530 0.5479 0.5542 0.5537 0.5528- 
(0.0526)- (0.0525) (0.0527) (0.0529) (0.0530) (0.0531) 
SIZE S -0.6632 - - - - - 
X10-J, (1.5145) 
SIZE M 3.4505 - - - - - 
X10-1 (2.4020) 
SIZE L, -1.7948 - - - - - 
X10-j" (1.9070) 
DUR S - -7.2043, - - - - 
X10-J, (3.3012) 
DUR M - 1.9150 - - - - 
x10-T (1.7410) 
DUR L - 0.1248 - - - - 
X10-j" (1.2692) 
DLOST S - -0.4528 - - - _ X10-3 (1.3424) 
DLOST M - - 0,7650 - - - _ X10-3 . (2.0280) DLOSTL - - -0.2558 - - - 
X10-3 _ (2.4647) 
STRIKE - - - 0.0091 0.0377 0.0288 
X10-3 (0.8274) (0.8400) (0.8411) 
STRIKE-1 - - - - -0.1428 -0.1135 
X10-3 (0.7092) (0.7178) 
SPILL - - - -0.2632 -0.2608 -0.2519 
X10-3 (0.3085) (0.3089) (0.3108) 
SPILL 
-1 - - - - - -0.0690 X10-3 (0.2528) 
Time YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dummies 
Diagnostics 
NxT 98x9 98x9 98x9 98x9 98x9 98x9 
InL 352.533 354.458 351.236 351.549 351.576 351.638 
R2 0.9102 0.9106 0.9099 0.9100 0.9100 0.9100 
Test for Constant Returns to Scale 
ac + 1.0498 1.0278 1.0420 1.0404 1.0402 1.0387 
(0.0663) (0.0662) (0.0664) (0.0662) (0.0662) (0.0665) 
Notes: 
1. See table 6.1. 
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Table 6.4 
The Impact of Unionisation and Strike Activity on Efficiency 
Column 1 Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
CONST -0.186 -0.073 1.678 3.399 
(0.690) (0.684) (0.738) (1.074) 
SIZE -0.647 -0.872 -0.302 -5.778 
(0.319) (0.325) (0.261) (3.286) 
PT P 3.620 3.989 1.902 1.505 
_ (1.582) (1.784) (1.468) (1.402) 
POPS 0.050 -0.340 -1.125 -1.517 
(0.852) (0.872) (0.855) (0.831) 
MKL - 0.006 -0.079 -0.099 
(0.077) (0.069) (0.071) 
MCONC - 0.353 0.070 0.128 
(0.386) (0.331) (0.351) 
AS - 2.651 1.484 2.062 (2.727) (2.615) (2.394) 
MCYCLE - -4.329 -5.949 -5.835 (2.728) (2.504) (2.408) 
P CA - - -0.700 -2.342 - (0.310) (0.786) 
MSTR - - -0.028 -0.176 (0.007) (0.069) 
P CA*SIZE - - 6.196 (3.499) 
MSTR*SI - - - 0.211 (0.248) 
P CA*MS - - 0.174 (0.081) 
P CA*MS - - - -0.246 
*SIZE (0.273) 
Diagnostics 
N 93 93 93 93 
InL -97.10 -94.81 -82.26 -78.89 
R2 0.128 0.170 0.366 0.410 
Notes: 
1. Heteroskedastic consistent standard errors in parentheses. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6 
Table A6.1 
Omitted 3-digit Industries 
i ti l Cl c d d on ass fi a ustria In 1968 Standar 
SIC Classification Key 
213 Biscuits + 
311 Iron and Steel (General) +# 
312 Steel Tubes # 
313 Iron Castings etc # 
333 Pumps, Valves and Compressors % 
334 Industrial Engines + 
335 Textile Machinery and Accessories + 
338 Office Machinery + 
349 Other Mechanical Engineering n. e. s. 
365 Broadcasting & Sound Reproduction Equipment 
369 Other Electrical Goods 
370 Shipbuilding and Marine Engineering # 
381 Motor Vehicle Manufacturing 
385 Railway Carriages and Wagons and Trams 
395 Cans and Metal Boxes % 
396 Jewellery and Precious Metals % 
399 Metal Industries n. e. s. % 
417 Hosiery and Knitted Goods 
461 Bricks, Fireclay and Refractory Goods 
484 Manufacturers of Paper and Board n. e. s. # 
485 Printing, Publishing of Newspapers # 
486 Printing, Publishing of Periodicals 
494 Toys, Games, Prams and Sports Equipment # 
499 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Enterprises # 
Key Identification 
* not available from Census of Production 
+ Index of Output figures not available 
# Capital Stock figures not available 
% Net Output figures not available 
Thus 8 industries have no data at all from the Census of Production (coded * in 
table A6.1), and a further 16 are missing vital series for the current analysis. This 
leaves a total of 98 industries from the 122 SIC 1968 3-digit manufacturing industries 
observed over the 10 years 1970 to 1979, a total of 980 observations. 
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Table A6.2.. 
Panel Datar Variable, Descrition and Summary Statistics %- 98 3-digit Industries 1970-1979 
Variable Measures of Strike. Activity: Levels Mean S. D. 
STRIKE Strike Frequency 9.42 13.36 
STRIKE2 Strike Frequency squared 266.94 997.62 
SIZES 99 > Number of Workers Involved . 4.10 6.68 SIZE 
-M 
100 < Number of Workers Involved < 249 2.26 3.45 
SIZE 
_L 
250 < Number of Workers Involved 3.06 4.57 
DUR 
-S 
Duration 1 day or less 1.19 2.26 
DUR 
_M 
Duration 2,3 or 4 days 3.29 4.69 
DUR_L Duration 5 or more days 4.93 7.53 
DLOST S 499 > Days Lost 4.69. 7.35 
DLOST M 500 < Days Lost < 2499 3.03 4.34 
DLOST_L 2500 < Days Lost - 1.70 2.83 PAY Number of Pay Strikes 6.09 8.85 
NONPAY Number of Non-pay Strikes 3.33 5.10 
SPILL Nunber of Strikes elsewhere in 2-digit Parent Industry 48.64 45.31 
Measures of Strike Activity: Per Capita 
STR_PH Strikes per head 0.173 0.158 
STR_PI-n Strikes per head squared 0.055 0.110 
SIZES 99 > Number of Workers Involved- 0.074 0.082 
SIZE 
-M 
100 < Number of Workers Involved < 249 0.042 0.054 
SIZE L 250 < Number of Workers Involved 0.057 0.070 
DUR 
-S 
Duration 1 day or less 0.021 0.038 
DUR 
_M 
Duration 2,3 or 4 days. 0.062 0.068 
DUR L Duration 5 or more days 0.089 0.093 
DLOST S 499 > Days Lost 0.085 0.094 
DLOST M 500 < Days Lost < 2499 0.057 0.062 
DLOST L 2500 < Days Lost - 0.031 0.044 PAY Number of Pay Strikes 0.113 0.116 
NONPAY Number of Non-pay Strikes 0.060 0.067 
SPILL Number of Strikes elsewhere in 2-digit Parent Industry 1.719 2.168 
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Table A6.3 
Industry Data: Variable Description and Summary Statistics"" 
93 3-digit Industries 1970-1979 
Variable Description Mean S. D. 
SIZE Average plant size above median size 0.217 0.216 
P PT Proportion part-time 0.084 0.052 
P ff Proportion female 0.358- 0.214 
POPS Proportion operatives 0.733 0.096 
MKL Mean (log) capital: labour ratio 1.884 1.017 MCONC Mean (5-firm) concentration ratio 0.478 0.240 
AS Advertising: sales ratio 0.016' 0.023 
MCYCLE Mean growth rate of output 0.007 0.032 
P CA Proportion covered by collective agreements 0.748 0.185 
MSTR Mean strike frequency 9.772 12.404 
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Average Productivity and Total Strike Frequency: 1970-1979 
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CHAPTER 7 
Summary and Conclusions 
7.1. Introduction. 
This final chapter of the thesis presents a summary of the main findings and brings 
together the results from the preceding analyses in section 7.2. The chapter briefly 
concludes in section 7.3 with a discussion of some of the implications for any future 
work in the economic analysis of industrial conflict in Britain. 
7.2. A Summary of the Major Findings. . 
The "overview of the theoretical and - empirical literature presented in chapter 2 
highlights the central issues that provide the motivation for much of the work in the 
thesis. Many of the'issues raised have long frustrated economists and researchers in 
industrial relations in their endeavours to describe and - explain industrial conflict. 
Given the recent advances in the, quality and quantity of micro-level data, it is the 
improved response to these difficulties that provides justification for the thesis. While 
acknowledging the weaknesses in the aggregate strike statistics published by the 
Department of Employment, it should still be emphasised that these provide the only 
consistent source of information on industrial conflict in Britain over any reasonable 
time period. On examination, the various dimensions of strikes measured by the 
Department of Employment are shown to be either overly sensitive or insensitive to 
particularly large strikes; while the numbers of workers involved and the number of 
days lost tend to reflect only the major disputes in any year, the statistics for strike 
frequency give such strikes equal weight as minor stoppages which just satisfy the 
minimum size criteria used. There seems no satisfactory solution to this dilemma with 
these data. However, the recent surveys of workplace industrial relations can provide 
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an alternative' source of data on industrial conflict, and one which records rather 
different dimensions of conflict- activity. ' Clearly; when 'used in'conjunctiori with'the 
strikes data from the Department of Employment, ' these mic'r'o-level surveys can 
provide much needed additional breadth to the study of conflict behaviour. 
The overview of the many theories of strike ' activity 'shows thät'most'äre'derived from 
North American studies, ' and are therefore' arguably inappropriate for'the system of 
industrial relations that pertains in Britain. In particular, ' notions of fixed-term 
contracts have only very weak counterparts in employment arrangements in Britain. 
Despite this and several other important differences in bargaining structures, many of 
the studies of British strike activity have used these models as the basis for their 
empirical work. Time-series studies of aggregate strike frequency dominate the 
literature, despite, or perhaps because of the relative insensitivity of this dimension of 
conflict to' major disputes. Many studies date from the 1970s, and there is therefore 
typically little econometric evaluation of the results obtained. Moreover, most models 
fail to take account of the changing volume of bargaining activity by neglecting to 
deflate the statistics for the number of strikes by a suitable measure of the 'population' 
size. 
The thesis recognises these limitations and argues for a more appropriate 
methodological approach which encompasses broader definitions of conflict than 
simply the number of strikes, and provides for more disaggregated studies in which 
the sectoral diversity in conflict can be investigated. Thus the central objective of the 
thesis is to investigate the various dimensions of conflict and their interrelationships, 
while only loosely attempting to encompass previous theoretical work. There would 
appear to have' been little previous study in this area, and much of it is rather 
unsatisfactory. 
In order to reinforce the argument for such an approach, the first substantive empirical 
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chapter, ` chapter 3, reexamines two of the most often cited aggregate econometric 
models of strike frequency in Britain. It is shown that these are fundamentally 
misspecified in a number of ways and thus the conclusions that are drawn in these and 
similar studies should be viewed with some caution. In particular, they are unable to 
forecast satisfactorily, even when given sympathetic treatment in terms of model 
specification. This would appear to be primarily due to the reversal in the trend in 
strikes after 1970. The chapter then turns to the central issue of the procyclicality of 
strikes that these aggregate econometric models often claim to demonstrate. Using the 
Bums-Mitchell NBER methodology for analysing business cycles, it is shown that 
while the total number of strikes is only very loosely related to the cycle, strikes 
arising over the level of remuneration bear a much closer correspondence with the 
level of economic activity. Of course, this finding accords with many of the 
theoretical models that have been proposed for strike activity. The number of strikes 
in the coal industry is seen to follow a completely different pattern however. The 
implications are that future aggregate econometric models should focus on non-coal 
wage strikes while concentrating on specifications that include only a single 
concurrent measure of the cycle; the proliferation of cyclical indicators in many of the 
previous studies has served to occlude the evident cyclicality in strike frequency. The 
chapter concludes with an examination of a 'cyclical-political' model of strikes which 
is seen to perform reasonably satisfactorily over the whole of the post-war period, a 
result that the 'econometric' models have been unable to achieve. The impact of the 
reforms in labour legislation which have been introduced in the 1980s, and which 
have had particular relevance for the ability of unions to call for strike action, is also 
examined at this juncture. 
One of the central conclusions drawn from the examination of the literature in this 
area in chapter 2 is that the emphasis on strike frequency is rather inappropriate. This 
is most starkly illustrated by the fact that while aggregate strike frequency fell by 
almost 25% between 1980 and 1984, the incidence of strikes at the establishment 
i 
279 
level as recorded by the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys actually increased by 
45%. Thus the substantial fall in -strike, frequency witnessed since 1970 does-not 
necessarily imply that conflict is less prevalent; the increasing concentration of unions 
by successive amalgamations and the fall in union density since- 1980 will have both 
served to reduce the number of strikes recorded by the Department of Employment 
even if the underlying level of conflict in the economy was unchanged. Thus it may 
be more appropriate to examine the determinants of strike incidence- rather than strike 
frequency, and it is this issue that forms the basis of the second substantive empirical 
chapter, chapter 4. Models for the incidence of conflict activity among manual 
workers in private sector establishments are estimated using the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Surveys of 1980 and 1984. Changes in the incidence of conflict are seen to 
be predominantly the result of changes in behaviour between the two years rather than 
changes in the composition of establishments, although the time scale is admittedly 
rather short for compositional changes to have impacted on the level of industrial 
conflict. However, this finding does contrast with that of Stewart (1991) who 
concludes that the small change in the union wage differential between the two years 
is attributable entirely to compositional changes, in particular, the shift away from the 
manufacturing sector. and the downward shift in the size distribution of 
establishments. As a subsidiary theme, the relationship between overt conflict activity 
(strikes) and lesser forms of grievance activity (go-slows, overtime bans, work-to- 
rules) is also investigated explicitly in this chapter. Strike action and non-strike 
activity are shown to be complementary forms of expression of industrial unrest at the 
establishment level, rather than being substitutes as some have argued. There is also 
some weak evidence in support of some 'switching' from (relatively costly) strike 
action to (cheaper) non-strike activity between the two survey dates. 
The next chapter, chapter 5, investigates the distinctions between public and private 
sector strike activity. While the raw incidence and frequency levels appear to be much 
higher in the public sector, there are a number of differences between the public and 
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private sector that act to make strikes more likely in the public sector. The most 
obvious influential characteristic is plant size which has been shown in many previous 
studies to be positively related to the likelihood of strike action. Given that public 
sector establishments, tend to be bigger, on -- average, than private sector 
establishments, then one would expect the public sector to experience higher levels of 
strike activity. Thus the primary purpose of chapter 5 is to estimate the ceteris paribus 
differences in strike probabilities between the public and private sectors utilising both 
the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys and the Department of Employment's 
Industrial Stoppages Data Tapes. The findings indicate that much of the divergence in 
recorded strike activity between the two sectors is a consequence of differences in 
their characteristics, and that variations in the incidence of conflict are typically not 
significant at conventional levels. Moreover, while it is apparent that the public sector 
exhibits a higher incidence of strikes per establishment, each of these strikes tends to 
be shorter and involve fewer workers and therefore results in fewer days being lost 
than during strikes, in the private sector. This chapter highlights the need to take 
account of the sectoral diversity in strike activity and, moreover, to suitably adjust 
raw incidence and frequency statistics for the differences in employment and union 
membership in order that appropriate comparisons can. be made. 
Chapters 3,4 and 5 focus attention on the significance of considering disaggregated 
measures of strikes (such as pay strikes) together with the importance of the 
relationship between strike frequency and strike incidence and the related issue of 
non-strike activity. The final substantive chapter, chapter 6, looks at some of the 
effects of strikes and, in particular, at their impact on industrial output and efficiency. 
The data used are a 3-digit panel of production industries in the 1970s drawn from the 
Census of: Productionl. -The structure of the model 
is novel in that a production 
frontier is estimated without having to assume an explicit functional form for the 
1. The intention is to extend this analysis to the 1980s once the 1981 Industrial Stoppages Data Tape becomes 
available. 
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(one-sided) inefficiency component. This formulation has a number of benefits and is 
due to the availability, of a panel of data in which the fixed effects can be viewed as 
capturing both the inefficiency term as well as the industry specific component. A 
second stage estimation is then used to examine the determination of the magnitude of 
the inefficiency parameter. While strikes do not appear to significantly reduce output 
in aggregate, there is some., evidence to suggest. that those industries which incur a 
large number of short strikes ý do have their output significantly disrupted. This is a 
similar result to that found by Knight (1989) , in his examination of a single cross- 
section of production industries in the late 1960s. The loss of output also serves to 
make these industries less efficient in general, over and above their lower efficiency 
resulting from higher levels of unionisation. Ultimately, it would be of interest to 
conduct a similar study at even finer levels of disaggregation since there is some 
suspicion that the real costs of strikes cannot be identified even at the 3-digit level. 
In sum, the findings of this essentially empirical work clearly illustrate the need for a 
wider perspective to be taken in the analysis of industrial conflict than has previously 
been the case for Britain. One major weakness of the extant studies is their estimation 
of models which are largely inappropriate given the system of industrial relations that 
exists outside North America. While the thesis does not address this problem directly 
by developing suitable alternative models, it does serve to establish further details of 
the patterns in industrial conflict that more appropriate theoretical models will need to 
encompass; the strong procyclicality in the number of wage strikes; the importance of 
institutional considerations; the trend towards fewer, but more extensive, stoppages; 
the sectoral diversity in conflict; the relationship between different forms of conflict 
activity; the costs and consequences of industrial action. and the impact of the 
changing patterns of unionism are all clearly issues that a satisfactory model of 
industrial conflict in Britain will need to address. 
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7.3. Conclusions. ,.... 
The collective bargaining process is fundamental to the operation of labour markets 
and the use of collective sanctions is an important factor in bargaining behaviour and, 
consequentially, in settlement outcomes. ' But conflict is costly, especially to the 
parties involved, and hence it is important to assess the motivations that lay behind 
both strike and non-strike action. Previous attempts to investigate industrial conflict in 
Britain have been marred by poor econometric models which concentrate mostly on 
strike frequency. The thesis argues for a change in the methodological approach to the 
study of conflict in Britain. The investigation of a number of different dimensions of 
industrial action using a variety of information sources would provide, a much more 
comprehensive and satisfactory picture of the nature and scope of conflict in Britain. 
I11ý" 
The conclusions of the research conducted in the thesis demonstrate that such an 
approach is now both feasible and beneficial. The results discussed in section 7.2 
above illustrate the importance of a more disaggregated, multi-dimensional approach 
to industrial conflict in Britain. 
ýi 
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